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Foreword 
The economies of China and of the Latin American and Caribbean region 
are the current global growth poles and, over the coming years, will grow 
twice or three times as quickly as the industrialized economies, which 
will have to adjust to slower growth and higher unemployment. 
The present juncture offers an opportunity to rethink global and 
regional partnership strategies and to put greater emphasis on South-
South ties in trade, foreign direct investment (FDI) and cooperation. 
In this document, the Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (ECLAC) posits that China and the Latin American and 
Caribbean region now enjoy a sufficiently mature relationship and are 
poised to make a qualitative leap towards a mutually beneficial strategic 
alliance. 
The Latin American and Caribbean countries must redouble their 
efforts to diversify sales to China, embedding more value and knowledge 
into their exports, and to stimulate business, trade and technological ties 
with their Chinese counterparts. They must also promote Latin American 
investments in the Asia-Pacific region in order to build the region's 
presence in Asian value chains, focusing on China. 
Trade and investment ties between China and Latin America and 
the Caribbean have continued to multiply. In 2010, the value of bilateral 
trade amounted to some US$ 200 billion and, during the last decade, the 
region was China's most dynamic trading partner. 
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Now a key trading partner for the region, China is already the 
largest importer of goods from Brazil and Chile, and the second largest in 
the case of Costa Rica, Cuba and Peru. It is also the third-largest source of 
goods imports for Latin America and the Caribbean, accounting for 13% of 
the region's imports. At the same time, the Latin American and Caribbean 
region has become a major destination for Chinese FDI. 
This publication looks at recent developments in trade between 
China and the Latin American and Caribbean region with respect to 
countries, sectors and goods, as well as Chinese FDI in the region. 
The analysis shows that while Chinese exports are composed 
principally of manufactured goods, Latin America and the Caribbean 
primarily exports raw materials. 
The Asia-Pacific region has entered a second stage of economic 
integration in which it is seeking a greater synergy between the de facto 
(market-driven) and de jure (government-driven) dimensions of this 
process. This integration process, based on trade and investment ties, and 
now also bolstered by trade agreements, would put Latin America and 
the Caribbean at a disadvantage if those recent trade agreements diverted 
trade flows away from the region, taking a toll on exports. The countries 
of the region must without delay adopt a strategy —incorporating trade 
agreements— for integration with Asia-Pacific. 
Despite the region's closer trade and investment ties with China, the 
quality of its trade integration into the global economy has not improved. 
The expansion of the sectors associated with natural resources has not 
boosted the development of new technological capacities in the region and 
the productivity gap with the countries that are considered to be at the 
forefront in that regard has widened. 
The region's trade relationship with China therefore presents both 
opportunities and challenges. One major challenge is to prevent the 
growing trade with China from reproducing and entrenching a centre-
periphery trade pattern in which China emerges as a new centre and the 
countries of the Latin American and Caribbean region as a new periphery. 
What is required, then, is progress towards trade relations that are more 
in keeping with the economic and social development patterns that this 
region needs. 
The region must tap this historic opportunity to make the 
investments in infrastructure, innovation and human resources needed 
to convert the gains derived from natural resources into human capital 
and international competitiveness. Higher levels of innovation and the 
endogenous development of technological capabilities should be promoted 
as a matter of urgency. 
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The political dialogue between Latin America and the Caribbean, 
the Asia-Pacific region and China must be institutionalized. The region's 
countries must recognize the importance of biregional trade and 
investment and adopt coordinated strategies, either between individual 
countries or as regional groupings, to strengthen trade and investment 
ties with the Asia-Pacific region. There is, however, a need for a more 
coordinated strategy among countries or groups of countries to create a 
link with China to invigorate trade and investment, and foster a variety 
of business and technological partnerships, using the impetus of Asian 
growth to stimulate the diversification of exports and spur the region to 
close the gap in relation to innovation and competitiveness. 
For years, ECLAC, through the Division of International Trade 
and Integration, has been monitoring and supporting activities aimed at 
strengthening economic relations between the two regions. ECLAC has 
participated in the five China-Latin America business summits that have 
been held and in various academic activities both in China and in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. 
This publication, which it is my pleasure to introduce, is an updated 
and more detailed version of several reports that ECLAC has prepared on 
the trade and investment ties between the Latin American and Caribbean 
region and the Asia-Pacific region. 
Alicia Bárcena 
Executive Secretary 
Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC) 
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Chapter I 
The principal characteristics and the economic 
and trading performance of China 
A. China is the main engine of global growth 
China has considerably increased its weight in the global economy in 
recent years. In terms of GDP measured at current prices, in 2010 the 
Chinese economy became the world's second-largest after the United 
States, having overtaken Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom and France. 
If GDP is measured in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, the country 
also ranks as the world's second-largest economy behind the United States. 
The Chinese economy accounted for over 8.6% and 12.6% of world GDP 
in 2009, at current prices and PPP, respectively. China accounts for half 
the combined GDP of the four countries known as the BRICs (Brazil, the 
Russian Federation, India and China). The size of the Chinese economy, at 
over US$ 5 trillion, already exceeds the combined GDP of all the economies 
of Latin America and the Caribbean. 
In the past 30 years, China has come close to achieving a two-digit 
average annual growth rate. In 2009, when the world was coping with the 
worst economic crisis in eight decades, the Chinese economy carried on 
growing at a rate of 9.1% and the country succeeded in consolidating its 
position as one of the leading actors in the world economy and the linchpin 
of the subsequent recovery. Continuing high growth in China was largely 
due to a huge raft of economic stimulus measures that were accompanied 
by a formidable expansion of credit (ECLAC, 2010a). 
1 6 E C L A C 
T a b l e 1.1 
G L O B A L G D P R A N K I N G O F T H E W O R L D ' S 15 L A R G E S T E C O N O M I E S , 
A T C U R R E N T P R I C E S A N D P U R C H A S I N G P O W E R P A R I T Y , 2 0 0 9 
(Billions  of  dollars  and percentages) 
Global G D P ranking 
(current  prices) 
Global G D P ranking 
(purchasing  power  parity) 
1 United States 14 256 24.5 1 United States 14 256 19.7 
2 Japan 5 0 6 8 8.7 2 China 9 104 12.6 
3 China 4 985 8.6 3 Japan 4 138 5.7 
4 Germany 3 347 5.8 4 India 3 752 5.2 
5 France 2 6 4 9 4.6 5 Germany 2 984 4.1 
6 United Kingdom 2 175 3.7 6 Russian Federation 2 687 3.7 
7 Italy 2 113 3.6 7 United Kingdom 2 257 3.1 
8 Brazil 1 572 2.7 8 France 2 172 3.0 
9 Russian Federation 1 4 6 0 2.5 9 Brazil 2 020 2.8 
10 Spain 1 336 2.3 10 Italy 1 9 2 2 2.6 
11 Canada 1 310 2.3 11 Mexico 1 5 4 0 2.1 
12 India 1 231 2.1 12 Spain 1 4 9 6 2.1 
13 Mexico 925 1.6 13 Republic of Korea 1 324 1.8 
14 Australia 875 1.5 14 Canada 1 2 8 0 1.8 
15 Republic of Korea 833 1.4 15 Turkey 1 0 4 0 1.4 
B R I C s 8 9 248 15.9 B R I C s 8 17 564 24.2 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
3 977 6.8 Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
6 062 8.4 
European Union 16 415 28.2 European Union 14 773 20.4 
World 58 133 100.0 World 72 537 100.0 
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI) [online] 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator, September 2010. 
a BRICs = Brazil, the Russian Federation, India and China. 
The Chinese economy is playing an essential role in sustaining 
global growth. With a growth rate of 10.4% for 2010 and 9.2% for 2011, 
China will continue to be the main driver of global growth. China by 
itself accounted for 28% of global GDP growth over the whole decade, 
measured at PPP. In 2009, China's contribution to GDP growth was 
close to 62% (see figure 1.1). If Chinese growth had been nil, the global 
economy would have shrunk by 2% and not 0.6%. Annual growth over 
the next five years is projected at between 8% and 9%. Thus, China will 
create a market of great potential for exports from the economies of Latin 
America and the Caribbean. 
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Figure 1.1 
CHINA AND INDIA: CONTRIBUTION TO WORLD GDP GROWTH, 2000-2009 
(Percentages) 
2 0 0 0 2001 ' 2002 2 0 0 3 20Ú4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 
India World (annual growth) 
• China 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
Figure 1.2 
CHINA: GDP BY MAIN EXPENDITURE COMPONENTS, 1998-2010 




2 0 0 0 2001 2002 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 ? 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2008 2 0 0 9 2010 
• Private-sector consumption Public-sector consumption Gross fixed capital formation 
^ Inventory changes Net exports 
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of official  information provided by the Chinese authorities 
and Economist Intelligence Unit, Country  Forecast  China,  October 2010. 
China has the lowest ratio of consumption to output of any of the 
world's 10 largest economies. Since before the crisis, the dynamism of 
the Chinese economy has relied primarily on investment as a driver of 
growth. Gross fixed capital formation accounts for some 40% of output, 
and in 2009 this percentage actually rose, owing to the strong emphasis 
18 ECLAC 
the economic stimulus package placed on infrastructure investment. The 
share of public-sector consumption increased to some 14% of GDP in 2010 
in consequence of the economic package, while the proportion of private-
sector consumption, in both urban and rural areas, held fairly steady 
at about 40%. This is why there is a general concern to see the Chinese 
economy rely more on consumption, limiting its current-account surpluses 
and thus contributing to a more balanced expansion of global demand. 
This is also one of the objectives of the economic stimulus package. The 
GDP share of net exports is expected to be very modest in the post-crisis 
era and indeed to decline, having stood at some 10% in 2008. 
Over time, the service sector has become one of the twin engines of 
Chinese growth. Despite the predominance of the secondary sector as a 
driver of growth, the contribution of the tertiary sector to output growth 
has begun to increase steadily. In the 2002-2008 period, the service sector 
contributed over 40% of Chinese GDP growth, a substantial figure that 
compares well with the 53% accounted for by the secondary sector (see 
figure 1.3). Furthermore, the contribution of services to output has been 
more stable than that of the secondary sector. Given the far-reaching 
globalization process China is currently going through, the importance of 
the sector as an engine of growth is likely to continue increasing. At the 
same time, its expansion should foster an economic development pattern 
driven more by private-sector consumption. 
Figure 1.3 
CHINA: CONTRIBUTION OF THE THREE SECTORS TO GROWTH, 
AT CONSTANT PRICES, 1990-2008 
(Percentage  points) 
14 
12 • -H-H-
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2 0 0 0 2001 2002 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2007 2008 
• Primary • Secondary Tertiary 
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of information from the National Bureau of Statistics of 
China, China Statistical  Yearbook,  2009, September 2009. 
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China has increased its per capita GDP tenfold in constant dollar 
terms over the last three decades. Economic growth has lifted over 
500 million people out of poverty, despite the worsening of the Gini 
coefficient in this period (World Bank, 2009), which reflects growing 
inequalities between the different regions of the country. 
One of the great challenges facing China is the need to change its 
growth structure. The most significant part of the twelfth Five-Year Plan 
for National Economic and Social Development (2011-2015) is that the main 
effort will be switched from supporting export-led sectors to fostering 
domestic consumer demand by raising workers' incomes so that the 
whole Chinese population can enjoy the benefits of globalization. This is a 
significant change for the country, and one that entails major challenges. 
Higher incomes would raise the cost of labour, which could have an impact 
on export-led sectors and feed through into inflationary pressures. Thus, 
China has ahead of it the major task of balancing inflationary threats with 
rising domestic demand, while also preserving the dynamism of export-
led sectors. 
To achieve this goal, it is necessary to improve the country's 
innovation capacity by providing incentives for the development of 
advanced manufacturing and services, without neglecting energy-saving 
practices and respect for the environment and the need to step up worker 
training. Both the eleventh and the twelfth five-year plans have given 
greater priority to improving infrastructure in rural areas than in urban 
ones, while also aiming to provide nine years' schooling for pupils living 
in the countryside (something that has already been achieved in the cities) 
and devote more resources to scientific research and development.1 
Given China's economic size, it is helpful to analyse its production 
and trade structure at the regional level. The country's GDP is unevenly 
distributed, with most originating in the coastal provinces and 
municipalities. Of the 31 provinces and municipalities, the combined 
regional output of Guangdong, Shandong, Jiangsu and Zhejiang accounted 
for 36% of the country's GDP in 2008 (see table 1.2). The regional output 
of Zhejiang province (US$ 309 billion at current prices), the fourth-largest 
of the country's 31 provinces and municipalities, is roughly the same as 
that of Argentina and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Similarly, 
Colombia's total GDP is roughly the same as that of Hebei and Henan 
provinces and Chile's GDP is 20% less than that of the municipality of 
Shanghai and the same as that of the municipality of Beijing. These figures 
also reveal the inequality of income, particularly between urban and rural 
areas and between the country's seaboard and its interior. 
1 Further details of the official Chinese position on the country's development strategy 
can be found in State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2010. 
Table 1.2 
CHINA: GROSS REGIONAL PRODUCT AND EXTERNAL TRADE, 2008 

















National total 4 716.0 2 563 .3 54 .4 1 430 .7 30 .3 1 132.6 24.0 
Beijing 151.2 271.7 179.7 57.5 38 .0 214.2 141.7 
Tianjin 91.6 80 .4 87.8 42.1 46.0 38 .3 41.8 
Hebei 233 .3 38 .4 16.5 24.0 10.3 14.4 6 .2 
Shanxi 100.0 14.4 14.4 9.3 9.3 5.1 5.1 
Inner Mongolia 111.9 8 .9 8 .0 3.6 3 .2 5.3 4 .8 
Liaoning 194.0 72 .4 37.3 42.1 21.7 30 .4 15.7 
Jilin 92 .6 13.3 14.4 4 .8 5.2 8.6 9.2 
Heilongjiang 119.8 23.1 19.3 16.8 14.0 6.3 5.3 
Shanghai 197.4 322.1 163.1 169.1 85 .7 152.9 77.5 
Jiangsu 436 .9 3 9 2 . 3 89 .8 238 .0 54 .5 154.2 35 .3 
Zhejiang 309 .7 211.1 68 .2 154.3 49 .8 56 .8 18.4 
Anhui 127.9 20 .2 15.8 11.4 8 .9 8 .8 6 .9 
Fujian 156.0 84 .8 54 .4 57.0 36 .5 27.8 17.8 
Jiangxi 93 .4 13.6 14.6 7.7 8 .3 5 .9 6.3 
Shandong 447.8 158.4 35 .4 93 .2 20 .8 65 .2 14.6 
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Henan 265 .3 17.5 6.6 10.7 4 .0 6 .8 2.5 
Hubei 163.3 20.7 12.7 11.7 7.2 9 .0 5.5 
Hunan 160.8 12.5 7.8 8 .4 5 .2 4.1 2.6 
Guangdong 514.5 6 8 5 . 0 133.1 405 .7 78.9 279 .3 54 .3 
Guangxi 103.4 13.2 12.8 7.3 7.1 5 .9 5.7 
Hainan 21.0 4.5 21.5 1.6 7.5 2 .9 14.0 
Chongqing 73 .5 9.5 13.0 5.7 7.8 3 .8 5 .2 
Sichuan 180.2 22.1 12.3 13.1 7.3 9 .0 5 .0 
Guizhou 48 .0 3 .4 7.0 1.9 4 .0 1.5 3.1 
Yunnan 82 .2 9.6 11.7 5 .0 6.1 4.6 5.6 
Tibet 5.7 0 .8 13.4 0.7 12.4 0.1 1.0 
Shaanxi 98 .7 8 .3 8.4 5.4 5.4 2 .9 3 .0 
Gansu 45 .8 6.1 13.3 1.6 3.5 4.5 9 .8 
Qinghai 13.9 0.7 5 .0 0.4 3.0 0.3 1.9 
Ningxia 15.8 1.9 11.9 1.3 7.9 0.6 3 .9 
Xinjiang 60 .6 22 .2 36.7 19.3 31.9 2 .9 4 .8 
SB d. 3 > 
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Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of information from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical  Yearbook,  2009, September 2009. 
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B. The key role of China in the global financial market 
China is a leading player not only in global production and trade, but in 
international finance too. China is playing a more and more important 
role in maintaining global economic balances. Its abundant supply of 
low-cost goods has helped to sustain high demand with low inflation in 
the developed countries, it is a provider of cheap savings to the United 
States, which has held interest rates down, and it has built up reserves 
by purchasing Treasury bonds, thus helping to finance the United States 
current-account deficit. 
China is currently the United States' largest creditor, having 
surpassed Japan in mid-2008. It owns some US$ 2.6 trillion of international 
reserves, equivalent to 27% of global reserves, which now yield some 
US$ 50 billion of interest a year. Thus, China has far outstripped Japan, 
whose US$ 990 billion of international reserves put it in second place. 
Any hint as to what China might do with its huge reserves therefore has 
immediate repercussions in international financial markets.2 Even as 
United States current-account deficits have trended downward in recent 
years, China has become the largest source of these deficits: the United 
States deficit in 2010 totalled US$ 470 billion, 65% of which (US$ 302 billion) 
was with China (see figure 1.4). 
China is a leading player in the international financial market, 
investing its voluminous savings abroad (for example, in United States 
securities). The Chinese State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), 
the body in charge of administering the country's international reserves, 
has actively invested in United States Treasury securities, holding a stock of 
US$ 884 billion at the end of September 2010, while its bond holdings in the 
euro zone countries were equivalent to US$ 630 billion at the end of May 
that year (Oakley and Anderlini, 2010).3 Before the European financial crisis 
broke out, there were doubts as to whether the Chinese central bank would 
carry on buying United States Treasury bonds in large amounts and the 
United States authorities were concerned about the possible withdrawal of 
Chinese investors from these markets. In fact, Chinese investors tended to 
withdraw from European markets in the first half of 2010 and turn to those 
of the United States and, to a much lesser degree, Japan (ECLAC, 2010a). 
2 Nothing reveals this better than the words used by the United States Treasury Secretary, 
Timothy Geithner, to sum up the purpose of his visit to China in early June 2009: 
"Chinese officials are giving United States efforts to prime its ailing economy a vote of 
confidence and understand why higher budget deficits are necessary." 
3 Chinese holdings of United States Treasury bonds have tended to decline since mid-
2009, having peaked at US$ 939 billion in July of that year. China increased its holdings 
dramatically during the financial crisis, from US$ 618 billion in September 2008 to the 
above figure by July 2009. 
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Figure 1.4 
UNITED STATES CURRENT-ACCOUNT DEFICIT WITH CHINA, 
BY QUARTER, 1999-2010» 
(Millions  of  dollars) 
2 5 0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 0 0 
150 0 0 0 
Other countries • China 
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of information from the United States Department of Commerce. 
a The figures for the fourth quarter of 2010 are preliminary. 
Short- and long-term United States debt securities held by China 
(US$ 1.5 trillion) represented 15% of the total (US$ 9.7 trillion), putting the 
country in first place ahead of Japan (United States Treasury, 2010). The 
2010 report on foreign portfolio holdings of United States securities states 
that, as of 30 June 2009, foreign holdings of United States securities totalled 
US$ 9.7 trillion, of which US$ 2.2 trillion were United States equities 
and US$ 6.3 trillion were United States long-term debt securities (with 
US$ 1.3 trillion being asset-backed securities and US$ 2.5 trillion non-
asset-backed securities). In relative terms, China held a particularly large 
share of the debt of the United States mortgage agencies Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, which also have an implicit guarantee from the United States 
Government (see table 1.3). 
As part of the diversification process, SAFE has bought into 
a number of foreign companies. In 2008, for example, it purchased 
minority shareholdings in large firms such as Rio Tinto, Royal Dutch 
Shell, BP, Barclays, Tesco and RBS. In 2009, purchases of firms abroad 
intensified: during the first half, 65 acquisitions were made for a total 
of US$ 14.7 billion, while in the second half there were 101 acquisitions 
totalling US$ 18.8 billion. These acquisitions were conducted mainly 
by State firms operating in the natural resource sector in Australia and 
Canada and on the African continent (such as CNPC, CNOOC, Sinopec, 
Chinalco and Baosteel). Furthermore, China Investment Corporation, 
which manages sovereign funds worth US$ 300 billion, has a mandate to 
invest its enormous Chinese reserves abroad. 
Table 1.3 
UNITED STATES: VALUE OF SECURITIES, EQUITIES AND LONG-TERM DEBT, BY MAJOR INVESTING COUNTRIES 
OR TERRITORIES AND SECURITY TYPES, JUNE 2009» 









Long-term agency debt 
Asset-backed other 
securities" 
Long-term corporate debt 




C h i n a 1 1 462 .7 76.4 757.1 357.6 96 .5 2.4 12.8 159.9 
Japan 1 269 .6 181.6 6 4 6 . 0 95 .7 123.4 40.0 114.2 68 .8 
United Kingdom 812.8 278.5 54 .4 7.4 8 .3 53.1 387.7 23 .3 
Cayman Islands 6 4 9 . 8 226 .9 19.1 33 .3 9 .2 105.8 182.7 72 .8 
Luxembourg 586 .2 136.9 51.8 13.6 9.6 34 .5 259.1 80 .6 
Belgium 429 .2 16.6 14.7 0.7 14.1 48 .8 326 .6 7.8 
Middle East exporting 
countries" 352 .8 109.3 122.9 15.1 6 .8 10.0 20 .8 67.9 
Ireland 3 4 8 . 0 59.6 17.5 18.1 15.6 45.1 76.7 115.2 
Canada 339.1 241.6 15.9 1.2 2.6 7.8 57.6 12.4 
Switzerland 328 .2 129.7 55 .5 4 .8 9.6 18.5 71.2 38 .9 
Netherlands 232 .6 127.7 13.4 15.3 2 .0 15.4 46 .0 12.8 
Hong Kong (SAR of China) 220 .5 27.3 58 .8 51.3 11.7 3 .9 14.8 52.7 
Bermuda 199.4 38 .9 18.3 24.7 14.1 20.9 55 .3 27.2 
Taiwan Province of China 194.3 11.2 111.6 36 .6 19.7 0.4 12.1 2.7 
Germany 182.1 44 .5 41.7 4.4 2.6 18.8 59 .8 10.3 
Brazil 155.7 1.4 109.0 0 .0 2 .2 0.0 2.7 40 .3 
Table 1.3 (concluded) 
Total long- Long-term Long-term agency debt Long-term corporate debt 
• Total short-
term debt 










Russian Federation 149.8 0.2 84 .6 0 .0 2 .0 « 0.2 62 .9 
Singapore 145.2 72.7 31.5 2.7 1.9 5.5 19.3 11.5 
France 138.8 80 .5 13.8 1.0 1.5 15.5 21.0 5 .5 
Norway 118.9 73 .3 5.3 7.9 0 .8 8.6 17.0 6 .0 
Unidentified country 114.5 2 .0 0.0 0 .0 0.1 0.0 100.3 12.0 
Republic of Korea 113.0 7.6 36 .4 26 .9 25 .4 2.1 7.6 7.0 
Australia 105.6 60 .2 6.4 2 .2 4.7 2 .8 21.4 7.9 
British Virgin Islands 82 .5 36 .0 5.7 0 .9 1.0 2.3 17.8 18.7 
Mexico 80.7 9.1 23.7 0.1 23 .3 1.7 9 .0 13.8 
Rest of world 881.1 196.6 287.0 30 .6 35 .8 33 .8 86 .5 210.9 
Total 9 693 .2 2 246 .3 2 602 .2 752 .3 444 .5 497.8 2 0 0 0 . 3 1 149.8 
China share of total 
(percentages) 15.1 3.4 29.1 47.5 21.7 0.5 0.6 13.9 
s> cr. 3 > 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United States Department of the Treasury, "Preliminary report on foreign 
holdings of U.S. securities at end-June 2009", Press  Release,  No. tg568, February 2010. 
Long-term debt securities have an original maturity of more than one year. 
Securities issued by agencies and asset-backed securities, known as ABS, are backed mainly by mortgages. Corporate ABS are backed by a wide variety of assets, 
such as auto loans, credit card receivables, mortgages, commercial loans and student loans. 
Excludes Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China and Macao Special Administrative Region of China, which report separately. 




The large quantity of reserves held by the Chinese authorities 
has driven a number of investment initiatives in Latin America, in the 
areas of infrastructure and natural resources (this is analysed in more 
detail in chapter II). The influx of reserves is also giving the central bank 
an incentive to turn the yuan gradually into a new reserve currency to 
replace the dollar. In April 2009, for instance, Argentina and China signed 
a currency swap agreement for 70 billion yuan (US$ 10.2 billion) so that 
the Argentine Government could pay for Chinese imports in yuan. The 
purpose of this scheme is to ensure that trade operations continue to be 
settled smoothly in the event of international illiquidity. This initiative 
follows other examples, not just of accords signed between central banks 
in industrialized countries, such as those of the United States Federal 
Reserve with the European Central Bank, the Bank of England and the 
Central Bank of Japan, but also of others such as the one signed between 
the Central Bank of Brazil and the Central Bank of the Republic of Korea. 
China has entered into similar accords with a number of Asian economies 
such as Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China, Indonesia, 
Malaysia and the Republic of Korea. 
The intention is for the Chinese currency, the yuan renminbi (RMB), 
to have a more international role, but it is still not "internationalizing". The 
RMB has quickly gained a higher profile in the banking system and in 
trade since the implementation of a pilot programme for the settlement of 
cross-border trade transactions in mid-2009 (State Council of the People's 
Republic of China, 2010, pp. 42-44). The programme began operating in 
Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Dongguan with 365 firms 
and has expanded not only to 20 provinces and four municipalities, but 
also to markets in Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China, 
Macao Special Administrative Region of China, the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and some countries in the Middle East. 
Yuan-denominated cross-border trade transactions totalled US$ 7.4 billion 
in the second quarter of 2010, twice the figure for the first quarter of the 
same year. This amount is still very small when set against the country's 
total trade (goods exports and imports) of US$ 2.2 trillion in 2009. 
There is still a long way to go before the yuan becomes an 
international currency, and the process will be very gradual. It is estimated 
that when this happens and the currency becomes fully convertible, 
operating with a stable financial system and reliable prudential provisions, 
the RMB could become an international currency in Asia and beyond, 
potentially accounting for between 3% and 12% of the reserves held by all 
the world's central banks by 2035 and surpassing the share of the Japanese 
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yen and the British pound sterling (Lee, 2010). For the yuan to be a fully 
convertible currency, the Chinese authorities would have to develop a 
much more effective financial system and abolish exchange-rate and 
capital-account controls (Lee, 2010; Dobson and Masson, 2009). 
The evolution of the Chinese currency has done little to facilitate 
the process of adjustment in the external imbalances of the United States. 
Following a relaxation of the yuan exchange rate in July 2005, the currency 
had appreciated by some 20% as of November 2010. The "China bloc" 
of currencies is considered to be undervalued by some 40% against the 
dollar. A correction of this exchange-rate imbalance would increase the 
exports and reduce the imports of the United States and lower its trade 
deficit by between US$ 100 billion and US$ 150 billion a year (Bergsten, 
2010). However, a revaluation of China's and most of the Asian countries' 
exchange rates would not be enough to stabilize the trade imbalance of the 
United States within a sustainable range. 
C. Steady growth in Chinese inward and outward 
foreign direct investment 
Despite a fall-off in flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) into China as a 
result of the crisis, the country remains very attractive to foreign investors. 
The crisis affected FDI inflows into China, which fell by 12% in 2009 from 
their 2008 level. However, the country continues to attract a substantial 
amount of FDI, equivalent to US$ 95 billion a year (see table 1.4). The share 
of world FDI going to China has continued to rise, so that in 2009 it stood 
at 8.5% of the global total. China absorbs a third of FDI flows to Asia and 
Oceania and about 20% of flows to developing countries. 
The FDI received by China from the three main sources (ASEAN, 
Japan and the Republic of Korea) has risen enormously, particularly since 
the country joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. These 
three sources accounted for an average of about 14% of total FDI in 2007 
and 2008, a considerable figure, given that: (i) around 4% and 6% of total 
FDI during the period came from North America and the European Union, 
respectively; (ii) the share originating from Taiwan Province of China was 
2%; and (iii) 42% of the FDI entering China comes from Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region of China by triangulation (see figure 1.5). In fact, 
the ASEAN countries are a major source of FDI for China, although the 
bulk of the FDI flows into the country originate in Singapore (between 
US$ 3 billion and US$ 4 billion a year). 
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Table 1.4 
CHINA: SHARES OF GLOBAL INWARD AND OUTWARD FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT (FDI), 1995-2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 AND 2009 
(Millions  of  dollars  and percentages) 
1995-2005 
(annual  average) 2006 2007 2008 2009 
(Millions  of  dollars) 
Annual inflows 
China 48 833 72 715 83 521 108 312 95 000 
India 4 137 20 328 25 001 40 418 34 613 
Asia and Oceania 123 886 284 426 338 226 374 639 303 230 
Developing economies 211 470 434 366 564 930 630 013 478 349 
World 741 045 1 459 133 2 099 973 1 770 873 1 114 189 
(Percentages) 
China 6.6 5.0 4.0 6.1 8.5 
India 0.6 1.4 1.2 2.3 3.1 
Asia and Oceania 16.7 19.5 16.1 21.2 27.2 
Developing economies 28.5 29.8 26.9 35.6 42.9 
World 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
(Millions  of  dollars) 
Annual outflows 
China 3 820 21 160 22 469 52 150 48 000 
India 1 021 14 285 17 233 18 499 14 897 
Asia and Oceania 54 314 154 013 225 550 204 344 176 795 
Developing economies 79 351 228 691 292 147 296 286 229 159 
World 717 852 1 410 574 2 267 547 1 928 799 1 100 933 
(Percentages) 
China 0.5 1.5 1.1 2.9 4.3 
India 0.1 1.0 0.8 1.0 1.3 
Asia and Oceania 7.6 10.6 10.7 11.5 15.9 
Developing economies 11.1 15.7 13.9 16.7 20.6 
World 100.0 96.7 108.0 108.9 98.8 
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World  Investment  Report  2010. 
Investing  in a Low Carbon  Economy  (UNCTAD/WIR/2010), Geneva, July 2010. United Nations publication, 
Sales No.: E.10.II.D. 
The second-largest source of FDI is Latin America and the Caribbean, 
which contributed a quarter of the total invested during 2007 and 2008 
(see figure 1.5). However, almost the entirety (99%) of this investment 
originated in the British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands, which are 
tax havens. In reality, FDI flows into China from Latin America and the 
Caribbean are very small. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit 
(EIU, 2008), the eight Latin American countries studied have accounted for 
less than 0.1% of the FDI going to China in recent years, with a total of 
between US$ 70 million and US$ 80 million a year. Argentina, Brazil, Chil
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and Mexico are the Latin American countries that invest most in China. 
The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Colombia and Peru also invest in 
the country, albeit more sporadically and on a smaller scale. 
Figure 1.5 
CHINA: DISTRIBUTION OF INWARD FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI), 
BY COUNTRY AND REGION, 2007 AND 2008 
(Percentages) 
Other ASEAN 
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of information from the National Bureau of Statistics of 
China, China Statistical  Yearbook,  2009, September 2009. 
FDI in China is concentrated in the coastal provinces. The final 
destinations of FDI in China by provinces and municipalities reflect the 
geographical distribution of GDP: the coastal provinces and cities are 
the largest recipients, with the exception of Hunan province.4 In 2009, 
the seven leading destinations (Hunan, Shanghai, Shandong, Liaoning, 
Zhejiang, Guangdong and Jiangsu) absorbed almost two thirds of inward 
FDI in China (see table 1.5). 
Having been one of the main recipients of FDI during the past two 
decades, China has recently started investing abroad. Although the crisis 
reduced China's outward F DI in 2009, it is still one of the main developing-
country investors. The country's outward FDI share was 4.3% of the world 
total that year, a considerable jump from the 2008 figure of 2.9%. In 2009 it 
maintained a level close to the previous year's, at US$ 57 billion, of which 
Hunan province contains the Chenzhou export processing zone, whichhas been developing 
since its creation in 2005 as one of China's leading export processing zones in high-
technology fields such as information technology, precision machinery and new materials. 
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US$ 47.8 billion was non-financial sector investment (see table 1.5). This 
meant that China was not far behind Japan (US$ 75 billion) and Germany 
(US$ 63 billion) and was ahead of the Russian Federation (US$ 46 billion) 
and Italy (US$ 44 billion). The investment stock of Chinese non-financial 
firms abroad was US$ 200 billion (more than twice the 2006 figure), 
of which US$ 52 billion and US$ 48 billion were invested in 2008 and 
2009, respectively. As of late 2009, some 12,000 Chinese firms had 13,000 
subsidiaries in 177 countries. The turnover of these Chinese subsidiaries 
abroad was US$ 164 billion, of which US$ 51 billion was in the form of 
exports. These subsidiaries employed 970,000 workers, 438,000 of whom 
were of Chinese origin (MOFCOM, 2010). 
Table 1.5 
CHINA: GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF INWARD AND OUTWARD FOREIGN 
DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI), NON-FINANCIAL SECTOR, 2009 
(Millions  of  dollars) 
Inward FDI in China Chinese outward FDI 
Position Province Amount Percentage Position Province Amount Percentage 
1 Hunan 10 163 10.8 1 Shanghai 1 209 12.6 
2 Shanghai 9 875 10.4 2 Hunan 1 006 10.5 
3 Shandong 9 093 9.6 3 Guangdong 923 9.6 
Qingdao 1 100 1.2 Shenzhen 414 4.3 
4 Liaoning 8 808 9.3 4 Jiangsu 851 8.9 
Dalian 4 275 4.5 5 Liaoning 758 7.9 
5 Zhejiang 7 821 8.3 Dalian 464 4.8 
Ningbo 2 902 3.1 6 Shandong 704 7.3 
6 Guangdong 7 739 8.2 Qingdao 105 1.1 
Shenzhen 3 622 3.8 7 Zhejiang 702 7.3 
7 Jiangsu 6 978 7.4 Ningbo 211 2.2 
8 Jilin 3 384 3.6 8 Beijing 452 4.7 
9 Shanxi 3 258 3.4 9 Fujian 366 3.8 
10 Fujian 3 108 3.3 Xiamen 124 1.3 
Xiamen 1 216 1.3 10 Shanxi 333 3.5 
11 Beijing 3 058 3.2 11 Jilin 298 3.1 
12 Yunnan 2 700 2.9 12 Yunnan 270 2.8 
13 Sichuan 2 609 2.8 13 Shanxi 225 2.3 
14 Tianjin 1 880 2.0 14 Hebei 220 2.3 
15 Inner Mongolia 1 853 2.0 15 Tianjin 210 2.2 
16 Henan 1 783 1.9 16 Xinjiang 181 1.9 
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Table 1.5 (concluded) 
inward FDI in China Chinese outward FDI 
Position Province Amount Percentage Position Province Amount Percentage 
17 Xinjiang 
Production and 
1 523 1.6 17 Inner Mongolia 155 1.6 
Construction 
Corps 
18 Heilongjiang 121 1.3 
18 Hebei 1 515 1.6 19 Henan 121 1.3 
19 Shaanxi 1 323 1.4 20 Sichuan 107 1.1 
20 Heilongjiang 1 294 1.4 21 Guangxi 82 0.9 
21 Hubei 1 095 1.2 22 Hainan 61 0.6 
22 Hainan 745 0.8 23 Anhui 58 0.6 
23 Guangxi 646 0.7 24 Chongqing 47 0.5 
24 Anhui 572 0.6 25 Hubei 41 0.4 
25 Chongqing 519 0.5 26 Xinjiang 
Production and 
39 0.4 
26 Jiangxi 404 0.4 Construction 
Corps 
27 Xinjiang 400 0.4 27 Jiangxi 23 0.2 
28 Gansu 164 0.2 28 Gansu 19 0.2 
29 Ningxia 125 0.1 29 Ningxia 15 0.2 
30 Guizhou 52 0.1 30 Guizhou 5 0.1 
31 Qinghai 21 0.0 31 Qinghai 2 0.0 







Source: Ministry of Commerce of China (MOFCOM) [online] http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aart icle/ 
tongjizi l iao/dgzz/201001/20100106747638.html. 
Developing countries, especially those of Asia, have been the main 
recipients of Chinese FDI, absorbing over two thirds of the total. At the 
end of 2009, the Asia and the Pacific region, including Australia, accounted 
for 78% of the worldwide stock of Chinese FDI. Chinese direct investment 
in North America and Europe has been insignificant, with shares of 2.0% 
and 3.5%, respectively (see figure 1.6). By contrast, the importance of Africa 
as a destination has increased substantially in the past two years. In 2008 
and 2009, China invested some US$ 5.5 billion and US$ 1.4 billion in Africa, 
respectively. The stock of Chinese FDI in Latin America and the Caribbean 
totalled US$ 31 billion in late 2009, a year when Chinese FDI in the region 
rose sharply to double the 2008 figure (MOFCOM, 2010). 
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Figure 1.6 
CHINA: OUTWARD FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI) BY MAIN DESTINATIONS, 
STOCK AT END-2009 AND FLOWS DURING 2009' 
(Millions  of  dollars  and percentages) 
Latin America 





Asia and the Pacific 
(78.1) 
B. Flows 
North Amer i ca Europe 
Latin Amer i ca and the Car ibbean • As ia and the Pacif ic 
Source: Ministry of Commerce of China (MOFCOM), 2009 Statistical  Bulletin  of  China's  Outward  Foreign 
Direct  Investment.  Beijing, 2010. 
a Asia and the Pacific includes the countries of Oceania and therefore  Australia, one of the main 
destinations for Chinese outward FDI. 
o 
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Although Latin America and the Caribbean as a whole is an important 
destination for Chinese FDI, this is overly concentrated in tax havens (as 
chapter II analyses in greater detail). By destination, over 12% of combined 
Chinese outward FDI (financial and non-financial) had gone to the economies 
of Latin America and the Caribbean as of late 2009 (the region's stock was 
US$ 31 billion). However, almost 95% of this stock was concentrated in two 
economies: the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands. 
As regards the geographical distribution of the sources of Chinese 
outward FDI, most of it comes from the coastal provinces. The ranking 
of provinces as originators of outward investment mirrors that of FDI 
recipients in the country (see table 1.5). The provinces and municipalities of 
Shanghai, Hunan, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Liaoning (particularly the city of 
Dalian), Shandong (Qingdao), Zhejiang (Ningbo), Beijing, Fujian (Xiamen) 
and Shanxi are the main sources of Chinese outward FDI. 
D. China is the main driver of world trade 
1. Trade in goods 
Despite a sharp fall-off in its exports, in 2009 China became 
the world's largest goods exporter (US$ 1.202 trillion), just surpassing 
Germany (US$ 1.121 trillion).5 China accounted for 9.6% of global exports 
that year. It was also the world's second-largest importer after the United 
States, with goods imports of US$ 1.006 trillion in 2009, representing 8% of 
global sales (see figure 1.7). 
World trade declined by 23% in value and 12% in volume in 2009, 
and China was not immune. During the crisis, however, the volume of 
Chinese imports increased. In 2009, global exports fell 23% by value to 
US$ 12.1 trillion, while exports of commercial services fell 13% to US$ 3.3 
trillion. Chinese exports contracted by 16% and 11% in value and volume, 
respectively, while imports declined 11% by value but rose 2.8% by volume 
(China was the only one of the main destination countries for world trade 
in goods to register an increase in import volumes that year). Its imports 
from South America were one of the main causes of this increase.6 
The reactivation of Chinese trade has been remarkable. In the first 
three quarters of 2010, exports grew by 34% over the same period in 2009, 
to US$ 1.3 trillion. Meanwhile, imports rose 42% to US$ 1 trillion. Both 
exports and imports in the period exceeded those of the same period in 
2008, before the crisis. 
5 In 2009, Chinese exports slumped by 16% and imports fell by 11%, yielding a trade 
surplus of US$ 196 billion. 
6 This important fact also explains why the economies of South America were able to cope 
with the crisis and quickly recover. 
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Figure 1.7 
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S o u r c e : W o r l d T r a d e O r g a n i z a t i o n ( W T O ) . 
Just over a third of Chinese exports go to neighbouring countries 
in Asia: India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan Province of China 
and ASEAN countries. The United States and European Union are very 
important export markets for China, representing 18% and 20% in 2009, 
but are less important from the point of view of imports as they account 
for only 8% and 13%, respectively, of the Chinese total. As a group, China's 
neighbours in Asia and the Pacific account for much larger shares of the 
country's trade (see table 1.6). Latin America and the Caribbean takes 5% 
of Chinese exports and provides 6% of its imports. Although starting from 
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a low base, exports from Latin America and the Caribbean have benefited 
most from the dynamism of the Chinese economy, as China's imports 
from the region grew by nearly 23% a year during the 2005-2009 period. 
Table 1.6 
CHINA: EXTERNAL TRADE IN GOODS, BY COUNTRY 
OF ORIGIN AND DESTINATION, 2009 
(Billions  of  dollars  and percentages) 
Exports Share of Imports Share of total total 
Hong Kong (Special Administrative 
Region of China) 166.2 13.8 8.7 0.9 
India 29.7 2.5 13.7 1.4 
Japan 97.9 8.1 130.9 13.0 
Republic of Korea 53.7 4.5 102.6 10.2 
Taiwan Province of China 20.5 1.7 85.7 8.5 
ASEAN 106.3 8.8 106.7 10.6 
Indonesia 14.7 1.2 13.7 1.4 
Malaysia 19.6 1.6 32.3 3.2 
Philippines 8.6 0.7 11.9 1.2 
Singapore 30.1 2.5 17.8 1.8 
Thailand 13.3 1.1 24.9 2.5 
Viet Nam 16.3 1.4 4.7 0.5 
European Union 236.3 19.7 127.8 12.7 
United Kingdom 31.3 2.6 7.9 0.8 
Germany 49.9 4.2 55.8 5.6 
France 21.5 1.8 13.0 1.3 
Italy 20.2 1.7 11.0 1.1 
Netherlands 36.7 3.1 5.1 0.5 
Russian Federation 17.5 1.5 21.3 2.1 
South Africa 7.4 0.6 8.7 0.9 
Canada 17.7 1.5 12.0 1.2 
United States 220.8 18.4 77.4 7.7 
Australia 20.6 1.7 39.4 3.9 
New Zealand 2.1 0.2 2.5 0.2 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
(33 countries) 56.4 4.7 64.1 6.4 
Total 1 201.7 100.0 1 005.6 100.0 
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of information supplied by the China Customs Office. 
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China has a large trade deficit with Japan, Taiwan Province of China 
and the Republic of Korea because these countries are the main suppliers 
of capital goods and intermediate inputs for its manufacturing industry 
(see table 1.6). China's trade balance with ASEAN is roughly in equilibrium, 
with exports and imports totalling US$ 106 billion. As analysed later, 
Chinese manufactures are subsequently exported to other trading partners, 
especially the United States and the European Union, with which it has 
very favourable trade balances in manufactures. China is thus becoming a 
platform for many neighbouring countries in Asia to export to the United 
States and European markets. Furthermore, the country has a small deficit 
with Latin America and the Caribbean because it imports large quantities of 
commodities and natural resource-based manufactures. 
Most Chinese exports originate in the coastal provinces and cities. 
With the exception of Xinjiang, the provinces of the interior are not 
major exporters. Although China is the world's largest goods exporter, 
its exports by province and city of origin are clearly differentiated. The 
four largest provinces (Guangdong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Shandong), plus 
the city of Shanghai, were the source of over 75% of the country's total 
exports in 2007. Exports from the provinces of Guangdong and Fujian, in 
the southern region, accounted for 34% of total Chinese exports that same 
year. Jiangsu, Shanghai and Zhejiang, in the east, were also important as 
sources of exports (see table 1.2). Given this concentration, in terms of both 
geographical origin and types of firm, China's trade needs to be analysed 
on a regional basis. 
Exports from the province of Guangdong are now greater than the 
total exports of the Republic of Korea, a major exporting country. That 
province alone accounted for over 28% of total Chinese exports in 2008, 
shipping goods worth US$ 405 billion. Guangdong thus ranked twelfth 
among exporting countries, almost equalling the export total of the 
Republic of Korea that year (US$ 423 billion). Foreign-owned firms were 
responsible for most of the exports of these leading exporting provinces 
and cities. In Guangdong province, for example, 63% of all exports came 
from foreign-owned firms, which accounted in turn for almost 18% of 
all Chinese goods exports. Foreign-owned firms accounted for a similar 
share of exports in other provinces and cities such as Jiangsu, Shanghai, 
Zhejiang, Shandong, Fujian and Beijing. 
2. Commercial services 
Besides its high profile in goods trade, China plays a prominent 
role as a source and destination for trade in services. In 2009, the country 
ranked fifth in the world as an exporter and fourth as an importer, making 
it a promising market for the services trade of Latin America and the 
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Caribbean. According to World Trade Organization (WTO) estimates, 
China exported US$ 129 billion and imported US$ 158 billion of services 
in 2009, representing a global market share of 3.9% and 5.1%, respectively 
(see figure 1.7). 
China's importance as exporter and importer in each of the three 
main sectors of trade in services has increased enormously in the past 
decade, from a very low level to a substantial market share. China has an 
extremely high profile as an originator and destination for commercial 
services in the travel sector, where it now ranks third as an exporter 
and importer because of the growing number of inbound and outbound 
tourists. Its profile as an origin and destination for "other services", the 
most dynamic sector in the world over recent years, is also high, as it ranks 
fifth as an exporter and fourth as an importer (see table 1.7). 
China represents a promising market for Latin American trade 
in services. Where exports are concerned, the share accounted for by 
transport has begun to recover in the last few years after falling in the 
late 1990s, reflecting rising demand for various types of transportation to 
support the country's flourishing trade. The "other services" category also 
presents an upward trend. In the area of imports, the declining share of 
the transport sector has been offset by a substantial rise in the proportion 
of "other services" (see table 1.8). To carry on expanding its goods trade 
with China, Latin America and the Caribbean needs to achieve a matching 
expansion of trade in services. 
Table 1.7 
CHINA: SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF COMMERCIAL SERVICES, BY 
SUBSECTOR AND POSITION IN THE GLOBAL RANKING, 2009 
(Billions  of  dollars  and percentages) 
Value 
China share of global total Ranking8 
China World 
2009 2000 2009 2009 
Exports 
Transport 24 700 1.1 3.4 7 
Travel 40 870 3.4 4.6 3 
Other services 65 1 780 1.6 3.7 5 
Imports 
Transport 47 835 2.5 5.6 3 
Travel 44 790 3.0 5.5 3 
Other services 68 1 520 2.0 4.5 4 
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of information from the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
a The European Union countries are treated as a single trading partner. 
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Table 1.8 
CHINA: TRADE IN COMMERCIAL SERVICES, 1985-2008 
(Millions  of  dollars  and percentages) 
Year 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2003 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Exports 
Transport 42.6 46.2 17.5 12.1 13.9 16.9 20.7 22.8 25.7 26.2 
Travel 32.0 29.7 45.6 53.3 53.4 37.2 39.4 36.9 30.6 27.9 
Other services 25.3 24.1 36.8 34.6 32.7 45.8 39.9 40.3 43.6 45.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Total exports 3 055 5 855 19 130 30 430 33 334 46 734 74 404 91 999 121 655 146 446 
Position In the 
global ranking 26 26 16 14 13 9 9 8 7 6 
Imports 
Transport 60.4 74.6 37.8 28.9 28.8 33.0 33.9 34.1 33.5 31.9 
Travel 12.4 10.8 14.6 36.4 35.4 27.5 26.0 24.1 23.0 22.9 
Other services 27.2 14.6 47.6 34.8 35.7 39.6 40.1 41.8 43.5 45.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Total Imports 2 524 4 352 25 223 36 031 39 267 55 306 83 796 100 833 129 254 158 004 
Position In the 
global ranking 33 32 12 10 10 8 7 6 5 5 
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of information from the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
3. Foreign-owned firms in China's external trade 
Foreign-owned firms are the main drivers of China's external trade, 
having rapidly displaced public-sector firms and collective partnerships. 
In 2008, such firms were responsible for exports worth US$ 790 billion 
(equivalent to 55% of total exports) and for imports worth US$ 619 billion 
(almost 55% of total imports) (see table 1.9). 
Foreign-owned firms of Asian origin are responsible for almost a 
quarter of China's external trade. According to detailed information for 
2006, products manufactured by foreign-owned firms from 10 selected 
Asian countries accounted for 45% of all exports by foreign-owned firms 
in China and 62% of their imports. Meanwhile, foreign-owned firms 
of United States and European origin accounted for 24% and 18% of all 
exports by foreign-owned firms in China, respectively. Foreign-owned 
firms from Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China held first 
place among firms of this type exporting from China, as it is calculated 
that they account for 20% of all exports by foreign-owned firms. Exports 
by firms of Japanese origin operating in China exceeded US$ 61 billion, 
and these were followed by firms from the Republic of Korea (US$ 25 
billion) and Taiwan Province of China (US$ 14 billion). Firms from the 
five countries of ASEAN (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand) were responsible for exports worth US$ 37 billion, equivalent 
to 6.5% of all exports by foreign-owned firms operating in China. The 
contribution of United States- and European-owned firms to China's 
exports is quite small by comparison with that of their Asian competitors. 
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Table 1.9 
CHINA: SHARE OF FOREIGN-OWNED FIRMS IN TOTAL 
TRADE, BY PROVINCE, 2008 
(Billions  of  dollars  and percentages) 
Total trade Trade by foreign-owned firms 
Region Total Exports Imports Total Exports Imports 
(billions  of  dollars) (percentages) 
Country total 2 563.3 1 430.7 1 132.6 55.0 55.3 54.7 
Beijing 271.7 57.5 214.2 20.9 40.1 15.8 
Tianjin 80.4 42.1 38.3 71.2 68.6 74.0 
Hebei 38.4 24.0 14.4 43.5 40.6 48.3 
Shanxi 14.4 9.3 5.1 15.4 13.8 18.2 
Inner Mongolia 8.9 3.6 5.3 16.7 25.2 11.1 
Liaoning 72.4 42.1 30.4 51.2 48.2 55.4 
Jilin 13.3 4.8 8.6 42.9 28.2 51.1 
Heilongjiang 23.1 16.8 6.3 6.0 4.8 9.2 
Shanghai 322.1 169.1 152.9 67.6 67.1 68.1 
Jiangsu 392.3 238.0 154.2 77.4 73.5 83.3 
Zhejiang 211.1 154.3 56.8 39.6 35.1 51.5 
Anhui 20.2 11.4 8.8 34.7 28.1 43.3 
Fujian 84.8 57.0 27.8 61.4 57.0 70.5 
Jiangxi 13.6 7.7 5.9 65.1 48.9 86.5 
Shandong 158.4 93.2 65.2 53.3 54.3 51.8 
Henan 17.5 10.7 6.8 18.3 16.0 22.1 
Hubei 20.7 11.7 9.0 35.5 32.3 39.7 
Hunan 12.5 8.4 4.1 15.4 12.5 21.4 
Guangdong 685.0 405.7 279.3 64.0 63.0 65.5 
Guangxi 13.2 7.3 5.9 34.3 22.0 49.7 
Hainan 4.5 1.6 2.9 53.1 41.1 59.6 
Chongqing 9.5 5.7 3.8 38.3 16.8 70.8 
Sichuan 22.1 13.1 9.0 37.2 27.0 52.0 
Guizhou 3.4 1.9 1.5 11.1 12.5 9.2 
Yunnan 9.6 5.0 4.6 6.6 8.6 4.5 
Tibet 0.8 0.7 0.1 0.8 0.1 9.2 
Shaanxi 8.3 5.4 2.9 25.0 20.5 33.3 
Gansu 6.1 1.6 4.5 3.3 10.4 0.7 
Qinghai 0.7 0.4 0.3 37.5 11.0 78.6 
Ningxia 1.9 1.3 0.6 29.1 14.7 58.3 
Xinjiang 22.2 19.3 2.9 1.4 1.2 2.8 
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of information from Ministry of Commerce of China 
(MOFCOM), 2009 Statistical  Bulletin  of  China's  Outward  Foreign  Direct  Investment,  Beijing, 2010. 
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The presence of firms of Asian origin is also a determining factor 
in China's import orientation. Firms from the 10 selected Asian countries 
were responsible for imports worth US$ 291 billion in 2006, equivalent 
to 62% of the total imports of foreign-owned firms in China. The shares 
of United States and European Union firms were just 7% and 10%, 
respectively. The firms dominating imports of this type in China are of 
Japanese, Korean, Taiwanese, Malaysian, Filipino, Thai and Singaporean 
origin. These firms import large quantities of components and inputs from 
their parent companies in their home countries, reflecting the high level of 
intra-industry trade already referred to. 
E. China is an increasingly important producer 
and consumer of the commodities supplied 
by a number of Latin American countries 
China's weight as a farm producer has continued to rise and now exceeds 
that of the United States and European Union by a large margin, and its 
share of value added in the mining sector remains high. China generates 
some 21% of global value added in the farm sector and its share of the 
worldwide total has been rising substantially. It is strongly placed by 
comparison with the United States and European Union, whose shares are 
9% and 16% of global value added in this sector, respectively. China's share 
as a generator of value added in mining has held steady at about 10% of 
the global total, exceeding that of the European Union and that of the nine 
Asian countries as a group (see figure I.8).7 Thus, China remains one of the 
world's foremost producers of natural resources. 
7 The nine Asian countries are: India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Republic of Korea, 
Singapore, Taiwan Province of China, Thailand and Viet Nam. China includes Hong 
Kong (Special Administrative Region of China). The European Union excludes Cyprus, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta and Slovenia. 
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Figure 1.8 
CHINA: SHARE OF GLOBAL AGRICULTURAL AND MINING 
VALUE ADDED, 1995-2007 
(Percentages) 
A. Agriculture 
1985 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 
Other ¡S China European Union 
0 Asia (9 countries) Japan • United States 
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of information from United States National Science Board, 
Science  and Engineering  Indicators:  2010 [online] http://www.nsf.gov/statist ics/seind10. 
China is a leading producer, consumer and importer of 
commodities that are of great interest to Latin America and the 
Caribbean. China's relative importance as a producer of a number of 
agricultural products of interest to the region is very high, as it produces 
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over 30% of the world's cotton and rice and over 20% of its maize. 
Furthermore, China produces over 20% of the world's soybean meal and 
soybean oil. India also accounts for large shares when it comes to rice 
and cotton (see table 1.10). China is at least as important a consumer as 
it is a producer in the cases of cotton and oil products. It also surpasses 
India as a consumer of seven of the eight products analysed (the one 
exception is sugar). In terms of imports, China buys 53% of all soybeans, 
28% of soybean oil and 23% of cotton exported outside their country of 
origin, even though it is among the main producers of these. China was 
responsible for half the worldwide increase in consumption of soybean 
oil and a third of the increase in demand for soybeans between 2007 and 
2009, while India accounted for half the increase in global consumption 
of rice and a quarter of the rise in consumption of wheat over the same 
period (ECLAC, 2008). 
Chinese demand has had an even greater effect on consumption 
of metals and oil than it has in food markets. In 2009, China's share of 
global consumption of ores and metals was about 40% in the cases of 
lead, nickel, tin, zinc and primary steel (see table 1.11). Similarly, in 2009 
China accounted for 38% and 39% of world consumption of refined copper 
and aluminium, respectively. That same year, it consumed some 10% of 
crude oil. China's weight as an importer of minerals and metals is very 
great in the cases of copper, nickel and iron ore. The share of Chinese 
demand in global consumption of several metals multiplied between 
2000 and 2009. In the case of refined copper, global consumption of which 
rose from 15.2 million tons to 18.3 million tons over the decade, Chinese 
consumption rose from 1.9 million tons to 7.1 million tons, equivalent to 
170% of the increase in global demand. The figures for other metals are 
even greater. China's share of world primary steel consumption reached 
35% in 2009, a large increase on the figure of 15% in 2000 (see figure 1.9). 
Chinese demand for oil and its derivatives increased almost six times as 
fast as global demand in the same period. Soybean oil is a particular case 
among agricultural products, with Chinese imports currently accounting 
for over half of total world imports of this product. China has thus become 
a leading importer and consumer of commodities that are of great interest 
to Latin America and the Caribbean. 
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Table 1.10 
CHINA AND INDIA: SHARE OF GLOBAL PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION AND 
IMPORTS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS, 2008-2009 
(Millions  of  tons and percentages) 
Product World China India China India 
Production 
Wheat 683.3 112.5 78.6 16.5 11.5 
Maize 797.8 165.9 19.7 20.8 2.5 
Rice 448.2 134.3 99.2 30.0 22.1 
Soybeans 212.0 15.5 9.1 7.3 4.3 
Soybean meal 151.4 32.5 5.8 21.4 3.8 
Soybean oil 35.7 7.3 1.3 20.5 3.6 
Cotton 23.6 8.1 4.9 34.2 20.8 
Sugar 151.1 13.6 16.0 9.0 10.6 
Consumption 
Wheat 635.8 105.0 72.5 16.5 11.4 
Maize 778.7 155.0 17.0 19.9 2.2 
Rice 437.5 131.0 93.2 29.9 21.3 
Soybeans 220.8 51.4 8.5 23.3 3.8 
Soybean meal 151.9 31.7 2.0 20.8 1.3 
Soybean oil 35.9 9.5 2.3 26.4 6.4 
Cotton 22.7 8.8 4.0 38.8 17.6 
Sugar 161.8 14.9 23.8 9.2 14.7 
Imports 
Wheat 136.9 0.5 0.0 0.4 0.0 
Maize 82.4 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Rice 27.2 0.3 0.0 1.3 0.0 
Soybeans 77.2 41.1 0.0 53.3 0.0 
Soybean meal 51.2 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.0 
Soybean oil 8.9 2.5 1.1 27.9 11.9 
Cotton 30.0 7.0 0.8 23.3 2.7 
Sugar 48.2 1.1 2.8 2.2 5.8 
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of United States Department of Agriculture and of Economist 
Intelligence Unit (EIU), "Industrial raw materials", World  Commodity  Forecasts,  January 2010 and "Food, 
feedstuffs  and beverages", World  Commodity  Forecasts,  November 2010. 
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Table 1.11 
CHINA AND INDIA: SHARE OF GLOBAL PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION AND 
IMPORTS OF ORES, METALS AND OIL, 2009 
(Thousands  of  tons and percentages) 
Product World China India China India 
Production 
Aluminium 36 891.2 12 846.0 1 478.6 34.8 4.0 
Copper 18 606.7 4 109.5 721.4 22.1 3.9 
Lead 8 903.7 3 707.9 137.7 41.6 1.5 
Nickel 1 326.7 246.7 - 18.6 0.0 
Tin 333.0 134.5 3.6 40.4 1.1 
Zinc 11 465.4 4 356.7 615.5 38.0 5.4 
Primary steel 1 219.7 567.8 56.6 46.6 4.6 
Crude oil 82.3 3.8 0.8 4.6 1.0 
Consumption 
Aluminium 34581.5 14275.7 1 478.1 38.7 4.3 
Copper 18 256.4 7 144.1 551.5 38.4 3.0 
Lead 8 951.4 3 859.9 180.0 43.4 2.0 
Nickel 1 305.6 541.3 24.5 40.8 1.9 
Tin 321.5 143.0 9.0 44.5 2.8 
Zinc 11 255.6 4 888.3 532.2 43.4 4.7 
Primary steel8 1 300.7 452.9 53.6 34.8 4.1 
Crude oil 83.7 8.2 3.0 9.8 3.6 
Imports 
Aluminium 17250.3 1 739.8 257.7 10.1 1.5 
Copper 7 970.0 3 185.0 15.5 40.0 0.2 
Lead 1 734.5 175.6 116.3 10.1 6.7 
Nickel 638.8 247.0 17.9 38.7 2.8 
Tin 254.0 20.5 6.1 8.1 2.4 
Zinc 3 660.1 670.2 93.6 18.3 2.6 
Iron ore 933.2 444.0 0.6 47.6 0.1 
Sponge iron 24.0 0.4 0.0 1.5 0.1 
Crude oil" 44.5 3.6 2.5 8.2 5.6 
Source: Energy Information Administration (EIA), World  Monthly  Metal  Statistics,  September  2010 [online] 
http://www.eia.gov/, and World Steel Association (WSA), Steel  Statistical  Yearbook  2009, Brussels, 2010. 
a Apparent steel use (equivalent to primary steel). Figures are for 2008. 
b Millions of barrels a day. Figures are for 2008. 
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Figure 1.9 
CHINA: GLOBAL CONSUMPTION SHARE OF SELECTED AGRICULTURAL 








Source: United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, official  estimates; World 
Bureau of Metal Statistics (WBMS), World  Metal  Statistics  - Monthly  Bulletin,  various Issues; Energy 
Information Administration (EIA); and Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), "Industrial raw materials", World 
Commodity  Forecasts,  January 2010 and "Food, feedstuffs  and beverages", World  Commodity  Forecasts, 
November 2010. 
China has the world's largest reserves of commercially exploitable 
rare earths and rare metals and is the largest producer and exporter of 
these.s A rare metal is a mineral containing one or more elements of the 
rare earth. According to the United States Geological Survey, industrial 
reserves and basic reserves of rare earths in China in 2008 were 27 million 
tons and 89 million tons, respectively, representing 30.7% and 59.3% of the 
world total (ResearchlnChina, 2009). Furthermore, China was responsible 
for 98% of global production of these minerals that year, and in 2007 it 
accounted for over 80% of global exports of rare earths, far more than the 
5% of the United States, the second-largest exporter (JETRO, 2008). The 
main importing countries for these materials are Germany, Japan and the 
Broadly speaking, rare metals are non-metallic materials whose reserves are scarce or 
hard to exploit for economic or technological reasons. These metals are used as inputs in 
the manufacture of high-technology products. In most cases, reserves and production are 
distributed very unevenly across countries and regions. Typical metals include lithium, 
cobalt and manganese, all vital inputs in the production of small batteries; tungsten, used 
in the production of filaments and very hard tools; molybdenum, used as an input in the 
production of special steels; and indium, employed in the production of liquid crystal 
display (LCD) screens. The term "rare earth" refers to 17 elemexrts, such as scandium and 
yttrium, used in the production of fluorescent materials and optical equipment. 
ECLAC 
United States. China's dominant position as a supplier of rare earths has 
turned these into strategic products in the country's foreign policy, and 
they now offer a solid basis for fostering the innovation and technological 
development upon which the Chinese authorities have embarked. 
Latin America is a major producer of a number of agricultural 
products in which China has a particular interest. However, the Asia and 
the Pacific region competes directly with Latin America in some product 
areas. As chapter II will analyse, a number of Latin American countries 
are major suppliers of natural resources to China. Nonetheless, China has 
diversified its sources of supply considerably, so that Latin America has 
not succeeded in building a strong negotiating position with regard to 
these products. There is substantial competition with certain developed 
economies such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States, 
and with neighbouring developing countries in the agriculture, fisheries 
and forestry sectors, in all of which Latin America has traditionally had 
comparative advantages. 
F. China, and to a lesser extent India, play a major 
role in the global manufacturing sector 
China is emerging as one of the main generators of value added in the 
global manufacturing sector, not only in sectors whose technology 
intensity is medium-low and low but also in sectors with high and 
medium-high technology intensity. The value added in the high-
technology sector of Chinese manufacturing (communications and 
semiconductors, computers and office machinery, pharmaceuticals, 
scientific equipment and aerospace), calculated at constant 2000 prices, 
grew from US$ 19 billion in 1995 to US$ 167 billion in 2007. As a result, its 
share almost quintupled from 3% to 14% over the same period. The share 
of the high-technology sector in Chinese manufacturing rose from 7% to 
13% over the same period. Similarly, China has experienced a substantial 
rise (from less than 4% in 1995 to 14% in 2007) in both the medium-high-
technology sector (automotive industry and chemicals) and the medium-
low-technology sector (rubbers, plastics and base metals), as well as in 
the low-technology sector (paper, food, and textiles and wearing apparel) 
(see figure 1.10). 
The rise in the Chinese share of global manufacturing value added 
in different sectors has been accompanied by a rapid rise in its exports 
in these sectors. For example, Chinese exports in the high-technology 
sector accounted for 20% of the sector's worldwide exports in 2008, quickly 
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displacing those of the United States, Japan and the European Union. 
Chinese exports represent close to 13% of world exports in both the 
medium-high-technology sector and the medium-low-technology sector, 
and account for some 30% of global exports in the low-technology sector 
(United States National Science Board, 2010). 
Figure 1.10 
CHINA: MANUFACTURING VALUE ADDED AND WORLDWIDE E X P O R T S ' 
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Figure 1.10 (concluded) 
G. Manufacturing value added in the low-
technology sector 
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Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of information from United States National Science Board, 
Science  and Engineering  Indicators:  2010 [online] http://www.nsf.gov/statist ics/seind10. 
a Global exports exclude trade within the European Union and trade between China and Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region of China. European Union exports exclude trade within the European 
Union and Chinese exports exclude those between China and Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region of China, in accordance with the manufacturing sectors classification of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
b The nine Asian countries are: India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singapore, 
Taiwan Province of China, Thailand and Viet Nam. 
China includes Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China. 
d The European Union excludes Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta and Slovenia. 
In the past two decades, China has increased its weight as a 
generator of value added in the manufacturing sector, not only compared 
with the industrialized countries, but also among developing countries. 
So far, China's performance in the manufacturing sector has looked very 
favourable when its share of the sector's value added is compared with that 
of the different developing regions. In the middle of the past decade, China 
alone accounted for 37% of the combined manufacturing sector value 
added of all developing countries and for almost 44% of manufacturing 
sector value added in East Asia and South Asia. This has made it the leader 
in Asia in terms not only of export performance, but also of the generation 
of value added in the region's manufacturing sector. Meanwhile, the Latin 
American share of developing-country manufacturing value added has 
fallen steadily from 36% in 1990 to 20% in 2006 (see figure 1.11). 
China and India have played a crucial role as consumers of various 
manufactured products that have traded very dynamically in the past 
decade. The Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO, 2006) states that 
the global car market expanded by 7 million units between 1999 and 2005, 
and that almost 46% of this growth was in the Chinese market, while 7.4% 
was in the Indian market. Very high percentages are also observed for 
other high-technology goods, such as sales of electronic items and access 
to mobile phones and portable computers. Regarding the automotive 
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industry, in 2009 China overtook the United States, where consumption 
was heavily affected by the crisis, to become its largest market. Chinese 
markets for other high-technology goods, such as sales of electronic items 
and access to mobile phones and portable computers, are also accounting 
for increasing shares of the global total. 
Figure 1.11 
DEVELOPING REGIONS: SHARE OF TOTAL DEVELOPING-COUNTRY 
MANUFACTURING VALUE ADDED, 1990-2006 
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Source: United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), Industrial  Statistical  Yearbook, 
various years. 
China has consolidated its dominant position in a number of 
industrial sectors. Measured in terms of value added, according to the 
International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities 
(ISIC), China is the world's largest producer in nine of the 16 industrial 
sectors analysed (see table 1.12), exceeding the figures achieved by the other 
three countries in the BRIC grouping. For example, in textiles, wearing 
apparel, and leather and leather products (ISIC 17,18,19), China represented 
37%, 29% and 39% of the value added of the sector concerned in 2007. 
China's share of base metals (ISIC 27), electrical machinery and apparatus 
(ISIC 31) and other transport equipment (ISIC 35) is very high, accounting 
for over 30% of world value added. In a number of manufacturing sectors, 
China, and to a lesser extent India, have an industrial base that is solid 
even by the standards of some industrialized countries, something that 
not only holds out numerous trade and investment opportunities to the 
Latin American countries, but also represents potential competition in 
Latin American and other markets. 
Table 1.12 
MAIN PRODUCERS IN SELECTED MANUFACTURING SECTORS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INTERNATIONAL STANDARD 
INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION OF ALL ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES (ISIC), 2007 
f/\s percentages  of  world  value  added,  at constant  2000 prices) 
ISIC 
Rev. 3 Product description Ranking China Ranking Brazil Ranking India Ranking 
Russian 
Federation 
15 Food products and beverages 2 14.3 9 2.6 14 1.7 
16 Tobacco products 1 51.4 12 0.9 
17 Textiles 1 36.7 4 4.2 
18 Wearing apparel, fur 1 28.7 8 2.0 
19 Leather, leather products and footwear 1 39.1 9 2.2 10 2.0 
20 Wood products (except furniture) 2 8.9 7 3.7 
21 Paper and paper products 3 12.9 12 2.1 15 1.5 
22 Publishing and printing 5 3.8 
23 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 2 15.7 4 6.0 10 1.8 
24 Chemicals and chemical products 2 3.5 12 1.9 7 3.5 
25 Rubber and plastics 1 18.3 9 2.2 15 1.4 
26 Non-metallic mineral products 1 16.1 9 2.5 13 2.1 12 2.2 
27 Base metals 1 36.3 14 1.3 6 2.9 7 2.3 
28 Fabricated metal products 4 9.4 9 2.4 
29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 2 15.9 10 1.6 12 1.4 11 1.5 
30 Office,  accounting and computing machinery 7 3.2 9 1.1 15 0.3 
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 1 30.8 7 2.0 5 3.1 15 0.8 
32 Radio, television and communication equipment 3 7.2 10 0.2 
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments 4 5.1 8 2.4 6 4.4 
34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 13 1.5 12 1.6 
35 Other transport equipment 1 35.9 3 5.6 10 2.4 13 1.0 
36 Furniture, manufacturing n.e.c. 2 20.7 11 1.4 
> 
Source: United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), International  Yearbook  of  Industrial  Statistics  2009, Vienna, 2009. O 
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G. China's weight in services is also increasing 
Although the engine of growth is still the secondary sector, China is 
becoming a major producer of services. The country has succeeded in 
increasing its share in the world total of each of the three most dynamic 
sectors in recent years: communications, financial services and business 
services. Measured in terms of value added (at constant 2000 prices), China 
has achieved the world's highest growth rate in the three market-oriented 
specialized knowledge-intensive services (viz., communications, financial 
services and business services), albeit from a very low level. In the 2000-
2005 period, these three sectors together grew at an annual rate of 14%, 
more than treble the global rate. Average value added in the three sectors 
in China between 2000 and 2005 was US$ 245 billion, 4% of the world 
total (see table 1.13). Of the three sectors, financial services accounted for 
the most value added (US$ 145 billion a year), while the communication 
services sector experienced the world's highest annual growth rate (18%). 
Output of services has also grown much faster in India and Malaysia than 
in the rest of the world. In the other two service sectors, which are more 
public service-oriented (health and education), China has maintained a 
stable share of between 3% and 4% of the global total in the first and has 
tended to increase its share of the second (United States National Science 
Board, 2010). 
China's share of world value added in technology-intensive services 
is similar to that of Latin America and the Caribbean. China has a higher 
profile than Latin America in communication services and financial 
services, while the latter is ahead in the business services sector, mainly 
thanks to the large contributions of Brazil and Mexico. When other Latin 
American and Caribbean countries not analysed in table 1.13 are included, 
the region's share could be similar to that of China, at around 3%. Thus, 
China offers opportunities in terms of greater production and trade 
complementarity and in biregional investments, but it could also become 
a powerful competitor in certain service segments in regional and third-
country markets. 
As mentioned earlier in connection with foreign trade, China is 
advancing in the most technology- and knowledge-intensive sectors 
within the service sector. The "other commercial services" component, 
which includes the subsectors growing fastest at the global level (such 
as communication services, construction, insurance, computer and 
information services, royalties and licence fees, personal, cultural and 
recreational services, and other business services), accounts for 46% of 
Chinese commercial services exports and far outweighs another two 
major components of the service sector: transport and travel. 
Table 1.13 
CHINA: GROWTH IN TECHNOLOGY-INTENSIVE SERVICES, 2000-2005 AVERAGE 
(Percentages  and billions  of  dollars,  at constant  2000 prices) 
All three sectors Communication services 
Billions of dollars Annual growth rate 
Share of sector 
total Billions of dollars 
Annual growth 
rate 
Share of sector 
total 
United States 2 490.2 3.1 40.5 374.4 5.1 38.8 
European Union 1 555.1 3.3 25.3 224.3 5.4 23.3 
Asia 1 328.9 5.7 21.6 206.8 9.7 21.5 
China 245.2 14.0 4.0 55.4 18.3 5.7 
India 61.7 9.1 1.0 12.9 22.9 1.3 
Japan 808.9 2.9 13.2 92.7 3.5 9.6 
Republic of Korea 81.7 7.1 1.3 16.3 12.4 1.7 
Taiwan Province of China 52.7 3.6 0.9 9.1 5.5 0.9 
ASEAN (5 countries) 78.5 7.0 1.3 20.4 8.9 2.1 
Indonesia 15.8 8.8 0.3 3.1 8.3 0.3 
Malaysia 10.2 10.6 0.2 2.9 18.5 0.3 
Philippines 26.9 3.1 0.4 6.0 1.4 0.6 
Singapore 8.9 7.7 0.1 2.7 5.5 0.3 
Thailand 16.8 9.1 0.3 5.7 14.6 0.6 
Latin America (5 countries) 219.0 2.4 3.6 37.1 5.7 3.8 
Argentina 39.7 -1.7 0.6 7.2 2.5 0.8 
Brazil 102.6 2.7 1.7 16.1 4.6 1.7 
Chile 12.8 4.4 0.2 1.8 8.5 0.2 
Costa Rica 2.5 8.6 0.0 0.9 11.8 0.1 
Mexico 61.4 4.1 1.0 11.1 9.0 1.1 
World 6 145.1 3.9 100.0 963.9 6.2 100.0 
Table 1.13 (concluded) O 
Financial services Business services 
Billions of dollars Annual growth rate 
Share of sector 
total Billions of dollars 
Annual growth 
rate 
Share of sector 
total 
United States 801.3 2.9 38.8 1 314.6 2.7 42.2 
European Union 403.8 2.9 19.6 927.1 2.9 29.7 
Asia 590.7 6.2 28.6 531.4 3.6 17.0 
China 144.5 12.8 7.0 45.4 12.8 1.5 
India 26.0 4.4 1.3 22.9 7.9 0.7 
Japan 316.6 3.5 15.3 399.6 2.3 12.8 
Republic of Korea 40.1 7.9 1.9 25.3 3.2 0.8 
Taiwan Province of China 35.2 3.3 1.7 8.5 2.9 0.3 
ASEAN (5 countries) 28.4 6.6 1.4 29.8 6.0 1.0 
Indonesia 4.4 5.8 0.2 6.7 6.9 0.2 
Malaysia 5.2 9.9 0.3 7.4 8.3 0.2 
Philippines 3.4 2.2 0.2 3.9 13.3 0.1 
Singapore 11.1 5.0 0.5 9.8 2.0 0.3 
Thailand 4.3 12.0 0.2 1.9 1.2 0.1 
Latin America (5 countries) 66.2 4.5 3.2 115.7 0.2 3.7 
Argentina 8.5 -8.6 0.4 24.0 -0.4 0.8 
Brazil 36.7 6.3 1.8 49.8 -0.3 1.6 
Chile 4.5 5.0 0.2 6.6 3.0 0.2 
Costa Rica 0.8 6.6 0.0 0.8 7.4 0.0 
Mexico 15.7 8.9 0.8 34.6 0.7 1.1 
All other 202.4 5.7 9.8 228.1 4.4 7.3 
World 2 064.3 4.2 100.0 3 116.9 2.9 100.0 











Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of information from the United States National Science Board, Science  and Engineering  Indicators:  2010 [online] http://www. 
nsf.gov/statistics/seind10. 
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Of the different commercial services subsectors, construction 
is prominent in exports and "other business services" in exports and 
imports. China has become a major exporter of construction services, 
currently accounting for 12% of the global total and ranking third behind 
the European Union (54%) and Japan (16%). In absolute terms, the most 
important sector is "other business services", with China's exports totalling 
US$ 46 billion in 2008 (see table 1.14). In this sector, China ranks third behind 
the European Union and the United States, and ahead of Japan, Singapore 
and India. China's importance as an importer is evident in "other business 
services", insurance, and payments and receipts of royalties and licence fees. 
China remains a major net importer in the royalties and licences sector, 
while running a surplus in "other business services". 
Table 1.14 
CHINA: COMMERCIAL SERVICES AND POSITION IN THE WORLD RANKING, 
SELECTED SUBSECTORS, 2008 
(Billions  of  dollars  and percentages) 
v a l u e China share 
China World8 of world total' 
Exports 
Communications 1 570 77 695 2.0 7 
Construction 10 329 86 420 12.0 3 
Insurance 1 383 77 200 1.8 8 
Computer and information 6 252 186 085 3.4 5 
services 
Payments and receipts of 
royalties and licence fees 
571 209 765 0.3 11 
Other business services 46 349 889 810 5.2 3 
Audiovisual and related services 418 12 540 3.3 5 
nports 
Communications 1 510 66 645 2.3 5 
Construction 4 363 79 310 5.5 6 
Insurance 12 743 129 465 9.8 3 
Computer and information 3 165 90 255 3.5 5 
services 
Payments and receipts of 
royalties and licence fees 
10 320 203 730 5.1 6 
Other business services 38 597 727 960 5.3 4 
Audiovisual and related services 255 9 302 2.7 10 
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of information from the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
a The world total is the sum of the world's 15 largest exporters and importers. The share given for China 
is its share of this total. 
b The European Union countries are treated as a single trading partner. 
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China's achievements in goods industries and trade have been 
paralleled by progress in services. China has succeeded in improving 
the efficiency of trade-related services (transport, physical infrastructure, 
communications, and business and professional services, including 
financial services), and this has been crucial to its international 
competitiveness. There is still progress to be made in this area, but 
the standard of infrastructure and logistics attained, combined with 
progress in innovation and technology, means that the idea that Chinese 
competitiveness essentially comes down to low wages has to be ruled out 
as simplistic. 
H. China is progressing rapidly in the field 
of research and development 
In the past 15 years, China has trebled its research and development 
spending as a percentage of GDP. This spending increased from the very 
low level of US$ 8.5 billion (at constant 2000 prices) to US$ 87 billion in 
2007. Although in 2007 China still spent much less than the United States 
(US$ 308 billion) or Japan (US$ 125 billion), it compares very favourably 
with Germany (US$ 59 billion), France (US$ 36 billion) and the Republic 
of Korea (US$ 37 billion). As a share of GDP, China spends more (1.49% in 
2007) than the Russian Federation and is quickly closing in on the United 
Kingdom and Canada (see table 1.15). 
Most research and development funding originates from and is 
destined for the business sector. In 2006, of US$ 70 billion in spending (at 
constant 2000 prices measured in purchasing power parity), the business 
sector financed US$ 47 billion, while the contribution of the government 
was just US$ 19 billion (United States National Science Board, 2010, see 
annex table 4-29). The Chinese pattern of spending distribution and 
allocation by major sectors is quite similar to that of other countries such as 
Germany, the United States and Japan. In the case of the Republic of Korea, 
the weight of the business sector as a source and recipient of research and 
development spending is greater. 
ECLAC 
Table 1.15 
SHARE OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SPENDING, 1985-2007' 
(Percentages,  at constant  2000 prices) 
1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
United 
States' 2.75 2.65 2.51 2.75 2.76 2.66 2.66 2.59 2.62 2.66 2.68 
Japan0 2.58 2.81 2.71 3.04 3.12 3.17 3.20 3.17 3.32 3.40 3.44 
China n.a. n.a. 0.57 0.90 0.95 1.07 1.13 1.23 1.33 1.42 1.49 
Germany0 2.60 2.61 2.19 2.45 2.46 2.49 2.52 2.49 2.48 2.54 2.54 
France 2.17 2.32 2.29 2.15 2.20 2.23 2.17 2.15 2.10 2.10 2.08 
Republic of 
Korea n.a. n.a. 2.37 2.39 2.59 2.53 2.63 2.85 2.98 3.22 3.47 
United 
Kingdom 2.24 2.14 1.94 1.85 1.82 1.82 1.75 1.69 1.73 1.76 1.79 
Russian 
Federation n.a. 2.03 0.85 1.05 1.18 1.25 1.28 1.15 1.07 1.07 1.12 
Canada 1.42 1.51 1.70 1.91 2.09 2.04 2.04 2.08 2.05 1.98 1.88 
Italy 1.10 1.25 0.97 1.05 1.09 1.13 1.11 1.10 1.09 1.13 n.a. 
Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Main  Science  and Technology 
Indicators,  Vol. 2009, Issue 1, Paris, August 2009. 
Note: n.a. = not available. 
a GDP in national currencies was converted into dollars using each country's implicit GDP deflator and 
the purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rate calculated by the OECD. 
b The United States data are based on the international standard used to calculate gross research and 
development spending, which differs  slightly from the methodology used in the protocol of the United 
States National Science Board. 
0 The Japan data from 1996 onward may be inconsistent with earlier data owing to a change in 
methodology. 
d The data for Germany in the 1981 -1990 period are for West Germany. 
The major leap made by China in research and development spending 
has not translated into practical, marketable inventions or innovations. 
By way of example, while the number of Chinese patent applications to 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has increased 
enormously in recent years, the more than 4,400 dossiers submitted by 
Chinese applicants represented just 0.9% of total applications (456,000) in 
2008. When it comes to patents actually granted, the Chinese percentage 
is lower (see table 1.16). The main geographical origins of scientists and 
researchers are the United States, the European Union and Japan, which 
accounted for 49%, 14% and 21%, respectively, of the total granted in 2008. 
Although the Chinese share looks very favourable in comparison with that 
of India and a number of other developing Asian countries, it is far below 
the level attained by Taiwan Province of China and the Republic of Korea. 
The country thus has a long way to go before it catches up with certain 
newly industrialized Asian countries. China's performance in this respect is 
much better than that of Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Table 1.16 
UNITED STATES: PATENTS GRANTED BY NATIONALITY OF APPLICANTS, 2000-2008' 
(Numbers  and percentages) 













(average) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
e u u i i u m y 
Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage 
United States 86 883 52.7 84 270 51.3 74 637 51.9 89 823 51.7 79 526 50.6 77 501 49.1 
European Union 26 551 16.1 24 906 15.2 21 125 14.7 24 364 14.0 21 956 14.0 21 863 13.9 
Japan 33 723 20.4 35 348 21.5 30 341 21.1 36 807 21.2 33 354 21.2 33 682 21.3 
China 225 0.1 404 0.2 402 0.3 661 0.4 772 0.5 1 225 0.8 
Asia (9 countries) 9 493 5.8 11 302 6.9 10 334 7.2 13 344 7.7 13 556 8.6 15 116 9.6 
India 225 0.1 363 0.2 384 0.3 481 0.3 546 0.3 634 0.4 
Malaysia 47 0.0 80 0.0 88 0.1 113 0.1 158 0.1 152 0.1 
Singapore 338 0.2 449 0.3 346 0.2 412 0.2 393 0.2 399 0.3 
Republic of Korea 3 646 2.2 4 428 2.7 4 352 3.0 5 908 3.4 6 295 4.0 7 549 4.8 
Taiwan Province of 5 192 3.1 5 938 3.6 5 118 3.6 6 361 3.7 6 128 3.9 6 339 4.0 
China 
Other (four countries) 45 0.0 44 0.0 46 0.0 69 0.0 36 0.0 43 0.0 
Central Europe/Asia 266 0.2 227 0.1 198 0.1 241 0.1 259 0.2 247 0.2 
Africa 130 0.1 116 0.1 106 0.1 123 0.1 102 0.1 106 0.1 
Latin America and 347 0.2 308 0.2 245 0.2 295 0.2 255 0.2 260 0.2 
the Caribbean 
Middle East 1 030 0.6 1 052 0.6 951 0.7 1 262 0.7 1 145 0.7 1 231 0.8 
Other 6 323 3.8 6 357 3.9 5 467 3.8 6 852 3.9 6 357 4.0 6 541 4.1 
World 164 971 100.0 164 290 100.0 143 806 100.0 173 772 100.0 157 282 100.0 157 772 100.0 
Source: United States Patent and Trademark Office  (USPTO), Extended  Year  Set - Historic  Patents  by  Country,  State,  and Year:  Utiiity  Patents  (December2008)  [online] http:// 
www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ldo/oeip/taf/cst_utlh.htm. 
a Patents assigned to regions or countries on the basis of the residence of the first  Inventor. 
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Aware of the need to promote its endogenous research and 
development capacity, China is implementing a number of innovation 
programmes with a long-term outlook. This involves close collaboration 
between the business sector and academia to create and enhance the 
capacity to turn scientific and technical achievements into real production 
and commercialization opportunities. The main sectors involved are: 
(i) new materials and products in the iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, 
construction materials and chemical industries; (ii) high-technology 
equipment in the metallurgical industry, the petrochemical industry and 
other industries, high-capacity thermal equipment, new energy vehicles 
and medium-sized multi-purpose helicopters; (iii) consumer products 
incorporating high-technology fibres, textile products and high value 
added light industrial products; (iv) key information and communication 
technology (ICT) industries, such as software, integrated circuits, new flat 
screen components, semiconductor lighting devices and next-generation 
networks; and (v) national engineering centres and industrial laboratories, 
the creation of platforms for technology shared among the leading 
industries, industrial alliances and all patents, technical cooperation, and 
technological re-engineering and absorption of imported technology. In 
2009,146 billion yuan (about US$ 22 billion) was assigned to this project, an 
increase of 25.6% over the previous year. Furthermore, China is promoting 
the biotechnology industry in an initiative that involves biological agro-
industry, bioenergies, biomanufacturing and biological protection of the 
environment, and is seeking to move ahead with third-generation mobile 
communications (State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2010). 
This initiative forms part of planning for industrial revitalization 
that has been applied to 10 sectors since 2009: (i) iron and steel, (ii) the 
automotive industry, (iii) textiles, (iv) manufactures produced by 
original equipment makers, (v) naval construction, (vi) ICTs, (vii) light 
industries, (viii) petrochemicals, (ix) non-ferrous metals and (x) logistics. 
The implementation period for this initiative is 2009-2011. Leaving aside 
the logistics industry, the other nine industries represent 80% of the 
country's industrial value added and a third of GDP. Some sectors have 
problems with overcapacity, excess supply, overstretched product lines, 
high energy consumption and environmental pollution. This initiative 
has been accompanied by planning for revitalization in other sectors, 
such as culture and the construction of communications and transport 
infrastructure (highways, river transport, railways, airports, etc.) (State 
Council of the People's Republic of China, 2010). 
China and Latín America and the Caribbean: Building a strategic economic. 
I. There is great potential for energy cooperation 
with China 
While China's high economic growth has helped improve its people's 
quality of life and reconfigure the global trade and investment scene, it 
has also had a considerable impact on environmental pollution, owing to 
the high energy consumption entailed by economic growth on this scale 
in such a populous country. China is currently the world's second-largest 
emitter of greenhouse gases after the United States, and is coming under 
continuous pressure from the international community as a result. This 
is being aggravated by the inefficient energy use still characteristic of 
industrial processes in China, which anyway are concentrated in energy-
intensive sectors such as cement, smelting, iron, meat and dairy products 
(Department of Natural Resources of Canada, 2008), and by the use of coal 
as the main energy source. In fact, China consumes more coal than the 
United States, Japan and the European Union put together. 
It is estimated that world energy demand will grow by about 30% 
between 2008 and 2020, with this increase being basically accounted for 
by the fastest-growing emerging economies, especially China and India. 
While energy demand in Europe, Japan and the United States will grow 
by 14% in this period, that of China, India and the rest of developing Asia 
will rise by 80%. Thus, by 2020 developing countries will consume half the 
world's output of oil, 55% of natural gas and 70% of coal (EIA, 2007). 
China is the world's third-largest oil importer after the United 
States and Japan and accounted for over a third of global growth in oil 
demand between 2000 and 2009. The increase forecast for the 2007-2030 
period represents 43% of that projected for the entire world economy 
during the period. While natural gas currently meets only a small part 
of the country's energy needs, it is estimated that imported energy still 
plays a more prominent role as a source of energy supply in the Chinese 
economy. In 2007, China became an importer of coal for the first time 
(Cosby, 2010). The huge volume of Chinese imports of a large number 
of natural resources, and the growing and indeed unprecedented needs 
projected for the country over the coming decades, are seen as an obstacle 
to the sustainable development of the Chinese economy as a whole. 
Average energy consumption per unit of output in major Chinese 
industries is far higher than in the country's OECD competitors. The least 
efficient plants in China currently convert between 27% and 36% of coal 
energy into electricity, while the most efficient achieve 44%, representing a 
reduction of more than a third in global warming emissions.9 The potential 
9 The most efficient plant in the United States achieves an efficiency level of some 40% 
because the country has yet to use the higher steam temperature now adopted in China. 
The average efficiency of coal-fired plants is still higher in the United States than in 
China because the latter built a great many inefficient plants in the last decade. 
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competitiveness gains from higher efficiency could be substantial. Coal 
consumption for the generation of thermal energy is some 40% greater 
than the OECD average, while consumption in the steel, cement and pulp 
and paper industries is 21.4%, 45.3% and 120% greater, respectively. These 
figures are averages, of course, and a number of installations are inefficient 
in the extreme. 
The main pollutant is coal, and China depends upon this for 80% of 
its energy. The domestic supply of electricity and heating is based on this 
commodity, as coal remains the cheapest energy source in China by a large 
margin. China has the world's third-largest coal reserves behind the United 
States and Russian Federation. Energy consumption is still rising because of 
economic growth, but also because of global warming, which has brought 
marked temperature fluctuations and increased demand for cooling and 
heating appliances. Because strong growth in the Chinese economy is 
generating an expanding middle class with incomes similar to those of the 
OECD, demand for these appliances has resulted in a sudden leap in the 
demand for energy. Because coal is the cheapest energy source in China, it 
has allowed this rising demand to be met with the provision of inexpensive, 
albeit excessively polluting, energy. However, by continuing to depend so 
heavily on coal, which supplies 80% of electricity, China is ensuring that 
it will continue to emit a large amount of carbon dioxide, since even an 
efficient coal-fired power station emits twice as much carbon dioxide as a 
natural gas plant. Nonetheless, the country is rapidly closing the gap and is 
now using the world's most advanced designs (Bradsher, 2009). 
Table 1.17 
CARBON INTENSITY IN DIFFERENT ECONOMIES 
(Gigatons  of  C02 emissions  per  trillion  dollars  of  GDP) 
Country or region Carbon intensity 
United States 0.46 




Source: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development  Report,  2007/2008: 
Fighting  climate  change: Human solidarity  in a divided  world,  New York, UNDP, 2007. 
The processing of imported raw materials and the manufacture 
and consumption of industrial products are highly polluting operations 
that consume a large amount of energy. The volume of the main products 
imported by China, such as oil and its derivatives, ores and metals, and 
plastics, has increased dramatically in recent years and, in conjunction 
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with the production of manufactured goods such as transport equipment 
and machinery, textile and rubber products, chemicals, automobiles, 
aircraft, electronic and computing equipment and other technology-
intensive items, consumes a large amount of energy. The energy content 
of China's exports is estimated to have been responsible for 23% of carbon 
dioxide emissions (Cosby, 2010). 
China's status as "workshop of the world" is one of the main causes 
of its lack of energy efficiency. The predominance of the processing 
trade in the manufacturing sector and the assembly activities of foreign-
owned firms have driven up the energy intensity of the Chinese export 
sector. Because it is fragmented along the Asian and global value chain, 
industrial production not only presents the problem of low value added 
but is also intensive in natural resources and energy, and thus has a large 
environmental impact. Exports of another type based on natural resources, 
such as cement, aluminium, paper and cardboard, are large consumers of 
energy (Lixin and others, 2010). 
China is taking determined steps to improve its energy efficiency, 
rely more on renewable energies and combat climate change. It should be 
recalled that China's energy efficiency improved by an impressive 50% 
in the 1990-2002 period, a feat without precedent anywhere else in the 
world. The eleventh plan set the ambitious goal of reducing the country's 
energy intensity by 20% during the 2005-2010 period. Other targets for the 
development of clean energy sources (including renewable, nuclear and 
hydroelectric sources) are also ambitious, with a goal of 15% of energy 
supplied from renewable sources by 2020. China is currently one of 
the world's leading sources of pollution and global warming, but at the 
same time it is developing far-reaching and vigorous initiatives in these 
areas with a view to moving towards a less carbon-intensive economy. 
Underpinning this is not only an appreciation of the seriousness of the 
problem, but also a strategic anticipation of international pressures 
that could become unsustainable if the country fails to show concrete 
commitments to changes in its pattern of energy use. 
Since 2007, for example, China has emerged as the world leader in 
more efficient and less polluting coal-fired thermoelectric plants, leading 
the technology frontier and cost reduction in this area. But this is far 
from easy. In the case of carbon, for example, it is not a matter of simply 
dispensing with polluting electricity generation plants, since there is 
a large workforce associated with this energy source and plant closures 
during the transition could lead to cuts in the electricity supply and 
higher electricity bills (Hong, Cosbey and Savage, 2009). Most coal-fired 
electricity generation plants in China and the world are technologically 
antiquated and inefficient, burning a great deal of coal and emitting large 
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amounts of carbon dioxide. This is why one of the initiatives has involved 
the construction of efficient and less polluting coal-fired plants. Although 
China, as a developing country, is not obliged to reduce its emissions of 
polluting gases, in some areas it is taking more substantial measures than 
the United States. While discussions as to whether or not to build more 
efficient coal-fired plants are still ongoing in the United States, China has 
already begun to build these at a rate of one a month. This new generation 
of low-pollution power stations turn coal into gas before burning it, so 
that less coal is consumed and less carbon dioxide emitted for each unit of 
electricity generated. 
China has become the world's largest market for power stations 
fuelled by high-specification coal with emissions control systems, according 
to a recent report by the International Energy Agency (IEA) (Bradsher, 2009). 
By adopting ultra supercritical technology, which uses superheated vapour 
to achieve the maximum efficiency, and constructing numerous identical 
electricity generating stations at the same time, the country has achieved 
dramatic cost reductions by the extensive use of scale economies. It can now 
cost a third less to build an ultra supercritical power plant in China than to 
build a less efficient coal-fired station in the United States. 
As well as improving the efficiency of its coal-fired plants, China 
is implementing other alternative energy initiatives. In 2007, the country 
doubled its investment in this area to US$ 11 billion (Bradsher, 2009). It 
has also doubled its total wind power capacity in the past four years to 6 
gigawatts, putting it on course to surpass the United States as the world's 
largest market for wind power equipment this year. Furthermore, China is 
building far more nuclear plants than the rest of the world, and these plants 
do not emit carbon dioxide once built (Bradsher, 2009). According to Hal 
Harvey, the CEO of ClimateWorks Foundation, a San Francisco group that 
finances projects to combat climate change: "The steps they've taken are 
probably as fast and as serious as anywhere in power-generation history" 
(Bradsher, 2009). 
China has set itself the goal of quadrupling its GDP in the two 
decades to 2020 whilst only doubling its energy consumption (from 920 
million tons of oil equivalent in 2000 to 1.83 billion tons of oil equivalent 
in 2020) (Bradley and Yang, 2006). In recent years, however, the income 
elasticity of energy has remained above 1, which means that, unless 
substantial adjustments occur, the trend indicates that China could require 
3.67 billion tons of oil equivalent by 2020, or twice as much as was projected 
at the beginning of this decade. Accordingly, a greater effort is needed 
than is being made at present. The scales involved are obviously gigantic. 
For example, to reduce the energy intensity of GDP by 20% between 2006 
and 2010, as the authorities have stated they intend to, it will be necessary 
to save energy equivalent to 600 million tons of coal. 
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If China is successful in reorienting its economy and reducing 
carbon emissions, it could become a leader in low-emission technology 
markets, which will not only help the environment but will also give 
rise to new opportunities for trade and technical progress (Abou, 2009). 
Although it is still too soon to analyse the effects of China's measures on 
its emissions, some improvements have already been seen in the climate 
models. The IEA report on China of November 2008 not only raised 
the agency's estimate for economic growth in 2009 but cut the forecast 
annual rise in global emissions from 3.2% to 3%, mainly in response to 
technological improvements in the coal sector. 
China's long-term energy planning has three key aims: improving 
energy efficiency, developing clean coal technology and preserving 
forests that absorb carbon (Hongbo, 2009). The specific goal of the Chinese 
Government is to double the share of renewable energy sources from the 
current 7% to 15% by 2020. One example of this commitment is provided 
by the capital, Beijing, where over 200 measures to reduce polluting gases 
emitted by vehicles, coal-fired power stations and factories have been 
introduced since 1998. This commitment was to be further emphasized 
as a result of the 2008 Olympic Games. The Government invested over 
US$ 10 billion in improving the capital's environment and earmarked almost 
US$ 28 billion more for infrastructure, allowing the city to be endowed with 
modern, ecological buildings that have set an example for the rest of the 
country. At the time of the 2008 Olympic Games, three quarters of Beijing's 
60,000 taxis and over a third of its 19,000 diesel buses were refitted or retired, 
and 4,000 ecological buses running on natural gas were brought in.10 
At the same time, the World Bank is supporting solid energy 
efficiency programmes in China via the creation of energy service 
providers offering projects to renew boilers, furnaces, motorized systems, 
internal electricity supply systems, modernization of combustion, heating, 
ventilation and air-conditioning systems, recovery and reuse of steam and 
gas, and replacement of bulbs and cooling systems. 
The Chinese authorities are in no doubt that, henceforth, the 
country's economic growth needs to go hand in hand with greater 
environmental responsibility, for if the Chinese economy carries on 
growing at high rates without any change to its energy use, it will 
overtake the United States as the world's largest emitter of greenhouse 
gases in three decades, and long before that it will be subject to growing 
international pressure, with trade retaliation more than likely. The 
European Union has got ahead of the United States by establishing an 
Producing the 3 billion plastic bags used in China each day consumes 13,000 tons of 
crude a year. In June 2008, the use of these bags by retailers was restricted and reusable 
bags were adopted. 
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energy and climate change cooperation agenda with China, which 
already includes a clean energy technology centre, a joint programme of 
research into carbon capture and storage (three years), and discussions 
on climate change, low-carbon economies, energy efficiency and 
international energy performance standards (Abou, 2009). 
Latin America and the Caribbean need to study this energy 
experience, with its heavy reliance on new technologies, whether to 
learn about these with a view to limiting pollution, or in view of the new 
business opportunities they entail. The region needs to be in touch with 
these processes and take steps to nurture joint ventures and binational 
partnerships in the areas of production, investment, technology and 
external trade. Holding back would not only mean forfeiting opportunities 
in the carbon industry but also, and even more seriously, would surely 
threaten the region's current comparative advantages and worsen its 
technology deficit. 
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C h a p t e r II 
China's trade links with Latin America and the 
Caribbean: towards a strategic relationship 
A. Introduction: in the past decade, Latin America 
and the Caribbean has been China's 
most dynamic trading partner 
China's fastest-growing goods trading relationship over the past five years 
has been with the region, and this is true of both exports and imports. 
In fact, exports and imports between China and Latin America and the 
Caribbean grew twice as fast as their overall exports and imports in the 
2005-2009 period (see table II.l). Thus, China's bilateral trade with the 
region passed the US$ 100 billion mark in 2007 and reached US$ 120 
billion in 2009. The region's shares of total Chinese imports and exports 
have continued to increase, and now stand at 4.7% and 6.4%, respectively. 
This trade is growing, then, but still from a low base. 
Asia, led by China, has considerably increased its share of the 
region's trade flows, even as the relative presence of the United States has 
diminished. In 2009, exports from Latin America and the Caribbean to 
Asia were US$ 103 billion, equivalent to 15% of the region's total exports, 
while the share going to the United States was 42% and the share going 
to the European Union was 14%. China accounts for almost half of Latin 
American and Caribbean trade with Asia (see table II.2). 
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Table 11.1 
CHINA: AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATE OF TRADE WITH 
LEADING PARTNERS IN THE REGION, 2005-2009 
(Millions  of  dollars  and percentages) 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Growth rate 
Exports 
Destination 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 23 259 35 396 51 060 71 045 56 449 24.8 
Asia and the Pacific 140 443 165 971 202 705 246 407 203 988 9.8 
United States 163 180 203 801 233 169 252 844 221 295 7.9 
European Union 145 613 189 978 245 563 293 360 236 442 12.9 
Rest of world 289 458 373 789 487 563 567 038 483 473 13.7 
Imports 
Origin 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 26 664 34 072 51 004 71 417 64 132 24.5 
Asia and the Pacific 259 677 309 645 365 432 414 786 375 533 9.7 
United States 48 741 59 314 69 548 81 586 77 755 12.4 
European Union 73 972 90 641 110 967 132 646 127 769 14.6 
Rest of world 250 898 297 789 359 164 432 129 360 367 9.5 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United 
Nations, Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE). 
Imports are an even greater component of the trading relationship 
with Asia, and China in particular, and this has led to a growing trade 
deficit with that region. Asia's share of imports into Latin America and the 
Caribbean continued to climb strongly over the past decade, rising to 25% 
of the total. Half of this (12%) came from China, which thus became one of 
Latin America's principal suppliers, easily surpassing the European Union 
and the Latin America region itself (see table II.2). This has led a number of 
countries in the region to assess the possibility of entering into free trade 
agreements with Asian countries. It has also created some concern about 
the consequences of the large volume of imports from Asia, owing to their 
effect on the competitiveness of industries in the region's own countries. 
China could displace the European Union as the region's second-
largest trading partner in the middle of the coming decade. Projections 
for 2020 suggest that China will play a vastly greater role as a destination 
for the region's exports. If the current rate of growth in demand for 
products from Latin America and the Caribbean in the United States, the 
European Union and the rest of the world continues, and demand from 
China grows at just half the rate seen in the decade from 2001 to 2010, the 
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latter will overtake the European Union in 2014 and become the second-
largest market for the region's exports. In the case of imports, China is 
forecast to surpass the European Union in 2015 (see figure II.l). This trend 
could moderate if bilateral trade is energized following the partnership 
agreements between the European Union and Central America, the 
Caribbean, the Andean Community and, potentially, MERCOSUR. The 
growth in imports from China is expected to be strongest in the area of 
capital goods, particularly electronic products, parts and components, 
and machinery and equipment, as well as textiles and wearing apparel. 
Chinese products of this type already have a strong presence in the region. 
Table 11.2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TRADE BY DESTINATION 
AND ORIGIN, 2000, 2006-2009' 
(Percentages) 
2000 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Exports 
Destination 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 19.0 17.2 18.2 19.6 18.9 18.9 
Asia 5.0 9.7 11.5 12.2 15.2 16.6 
China 1.1 3.4 4.7 4.9 7.1 8.3 
Other countries of Asia 3.9 6.4 6.8 7.2 8.1 8.3 
United States 61.0 50.0 46.2 43.3 41.5 41.0 
European Union 11.8 14.2 15.0 15.2 13.9 13.1 
Rest of world 3.2 8.9 9.2 9.8 10.5 10.5 
Imports 
Origin 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 15.1 20.5 20.5 21.2 20.7 19.7 
Asia 10.9 22.0 23.1 23.3 24.7 26.9 
China 1.8 8.4 9.6 10.5 11.8 13.3 
Other countries of Asia 9.1 13.6 13.4 12.9 12.9 13.6 
United States 55.0 34.9 32.7 31.2 31.5 30.8 
European Union 12.1 14.3 14.6 14.7 15.1 14.3 
Rest of world 6.9 8.2 9.1 9.6 8.0 8.3 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official  figures 
from the countries; Statistical Office  of the European Communities (EUROSTAT); United States International 
Trade Commission (USITC); and International Monetary Fund (IMF), Department of Trade Statistics (DOTS). 
a The data are for Argentina, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, 
Peru, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Uruguay and the Caribbean. The information on the Caribbean 
was compiled from mirror statistics. The data for the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela come from the 
DOTS database of the IMF. The December data for the country were weighted using national totals and 
the DOTS structure for the last three months. 
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Figure 11.1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (16 COUNTRIES): TOTAL TRANSACTION 
SHARE OF LEADING DESTINATIONS AND ORIGINS, 2000-2020» 
A. Exports 
B. Imports 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United 
Nations, Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE), and national sources. 
a The 16 countries are: Argentina, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia and Uruguay. Estimates and projections based on GDP growth rates in Asia and the 
Pacific, China, the European Union, Latin America and the Caribbean, the United States and the rest of 
the world from 2000 to 2009. The rate of trade growth is expected to converge on the long-term growth 
rate of the economies. 
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It is striking that the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean 
should attribute so much importance (however justified) to negotiations 
with the European Union, whose relative importance as a trading partner 
for the region is gradually declining, and should be so unaware by 
comparison of the importance of Asia and the Pacific. There is certainly 
nothing that could be called a coordinated strategy between countries 
or groups of countries to intensify trade and investment links with that 
region, whose importance for trade is increasing enormously for Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Hitherto, efforts by Latin American countries 
to forge ties with Asia and the Pacific have instead been sporadic and 
isolated, in the form of bilateral free trade treaties. 
The economic slowdown of the 2008-2009 period intensified the 
structural change that was occurring in the region's export pattern. The 
share of Asia, meaning mainly China, increased on the back of the large 
decline in the share of the United States. In 10 years, China virtually 
septupled its share of the region's trade. After two years of stagnation 
(1998-1999) because of the Asian crisis, trade between Latin America and 
the Caribbean and Asia recovered, growing steadily thereafter until the 
recent international financial crisis. 
Despite China's growing importance in the global economy and 
in the region's trade flows, until recently it was a market that had gone 
relatively unexploited, with the exception of some commodities from South 
America. Latin America faces huge challenges if it wishes to strengthen 
its ties with China in order to increase production and investment 
synergies with the country. Biregional trade is still inter-industrial, with 
Latin America exporting mainly commodities and natural resource-
based manufactures to China and importing from it almost nothing but 
manufactures with differing degrees of technology intensity. China's 
great importance in world trade and its (still) low level of trade with Latin 
America and the Caribbean represent challenges and, at the same time, 
major opportunities for the region. 
B. The strong demand for commodities from the Asia 
and Pacific region has helped to improve the 
terms of trade, especially for the countries 
of South America 
China has become a leading importer and consumer of commodities, and 
thus a trading partner of great interest to Latin America and the Caribbean. 
The high growth rate and rapid industrialization of China and, to a lesser 
degree, India have accounted for much of the rise in commodity prices in 
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recent years. As analysed in chapter I, India was responsible for half the 
increase in global rice consumption and a quarter of the increase in wheat 
consumption between 2000 and 2007, while China accounted for half the 
global increase in consumption of soybean oil and a third of the growth 
in demand for soybeans in the same period. Chinese demand has been 
even more apparent in the consumption of metals and petroleum than in 
food markets. China's share of world consumption of finished steel and 
refined aluminium products reached a third in 2007, a large rise on the 
2000 figures of 16% and 14%, respectively. Furthermore, Chinese demand 
for petroleum and its derivatives rose almost six times as fast as global 
demand over the same period, so that it accounted for 35% of the increase 
in global demand for these products. 
Rising Chinese demand for commodities has driven exports and 
improved the terms of trade, especially in the countries of South America. 
The greatest beneficiaries have been petroleum and mineral exporting 
countries (see figure II.2). Higher prices for export products have had a 
greater effect than higher volumes, especially in the countries of South 
America.1 In the cases of Mexico and Central America (except Costa Rica), 
the tendency has been the opposite, with export volumes increasing more. 
This is a clear sign of the importance of the export pattern in this cycle 
and, in particular, the strength of the link with China and with Asia and 
the Pacific in the 2007-2008 period. The countries that went furthest in 
strengthening their trading ties with China as exporters of commodities 
were the ones that saw the greatest improvement in their terms of trade 
in the period. Conversely, the terms of trade of the Central American 
countries worsened. 
Higher commodity prices drove exports during the 2000s. Breaking 
down the value of the region's exports during the 2000s into price and 
volume effects reveals the huge boost given by prices, which largely 
favoured commodity producers. This is the case with the oil- and mineral-
producing countries, especially in South America (see figure II.3). Between 
2000 and 2008, the average rate of growth in these countries' export prices 
was 7.6%, while volume growth was only 4.2%. The products whose prices 
grew at the fastest rates were crude oil, copper, iron ore, soybeans, natural 
gas, and meat and offal, among others. 
1 The value of Latin American and Caribbean goods exports increased at an average rate 
of 10.8% during 2001-2010, thanks to a combination of the price effect (5.5%) and the 
quantity effect (5.3%). When Mexico is excluded, the corresponding figures are: growth 
rate in value, 13.5%, with 7.9% and 5.6% in terms of price and volume, respectively. 
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Figure 11.2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TERMS OF TRADE 
FOR GOODS f.o.b., 2007-2008 
(Index  2000=100) 
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official 
information. 
Figure II.3 
LATIN AMERICA (19 COUNTRIES): PRICE AND VOLUME DECOMPOSITION 
OF EXPORT GROWTH RATES BY VALUE, 2000-2008 
(Percentages) 
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 
Peru 
Chile 



















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official 
information. 
ECLAC 
C. Asia and the Pacific (and China in particular) have 
become vital trading partners for the region, 
particularly where imports are concerned 
China is the linchpin in the market diversification process for Latin 
America and the Caribbean in the Asia and the Pacific region, but 
dynamism in that area is not confined to China. The region has become 
a very important trading partner for Latin America and the Caribbean, 
mainly as an importer. China is playing a more and more important role 
in that trade dynamic, with regard to both exports and imports, having 
quickly displaced Japan as the region's leading trade partner in Asia and 
the Pacific at the beginning of the last decade, notwithstanding the slight 
recovery in Japanese exports in recent years. Furthermore, the countries of 
the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN-6) have caught up 
with the Republic of Korea, or even overtaken it, as a source of imports 
for Latin America and the Caribbean and a destination for the region's 
exports (see figure II.4). 
Some countries in the region still have relatively weak trade links 
with China, despite the country's indisputable importance as a trading 
partner. China's importance as an export market varies considerably 
among the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean (see table II.3 
and figure II.5A). Since the beginning of the past decade, China has 
become a crucial export market for Cuba, Chile, Peru, Brazil, Costa Rica 
and Argentina (listed in order of the share of exports taken by China). 
At the same time, the Chinese market has not been much exploited by 
Ecuador and the countries of Central America, with the exception of Costa 
Rica. China takes a strikingly small share of Mexico's exports: just 1.0% of 
the total in 2009. China has recently come to account for almost half of all 
exports to Asia and the Pacific for most of the region's countries. China's 
importance as an export destination has increased in almost all cases, the 
exceptions being Ecuador and some Caribbean countries. 
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Figure 11.4 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EXPORT AND IMPORT 
SHARES OF SELECTED COUNTRIES IN THE ASIA 




-ASEAN (6) China Rep. of Korea Japan Other 
Source: United Nations, Commodi ty Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE). 
a The statistics were obtained from the Asian countries and supplemented with figures from Latin 
America and the Caribbean where necessary. ASEAN-6 includes Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam. "Other" includes Australia, Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region of China, New Zealand and other unspecified countries and territories. 
ECLAC 
Table 11.3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EXPORTS 
TO MAIN DESTINATIONS, 2000 AND 2009'" 
(Percentages  of  total  exports) 
Latin 
United European America 
States Union and the 
Caribbean 
2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 
Argentina 9.4 15.2 3.0 6.6 12.0 6.2 18.0 18.6 48.1 42.2 
Bolivia (Piurinationai 
State of) 1.4 18.3 0.4 2.4 24.0 8.4 17.3 9.1 44.2 59.6 
Brazil 10.3 26.1 2.0 13.2 24.3 10.2 28.0 22.2 24.8 22.5 




Colombia 2.6 6.0 0.2 2.9 50.4 39.6 13.9 14.2 28.9 24.6 
Ecuador 10.9 2.6 1.2 0.9 37.9 33.4 12.9 14.9 31.5 42.7 
o 
W 
Paraguay 2.0 7.1 0.7 1.1 3.9 1.6 13.6 6.0 74.5 69.6 
Peru 16.9 26.9 6.4 15.4 28.0 16.3 22.0 15.6 18.1 16.0 
Uruguay 8.3 8.5 4.0 4.3 8.3 3.3 16.3 15.0 54.2 40.0 
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of) 1.9 15.5 0.1 5.9 59.6 48.8 5.8 13.3 19.6 15.8 
Costa Rica 5.5 17.6 0.2 8.8 52.0 33.7 22.1 17.3 19.0 27.1 
05 El Salvador 0.4 1.7 0.0 0.1 65.5 46.6 5.7 5.8 27.8 43.5 
0 
E < 
Guatemala 3.6 3.2 0.1 0.4 44.0 42.5 10.9 5.5 35.6 40.1 
Honduras 1.6 3.4 0.0 1.5 79.3 40.7 4.5 22.7 6.0 29.3 
"c 
0 
Mexico 1.4 3.7 0.2 1.0 88.2 80.7 3.5 5.1 3.6 6.4 
u Nicaragua 0.8 2.5 0.0 | 57.2 29.5 16.4 13.3 23.4 50.8 
Panama 2.0 8.2 0.2 2.5 45.9 42.6 21.7 24.4 23.2 19.5 
Bahamas 2.4 20.2 0.0 0.0 48.3 37.2 29.8 18.0 1.5 13.6 
Barbados 0.7 2.8 - 0.9 13.5 9.9 18.5 7.7 16.2 73.1 
Belize 0.8 5.1 - 0.1 45.0 32.1 27.8 29.4 30.6 21.0 
W 
.33 
Cuba 9.8 27.0 4.8 24.3 - - 38.5 21.0 10.5 20.0 
c Dominican Republic 1.4 4.3 - 2.0 91.1 61.9 6.3 10.4 4.2 20.7 
o 
c 
m Dominica 0.0 42.4 - 1.4 10.9 0.9 56.9 7.0 28.8 34.7 üí .Q Grenada 3.1 0.7 - 0.0 7.4 12.8 56.2 7.4 24.4 54.3 
03 
O 
Guyana 6.6 3.4 - 1.4 20.5 25.9 48.5 18.6 10.3 17.5 
Haiti 1.2 2.4 - 0.9 83.0 80.7 12.5 4.9 6.5 4.8 
Jamaica 1.0 3.0 0.0 0.4 28.4 35.1 31.8 16.3 5.1 10.4 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 3.3 0.7 - 0.3 61.3 57.9 34.2 9.2 3.8 8.2 
Asia and _ China the Pacific 
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Table 11.3 (concluded) 
Asia and 
the Pacific China 
Latin 
United European America 
States Union and the 
Caribbean 
2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 
Í» Saint Lucia 0.1 3.6 - 0.1 16.6 19.4 68.9 24.7 8.7 50.5 
c 
g Saint Vincent and the 
° Grenadines c 05 1» „ • -o Suriname .a 
0.0 2.1 - 0.0 10.6 1.5 54.6 60.7 34.0 29.9 
6.2 1.4 - 0.8 11.8 12.3 38.3 22.6 6.3 6.5 
O Trinidad and Tobago 1.4 4.7 0.1 0.7 53.9 46.8 9.0 14.8 18.0 27.9 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 5.3 15.4 1.1 7.1 59.7 40.9 11.6 13.6 16.0 19.2 
Source: United Nations, Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE); official  information from the 
countries; and International Monetary Fund (IMF), Department of Trade Statistics (DOTS) (where indicated). 
a Maquila exports have been included in the total for the Central American Common Market (CACM) 
countries and have been assigned to the United States. 
b The 2000 data are from United Nations, Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE), while 
those for 2009 are from national sources. The Caribbean data (other than those for the Dominican 
Republic) are from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Department of Trade Statistics (DOTS). 
Increase of over 10% in the share of total exports taken by the country or region. 
Decrease of over 10% in the share of total exports taken by the country or region. 
China's importance as a source of imports also varies greatly 
between the region's countries. Paraguay, Peru, Chile, Mexico, Brazil, 
Argentina, Cuba and Dominican Republic and a number of countries in 
South America are particularly dependent on trade with China, making 
at least 10% of their external purchases from that country (see table II.4 
and figure II.5B). The countries of Central America and the Caribbean 
depend less on China as a source of imports, although much more than 
for their exports. Mexican dependence is particularly high, as the country 
buys almost 14% of all its imported goods and services from China, as 
compared to just 12% or so from the European Union. In summary, the 
region's trade is becoming more balanced between the exporting countries 
of Asia. By contrast with the 1980s and 1990s, when Japan was the region's 
main supplier and importer, in recent years China, Japan, the Republic of 
Korea and ASEAN have played a large part in the trade of Latin America 
and the Caribbean. Generally speaking, China is the main trading partner 
in terms of both exports and imports, and is very strongly represented in 
Latin American and Caribbean imports from Asia and the Pacific. 
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Table 11.4 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: IMPORTS 
BY MAIN ORIGINS, 2000 AND 2009' 
Asia and 







2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 
Argentina 13.9 20.8 4.6 12.4 18.9 13.2 23.5 16.8 34.3 40.0 
Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of) 10.6 18.7 3.1 8.1 22.0 13.5 11.7 8.7 49.6 57.5 
Brazil 13.6 29.0 2.2 12.5 23.3 15.7 26.0 22.9 21.3 17.6 
TO o Chile 16.3 27.8 5.7 14.6 19.7 18.1 17.4 16.2 35.8 30.1 
a) 
E Colombia 11.8 15.9 3.0 11.3 33.2 28.7 16.7 16.1 27.1 25.2 
< .n Ecuador 8.5 19.7 2.2 6.8 25.6 25.6 12.6 10.2 43.7 41.4 
o 
CO 
Paraguay 19.1 38.0 11.4 30.1 7.3 4.1 12.0 5.5 56.0 48.6 
Peru 16.1 28.4 3.9 14.8 23.4 19.6 14.1 11.2 38.4 33.2 
Uruguay 7.8 16.8 3.2 11.9 9.8 8.2 18.8 10.8 51.7 56.6 
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of) 8.6 12.5 1.3 8.6 37.8 24.3 19.4 18.8 25.0 36.2 
Costa Rica 5.5 11.6 0.2 6.1 52.0 25.8 22.1 6.3 19.0 25.9 
TO 
EL Salvador 0.4 10.6 0.0 4.6 65.5 36.0 5.7 7.5 27.8 40.9 
O 
CD E < 
Guatemala 3.6 11.9 0.1 6.4 44.0 36.0 10.9 7.2 35.6 34.4 
Honduras 1.6 10.8 0.0 4.8 79.3 33.6 4.5 6.1 6.0 45.6 
"c 
03 Mexico 9.7 31.4 1.6 13.9 71.2 48.1 8.4 11.7 2.6 4.4 
O 
Nicaragua 0.8 17.6 0.0 57.2 20.1 16.4 7.4 23.4 54.1 
Panama 9.4 13.3 0.6 4.2 33.1 29.1 8.8 7.0 30.9 23.0 
Bahamas 7.6 9.0 0.4 4.9 33.7 27.2 20.9 10.9 21.8 44.7 
Barbados 25.4 34.5 0.0 4.9 38.1 25.1 19.0 11.4 5.1 20.7 





Cuba 14.6 17.7 9.2 12.9 0.1 7.1 35.3 19.7 36.5 43.6 
República 




Dominica 9.5 60.3 0.6 7.9 33.1 14.1 23.0 4.7 24.7 18.4 
£ Granada 10.3 4.4 0.7 1.5 30.6 21.1 21.5 5.7 28.2 53.8 
O Guyana 6.7 17.8 0.3 7.4 29.9 25.6 23.8 9.7 16.4 38.2 
Haiti 8.4 13.6 0.5 7.6 57.9 36.2 11.5 7.6 6.8 31.6 
Jamaica 6.9 9.5 0.4 5.0 48.5 35.0 11.4 6.9 20.4 39.9 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 3.9 3.7 - 0.7 52.8 42.0 25.4 21.4 11.7 26.7 
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Table 11.4 (concluded) 
77 
Latin 
Asia and China United European America 
the Pacific States Union and the 
Caribbean 
2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 
1 Saint Lucia 10.0 0.7 0.0 0.2 45.4 11.6 25.7 1.3 12.5 85.7 
sz 
g Saint Vincent and the 
° Grenadines c 5.6 38.8 0.7 13.1 36.5 15.2 26.5 16.4 24.7 21.2 
® ... . -Q Suriname 4.9 18.7 0.3 8.8 40.1 28.0 30.3 25.9 16.9 23.5 
Q Trinidad and Tobago 6.4 12.0 0.8 4.4 40.9 29.2 16.8 8.8 21.0 22.7 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 10.6 25.3 2.2 11.9 50.4 30.4 14.2 14.5 15.3 21.0 
Source: United Nations, Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE); official  information from the 
countries; and International Monetary Fund (IMF), Department of Trade Statistics (DOTS) (where Indicated). 
a The 2000 data are from COMTRADE, while those for 2009 are from official  country information and 
DOTS. The data on theCaribbean countries (except the Dominican Republic) are from DOTS. 
Increase of over 10% in the share of total imports taken by the country or region. 
Decrease of over 10% in the share of total imports taken by the country or region. 
Figure 11.5 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: SHARE OF ALL TRANSACTIONS 
ACCOUNTED FOR BY SELECTED GROUPINGS AND COUNTRIES IN 
THE ASIAAND THE PACIFIC REGION, 2006-2008 AVERAGE • 




Rep. of Korea Japan IS India China • Australia and New Zealand ASEANb 
ECLAC 
Figure 11.5 (concluded) 
B. Imports 
Rep. of Korea Japan c i n d i a China • Australia and New Zealand ASEANb 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United 
Nations, Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE). 
a In the years for which data are available in each country. 
b Includes Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam. 
Includes Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, 
Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago. 
Latin America and the Caribbean has not been a major trading 
partner for Asia and the Pacific, so the relationship between the two 
regions is very asymmetrical. On average, just 2.3% of total exports from 
Asia and the Pacific went to Latin America and the Caribbean in the 
2005-2008 period, while 2.7% of its imports came from there. For all the 
geographical groupings on which data are available, the share of Latin 
America and the Caribbean in the total exports and imports of Asia and 
the Pacific generally does not exceed 4%, the exception being the Republic 
of Korea (see figure II.6). Nonetheless, there are considerable differences 
from one country to another. On average, the region's largest share is 
in the total exports of the Republic of Korea (4.6%), while in the case of 
imports China has the largest share (3.3%). The share of Latin America and 
the Caribbean in the total exports and imports of the small economies of 
Asia and the Pacific (such as the ASEAN countries) is very small. 
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Figure 11.6 
ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, SELECTED COUNTRIES AND GROUPINGS: EXPORT 
AND IMPORT SHARES OF LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN 
COUNTRIES AND GROUPINGS, 2005-2008 AVERAGE 
(Percentages  of  country  totals) 
A. Exports 
Rep. of Korea 
New Zealand 
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Rep. of Korea 
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• Andean Communlty-5b HCACM MERCOSUR ^Chi le Mexico 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United 
Nations, Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE). 
a Includes Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. 
b The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is included in the Andean Community for the purposes of this 
analysis. 
o 3 5 
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D. China helped to bolster the region's exports 
during the financial crisis 
The crisis brought to an end a "golden age" for the Latin American economy. 
Growth in Latin America and the Caribbean was 4.6% in 2008, making this 
the sixth consecutive year of expansion in the region, but it also marked 
the end of a period with few precedents in the economic history of Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Between 2003 and 2008, the region expanded 
at an average annual rate of close to 5%, which meant that per capita GDP 
growth was in excess of 3% a year. This growth was accompanied by 
improving labour market and income distribution indicators in the region, 
and by a reduction in poverty. Another remarkable characteristic of the 
period is that most of the countries prioritized macroeconomic equilibria 
in their policymaking and accordingly ran surpluses in their external and 
fiscal accounts, something the very favourable external environment of 
recent years also contributed to. 
To a large extent, the growth seen in Latin America and the 
Caribbean between 2003 and 2008 and the region's rapid recovery from the 
crisis were due to its increasing links with the Asia and the Pacific region, 
and China in particular. This was most particularly the case in South 
America, although Costa Rica in Central America is an interesting case of 
export diversification towards Asia and the Pacific. High Chinese demand 
for food, energy, metals and minerals has benefited countries exporting 
these, substantially improving their terms of trade and stimulating 
growth. At the same time, from a trade point of view, the emergence of 
the Latin America and Caribbean region from the international financial 
crisis has largely been due to the economic recovery of Asia in general and 
China in particular, one of the few drivers of global growth in 2009. As 
can be seen in figure II.7, Latin American exports to China became more 
dynamic and indeed recovered strongly in the post-crisis period, ahead of 
those to all other leading destinations. 
Latin American and Caribbean output and trade have recovered 
more quickly than anticipated. After experiencing one of their severest 
contractions of the last 72 years in 2009, the region's trade flows recovered 
vigorously in 2010. This solid recovery has largely been based on the 
dynamism of domestic demand, a pick-up in investment and a robust 
export performance driven by demand from China and the rest of Asia and 
by the normalization of demand in the United States. Unflagging demand 
from China and the rest of Asia for a number of the commodities exported 
by the region has underpinned high international prices for these goods, 
which are such an important part of the economic performance of the Latin 
American and Caribbean countries. In the post-crisis period, exports from 
the South American countries performed best, while Mexico and the Central 
American countries fared less well. This is connected to the more favourable 
pricing of raw material exports, which represent a larger percentage of 
South American than of Mexican or Central American exports. 
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Figure 11.7 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: VALUE OF GOODS EXPORTS TO 
LEADING DESTINATIONS, MARCH 2006 TO DECEMBER 2009 
(January  2006=100) 
United States European Union 
Asia (excluding China) China 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official 
country information. 
The exports of Latin America and the Caribbean contracted during 
2009, with the exception of those going to China, which continued to rise 
at the height of the crisis. Bilateral trade relations with China and the rest 
of Asia merit special attention, since these have been the flows with the 
most dynamic performance before, during and since the crisis. Despite 
the international recession, in 2009 the region's exports to China rose 
by 5%, while in the same year its exports to the United States and the 
European Union fell by 26% and 28%, respectively; those to Asia fell by 
just 5% (see figure II.8). 
The economic dynamism of China has come to the rescue of Latin 
American and Caribbean exports. The countries of South America, and 
especially those of MERCOSUR, were actually able to increase their 
exports to China at the height of the crisis (see figure II.9). Chile's exports 
to China recovered rapidly in 2009 after falling substantially in 2008. 
Because their export baskets are less dependent on commodities, Mexico 
and Central America experienced higher export growth at the height of 
the crisis than South America. In the post-crisis period, all the countries 
in the region except Costa Rica and Honduras saw their exports to China 
grow quite strongly (ECLAC, 2010a). The region's imports from China fell 
by 15%. By country and subregion, Mexico was the least-affected market, 
while the countries of South America saw a considerable decline in 2009 
by comparison with the previous year. 
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Figure 11.8 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: VALUE OF GOODS EXPORTS BY MAIN 
ORIGINS AND DESTINATIONS, 2007 TO 2008 AND 2008 TO 2009 
(Percentages) 
A. Exports 
-40 -20 0 20 40 
B. Imports 
-40 -20 0 20 40 
2007 -2008 1 2 0 0 8 - 2 0 0 9 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official 
country information. 
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Figure 11.9 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: VALUE OF GOODS TRADE TO 
AND FROM CHINA, 2007 TO 2008 AND 2008 TO 2009 
(Percentages) 
A. Exports 




Latin America and Caribbean 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official 
country information. 
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As a region, Latin America and the Caribbean runs a trade deficit 
with China because of the growing negative trade balance of Mexico and 
Central America. Latin America and the Caribbean ran a trade deficit with 
China over the past decade, mainly because of the rising negative balances 
of Mexico and the Central American countries. By contrast, the trade of the 
South American economies with China has been in rough balance over the 
past 10 years (see figure 11.10). China has become one of the main sources 
of imports for Mexico and Central America, but the weight of China as 
an export destination has not increased significantly. This asymmetry will 
have to be taken into account in their respective trade strategies. 
At the height of the crisis, the quantity of Chinese imports of a 
number of products of great interest to the economies of Latin America 
and the Caribbean continued to rise. During the crisis, exports to China of 
a number of products of interest to the region, such as fruit, cereals, wood 
and some minerals and metals, actually rose by value. 
Figure 11.10 
SOUTH AMERICA, CENTRAL AMERICA AND MEXICO: EXPORTS 
AND IMPORTS AND TRADE BALANCE WITH CHINA, 1985-2009 
(Millions  of  dollars) 
A. South America 
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Figure 11.10 (concluded) 
B. Mexico and Central America 
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Trade balance Exports Imports 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United 
Nations, Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE); official  country information; and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), Department of Trade Statistics (DOTS). 
Table 11.5 
CHINA: RATES OF IMPORT GROWTH FROM JANUARY TO SEPTEMBER 2009 
COMPARED TO THE SAME PERIOD THE PREVIOUS YEAR, 
BY PRODUCT AND BY PRICE AND VOLUME 
(Millions  of  dollars  and percentages) 
Value 
Compared to the same 
period in 2008 
Quantity Value 
Fresh and dried fruit  and nuts 1 247.1 36.0 42.4 
Cereals and cereal powder 627.8 82.8 6.4 
Soy 14 068.8 12.8 -19.4 
Edible vegetable oil 4 347.1 9.7 -34.4 
Average -18.0 
Iron ore 36 483.5 35.7 -26.1 
Copper 
Copper and unwrought sheet copper 16 371.7 77.0 8.3 
Copper scrap 3 875.6 -32.6 -22.7 
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Table 11.5 (concluded) 
Value 
Compared to the same 
period in 2008 
Quantity Value 
Steel 14 731.0 8.6 -18.3 
Billets and crude forgings 1 669.8 2689.1 350.0 
Alumina 990.4 16.6 -29.2 
Aluminium and unwrought aluminium 4 295.2 189.8 45.3 
Scrap metal 1 783.6 8.4 -12.3 
Average -5.6 
Crude oil 58 595.6 8.2 -44.4 
Refined oil 12 325.1 -8.2 -53.3 
Average -45.9 
Plastics in primary forms 25 290.3 30.6 -7.9 
ABS resin 2 482.0 3.4 -14.8 
Fertilizers 1 751.0 -24.6 -27.4 
Pesticides 277.7 3.8 19.0 
Natural rubber (including latex) 1 967.9 1.1 -41.7 
Synthetic rubber (including latex) 2 173.4 9.0 -22.0 
Polyester chips 210.9 13.9 -15.9 
Unsawn wood 2 932.3 -9.7 -27.8 
Wood 1 610.8 35.5 8.2 
Wood veneer 52.7 -45.3 -54.2 
Wood pulp 5 062.0 40.6 -7.5 
Paper and cardboard (not cut to shape) 2 268.2 -12.0 -18.2 
Synthetic textiles 519.7 3.7 -16.6 
Average -12.3 
Metal processing machine tools 4 510.1 -27.7 -21.2 
Aircraft 6 867.9 10.0 4.4 
Synthetic yarn 1 118.0 -6.4 -9.9 
Machinery and electrical products 345 925.4 - -16.8 
High-technology products 217 393.0 - -18.1 
Automobiles and automobile chassis 9 297.1 -16.7 -20.5 
Average -17.1 
Source: Economic Commission for Lafln America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official 
Information from the Chinese General Administration of Customs. 
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E. The region's trade with China is characterized 
by a high concentration of origin and 
destination countries 
Most Latin American and Caribbean trade with China is carried out by a 
few countries. The region's imports from China are even more concentrated 
than its exports. During the 2005-2008 period, five countries accounted for 
an average of almost 86% of all the region's exports: Brazil (33%), Chile 
(25%), Argentina (12%), Mexico (9%) and Peru (7%) (see table II.6). The 
region's imports of goods from China are even more concentrated: Mexico 
is the largest importer in Latin America and the Caribbean, accounting for 
48% of the region's total purchases, followed by Brazil (20%), Argentina 
(6%) and Chile (6%). Chile and Peru's imports of Chinese products are 
much smaller than their exports to the country (see table II.7). The most 
striking characteristic of the region's imports of goods from Asia and the 
Pacific, and from China in particular, has been the rapid increase in the 
share of Mexico, which accounted for about half of total imports from 
China in the period, as compared to the 25% recorded in early 1990. Thus, 
China has become the second-largest exporter to Mexico after the United 
States. Where the region in general is concerned, China plays a leading 
role as both exporter and importer, whereas Japan is mainly an importer. 
However, the share of the Republic of Korea and ASEAN-5 is moderately 
high in some countries. 
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Table 11.6 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EXPORTS TO SELECTED COUNTRIES AND 
GROUPINGS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, 2005-2008 AVERAGE • 
(Millions  of  current  dollars  and percentages) 
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Latin America and 
the Caribbean 16 707.1 30 549.4 8 198.6 8 649.6 1 979.6 4 785.7 70 870.1 724 733.5 
Andean 
Community 2 341.3 3 613.7 1 030.5 408.8 122.9 291.0 7 808.3 138 064.9 
Bolivia 
(Plurinational 
State of) 283.1 60.1 280.0 20.1 5.0 2.9 651.3 4 683.2 
Colombia 355.2 479.2 140.3 168.8 23.1 40.2 1 206.7 28 299.7 
Ecuador 100.5 155.8 22.1 14.0 17.1 49.9 359.3 13 727.0 
Peru 1 467.5 2 725.4 553.9 159.8 76.9 167.2 5 150.6 24 960.5 
Venezuela 
(Bolivarian 
Republic of) 135.0 193.2 34.3 46.1 .8 30.9 440.3 66 394.5 
MERCOSUR 6 424.5 17 921.6 3 322.5 6 375.3 1 078.9 2 047.6 37 170.4 234 497.4 
Argentina 463.5 4 546.7 498.9 1 901.6 224.7 830.0 8 465.5 53 113.2 
Brazil 4 453.2 10 597.3 2 256.1 4 279.7 777.0 1 034.3 23 397.6 153 731.5 
Paraguay 40.3 52.2 13.7 34.2 .3 16.1 156.7 2 692.2 
Uruguay 1 467.5 2 725.4 553.9 159.8 76.9 167.2 5 150.6 24 960.5 
Chile 5 888.4 6 437.5 3 156.2 892.4 193.6 1 399.1 17 967.3 53 405.1 
CACM 178.4 628.5 143.5 214.0 26.3 27.9 1 218.6 18 845.0 
Costa Rica 69.6 561.4 75.0 163.9 15.6 18.3 903.8 8 269.4 
El Salvador 16.2 5.5 2.9 10.5 1.5 2.6 39.3 1 977.1 
Guatemala 63.2 39.1 43.8 33.7 3.1 6.6 189.5 5 803.5 
Honduras 18.7 17.0 21.2 3.3 3.6 .4 64.2 1 855.2 
Nicaragua 10.8 5.4 .4 2.6 2.5 .0 21.7 939.7 
Mexico 1 755.6 1 690.9 479.4 713.3 537.5 961.5 6 138.1 256 813.5 
The Caribbean and 
other countries of 
Latin America 118.8 257.3 66.5 45.8 20.3 58.6 567.4 23 107.6 
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Table 11.6 (concluded) 
Latin American and Caribbean percentage of total Each destination's percentage of total 
< LU 
tn < 
iz ™ ra 
< N 
TO 0 </>  ro < 0-
< LU 
tn < 
iz ™ ra 
< N 
W 03 < CL 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 2.3 4.2 1.1 1.2 0.3 0.7 9.8 
14.0 11.8 12.6 4.7 6.2 6.1 11.0 1.7 2.6 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.2 5.7 
1.7 0.2 3.4 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.9 6.0 1.3 6.0 0.4 0.1 0.1 13.9 
2.1 1.6 1.7 2.0 1.2 0.8 1.7 1.3 1.7 0.5 0.6 0.1 0.1 4.3 
0.6 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.9 1.0 0.5 0.7 1.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.4 2.6 
8.8 8.9 6.8 1.8 3.9 3.5 7.3 5.9 10.9 2.2 0.6 0.3 0.7 20.6 
0.8 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.7 
38.5 58.7 40.5 73.7 54.5 42.8 52.4 2.7 7.6 1.4 2.7 0.5 0.9 15.9 
2.8 14.9 6.1 22.0 11.4 17.3 11.9 0.9 8.6 0.9 3.6 0.4 1.6 15.9 
26.7 34.7 27.5 49.5 39.2 21.6 33.0 2.9 6.9 1.5 2.8 0.5 0.7 15.2 
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.2 1.5 1.9 0.5 1.3 0.0 0.6 5.8 
8.8 8.9 6.8 1.8 3.9 3.5 7.3 5.9 10.9 2.2 0.6 0.3 0.7 20.6 
35.2 21.1 38.5 10.3 9.8 29.2 25.4 11.0 12.1 5.9 1.7 0.4 2.6 33.6 
1.1 2.1 1.7 2.5 1.3 0.6 1.7 0.9 3.3 0.8 1.1 0.1 0.1 6.5 
0.4 1.8 0.9 1.9 0.8 0.4 1.3 0.8 6.8 0.9 2.0 0.2 0.2 10.9 
0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.8 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.1 2.0 
0.4 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.3 1.1 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.1 0.1 3.3 
0.1 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 1.0 0.9 1.1 0.2 0.2 0.0 3.5 
0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.6 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.0 2.3 
10.5 5.5 5.8 8.2 27.2 20.1 8.7 0.7 0.7 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.4 2.4 
0.7 0.8 0.8 0.5 1.0 1.2 0.8 0.5 1.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.3 2.5 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United 
Nations, Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE). 
a The Asia and the Pacific total is the sum of the preceding columns, so that it does not include 
exports to countries in Asia or to economies such as Taiwan Province of China or Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region of China. 
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Table 11.7 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: IMPORTS FROM SELECTED COUNTRIES 
AND GROUPINGS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, 2005-2008 AVERAGE • 
(Millions  of  current  dollars  and percentages) 
















































Latin America and 
the Caribbean 28 586 60 514 20 449 19 958 3 188 4 981 137 676 645 972 
Andean 
Community 3 238 8 249 2 209 1 468 247 784 16 195 97 547 
Bolivia 
(Plurinational 
State of) 298 253 23 29 5 19 626 3 424 
Colombia 1 008 2 928 793 546 37 400 5 712 29 983 
Ecuador 543 1 173 469 290 10 67 2 553 13 176 
Peru 601 1 706 421 335 83 174 3 319 16 102 
Venezuela 
(Bolivarian 
Republic of) 787 2 190 504 268 112 125 3 985 34 862 
MERCOSUR 6 146 17 794 4 221 5 805 1 098 2 527 37 591 167 831 
Argentina 1 017 4 212 519 1 096 195 345 7 383 41 243 
Brazil 4 665 11 500 3 559 4 532 884 2 101 27 242 114 690 
Paraguay 403 1 571 79 135 3 32 2 222 6 104 
Uruguay 61 510 65 43 16 49 744 5 794 
Chile 1 249 3 635 1 933 731 237 169 7 953 35 772 
CACM 1 445 1 980 816 499 132 196 5 068 39 136 
Costa Rica 668 631 229 211 15 36 1 790 12 073 
El Salvador 161 266 108 62 42 20 660 6 809 
Guatemala 365 706 403 141 50 86 1 751 12 026 
Honduras 134 164 35 40 18 29 420 5 290 
Nicaragua 117 213 41 44 8 25 447 2 938 
Mexico 15 250 26 642 10 815 10 833 1 236 1 163 65 938 267 104 
The Caribbean and 
other countries of 
Latin America 1 258 2 213 456 622 238 143 4 930 38 583 
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Table 11.7 (concluded) 
Percentage of the Latin American 
and Caribbean total Percentage of total from each origin 
S « i = .2 ü cL •— a J . « 5 , ! u tf)  u> ro m .n a) 
< < N ^ < C L ™ o a: < < n £ < o-
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 4.4 9.4 3.2 3.1 0.5 0 .8 21.3 
11.3 13.6 10.8 7.4 7.7 15.7 11.1 3 .3 8.5 2 .3 1.5 0.3 0 .8 16.6 
1.0 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.5 8.7 7.4 0.7 0.8 0.1 0 .5 18.3 
3 .5 4.8 3.9 2.7 1.2 8.0 4.1 3.4 9.8 2 .6 1.8 0.1 1.3 19.0 
1.9 1.9 2.3 1.5 0.3 1.3 1.9 4.1 8.9 3 .6 2.2 0.1 0.5 19.4 
2.1 2.8 2.1 1.7 2.6 3 .5 2.4 3.7 10.6 2 .6 2.1 0.5 1.1 20 .6 
2 .8 3.6 2.5 1.3 3 .5 2 .5 2.9 2 .3 6.3 1.4 0.8 0.3 0.4 11.4 
21.5 29 .4 20.6 29.1 34 .4 50.7 27.3 3.7 10.6 2 .5 3 .5 0.7 1.5 22 .4 
3.6 7.0 2.5 5 .5 6.1 6.9 5.4 2 .5 10.2 1.3 2.7 0.5 0 .8 17.9 
16.3 19.0 17.4 22 .7 27.7 42.2 19.8 4.1 10.0 3.1 4.0 0.8 1.8 23 .8 
1.4 2.6 0.4 0.7 0.1 0.6 1.6 6.6 25.7 1.3 2.2 0.1 0 .5 36 .4 
0.2 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.5 1.0 0.5 1.0 8.8 1.1 0.7 0.3 0 .8 12.8 
4.4 6.0 9.5 3.7 7.4 3.4 5.8 3 .5 10.2 5 .4 2.0 0.7 0 .5 22 .2 
5.1 3.3 4.0 2 .5 4.1 3.9 3.7 3.7 5.1 2.1 1.3 0.3 0 .5 13.0 
2 .3 1.0 1.1 1.1 0.5 0.7 1.3 5.5 5.2 1.9 1.7 0.1 0 .3 14.8 
0.6 0.4 0.5 0 .3 1.3 0.4 0.5 2.4 3.9 1.6 0.9 0.6 0 .3 9.7 
1.3 1.2 2.0 0.7 1.6 1.7 1.3 3.0 5.9 3 .3 1.2 0.4 0.7 14.6 
0.5 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.6 0.3 2.5 3.1 0.7 0.8 0.3 0 .5 7.9 
0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.3 4.0 7.3 1.4 1.5 0.3 0 .9 15.2 
53 .3 44 .0 52 .9 54 .3 38 .8 23 .4 47.9 5.7 10.0 4.0 4.1 0.5 0.4 24.7 
4.4 3.7 2.2 3.1 7.5 2.9 3.6 3 .3 5.7 1.2 1.6 0.6 0.4 12.8 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United 
Nations, Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE). 
a The Asia and the Pacific total is the sum of the preceding columns, so that it does not include exports 
to other countries in Asia or to economies such as Taiwan Province of China or Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region of China. 
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F. China as a key factor in the current process of 
"re-commodification" of the Latin American 
and Caribbean export sector 
China has been a determining factor in the renewed predominance of raw 
materials in the region's export structure. After declining from levels of 
nearly 52% in the early 1980s to a low of 27% in the late 1990s, the share 
of raw materials in exports increased during the last decade to almost 
40% of the total in the two-year period 2008-2009 (see figure 11.11). While 
the export growth rate of South America doubled during the decade just 
past, that of Mexico and Central America moderated by over 50%. Natural 
resource exports were the region's most dynamic, especially in South 
America (ECLAC, 2010b). 
Figure 11.11 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EVOLVING STRUCTURE 
OF WORLDWIDE EXPORTS, 1981-2009 
(Percentages  of  the totai  by  value) 
100 -












1981-1982 1985-1986 1991-1992 1995-1996 1998-1999 2001-2002 2005-2006 2008-2009 
High-technology manufactures 
^ Medium-technology manufactures 
Low-technology manufactures 
Natural resource manufactures Raw materials 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United 
Nations, Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE). 
Growth in sectors associated with natural resources, driven mainly 
by Chinese demand, has not done enough to create new technological 
capabilities in the region. Although profitability in these sectors has 
increased and there have even been productivity gains, the lack of active 
production development policies has resulted in widening productivity 
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gaps relative to countries deemed to be at the production frontier, 
especially the United States. Consequently, there is a need to move towards 
a trading relationship better suited to the patterns of economic and social 
development that Latin America and the Caribbean needs (ECLAC, 2010a). 
Exports to China and the rest of Asia are characterized by a more 
concentrated pattern. Specifically, in the composition of exports by 
technology intensity those going to the main destinations in Asia, and 
to a lesser extent the European Union, are dominated by raw materials, 
which average over 55% of total exports. Next in importance come 
natural resource-based manufactures, with processed mineral products 
(copper and iron, among others) and, to a lesser extent, agro-industrial 
products such as food, drink and tobacco (see figure 11.12). Conversely, 
the pattern of exports to the United States is more diversified. This is 
largely because of Mexico's exports. Exports within the region itself are 
more diversified and have a larger share of manufactures. Industrialized 
products represent virtually 80% of the total, with natural resource-
based manufactures and those with a medium and low technology 
content predominating. Thus, of all extraregional destinations, it is only 
in exports to the United States that manufactures are as well represented 
as in intraregional trade (ECLAC, 2010a). 
Figure 11.12 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: STRUCTURE OF EXPORTS TO MAIN 
DESTINATIONS BY TECHNOLOGY INTENSITY, 2005-2008 
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Latin America United States European Union China Other Asia 
and the Caribbean 
A. Including Mexico 
94 ECLAC 
Figure 11.12 (concluded) 
B. Not including Mexico 
and the Caribbean 
• High-technology manufactures Medium-technology manufactures 
Low-technology manufactures K Natural resource-based manufactures 
Commodities 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United 
Nations, Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE). 
Trade between Asia and the Pacific and Latin America and the 
Caribbean is almost entirely inter-industrial, although there are some 
differences between the countries of the former region as regards the origin 
and destination of products. The prominence of primary products and 
natural resource-based manufactures in the exports of Latin America and 
the Caribbean to Asia and the Pacific is plain to see in the cases of Japan and, 
to a lesser extent, of China, the ASEAN countries and the Republic of Korea. 
The manufactures of Latin America and the Caribbean, including those 
with a medium or high technology content, account for a no less significant 
percentage in the import basket of ASEAN. The countries of Oceania 
usually exhibit a large component of medium-technology manufactures (see 
figure 11.13). With the "re-commodification" of the region's export sector in 
recent years, the share of commodities has increased. 
The structure of Latin American and Caribbean imports from the 
Asia and the Pacific region is the reverse of the region's export structure, 
although it does vary markedly between countries and subregions. Where 
Japan and, to a lesser extent, China, the Republic of Korea and ASEAN 
are concerned, the most important components are medium- and high-
technology manufactures. The largest percentage of high-technology 
manufactures is seen in the ASEAN group. Conversely, the export basket 
of the countries of Oceania is dominated by primary products. It remains 
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to be seen whether the trade agreements currently in force or being 
negotiated in the Asia and the Pacific region, or between this and Latin 
America and the Caribbean, will alter these structures. 
Figure 11.13 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: STRUCTURE OF TRADE WITH SELECTED 
MARKETS IN ASIA, BY TECHNOLOGY INTENSITY, 2005-2008 AVERAGE 
(Percentages  of  total) 
A. Exports 
Japan China i. of Korea ASEAN (5)a Australia and Rest of Total world 
New Zealand world 
B. Imports 
Japan China Rep. of Korea ASEAN (5)3 Australia and Rest of Total world 
New Zealand world 
I Commodities 
Natural resource-based manufactures 
Low-technology manufactures 
S; Medium-technology manufactures 
High-technology manufactures 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United 
Nations, Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE). 
a Includes Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. 
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China's imports from Latin America and the Caribbean are 
dominated by natural resources and processed products based on these. Of 
the 20 categories of products that China imported most of from the region 
by value during 2007-2009, natural resources and natural resource-based 
manufactures heavily predominated (see table II.8). The top five products 
(iron ore, soybeans, copper cathodes, crude oil and copper ore) account 
for two thirds of total imports from the region. Of these 20 products, 
integrated circuits are the only one that is purely manufactured. Table II.8 
also shows the value of the worldwide trade in these products. These 20 
categories between them account for some 86% of all Chinese imports from 
the region; table II.8 also shows the region's main supplier and the main 
competitor for each of the 20 products during the same period, with their 
respective market shares. The process of "re-commodification" referred to 
earlier has caused the region's export basket to become more concentrated 
where China is concerned, particularly in the last few years. 
Latin America is now the main supplier of certain products 
imported by China. For example, China purchased over 55% of its total 
imports of copper ore from the region (with 30% coming from Chile) in 
2007-2009, a period when over 57% of China's imports of oilseeds also 
came from the region (36% from Brazil), while over 95% of the soy oil it 
imported was from Latin America (73% from Argentina) (see table II.8). 
The region has become the main supplier of a number of primary products 
that are among China's top 20 imports from the region, exceptions being 
crude oil, other oil derivatives and integrated circuits. 
Despite the high concentration of the region's exports in a limited 
number of products, though, China has succeeded in diversifying its 
sources of supply sufficiently to prevent Latin America and the Caribbean 
from acquiring much bargaining power with regard to these products. 
There is substantial competition with a number of developed economies, 
such as Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the United States, and 
with neighbouring countries in developing Asia, such as Indonesia and 
the Republic of Korea, in respect of mining and farm products for which 
Latin America and the Caribbean tends to have comparative advantages. 
By way of example, Chile competes with Japan as a main supplier of copper 
cathodes in the Chinese market. There is also growing competition with 
some African countries in a number of natural resource-related sectors. 
This competition could also create opportunities for promising 
trade, production and technology partnerships, provided these are entered 
into with a strategic vision. For example, given that Brazil competes 
with Australia as a supplier of iron to the Chinese market, Chile with 
Japan in cathodes and Peru with the United States in lead, there may be 
opportunities for joint investments and strategic alliances that allow 
Chinese demand to be better catered to and yield mutual benefits. 
Table .8 
CHINA: MAIN PRODUCTS IMPORTED FROM LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, 2007-2009 AVERAGE • 
(Millions  of  current  dollars  and percentages) 
Latin America and the Caribbean Nearest competitor 




























imports of the 
product 
1 260111 Iron and concentrates, 45 018 20.2 12 717 28.2 Brazil 25.4 Australia 39.3 
unagglomerated 
2 120100 Soybeans 17 359 15.8 9 972 57.4 Brazil 35.6 United 42.3 
States 
3 740311 Cathodes and 11 892 9.9 6 254 52.6 Chile 49.6 Japan 12.3 
sections of cathodes 
4 270900 Crude oil 99 482 9.0 5 698 5.7 Venezuela 2.3 Saudi 19.4 
(Bolivarian Arabia 
Republic of) 
5 260300 Copper ores and 9 081 7.9 4 947 54.5 Chile 30.4 Australia 10.5 
concentrates 
6 854229 Integrated circuits 125 632 4.5 2 805 2.2 Costa Rica 1.8 Republic 17.4 
of Korea 
7 150710 Crude soy oil 2 419 3.7 2 315 95.7 Argentina 73.3 Republic 4.2 
of Korea 
8 271019 Other petroleum 19 467 2.7 1 698 8.7 Venezuela 8.7 Republic 26.1 
derivatives (Bolivarian of Korea 
Republic of) 
9 260112 Iron and concentrates, 3 184 2.1 1 307 41.1 Brazil 33.0 Canada 17.2 
agglomerated 
10 470329 Chemical wood pulp, 2 305 1.9 1 184 51.4 Brazil 33.3 Indonesia 28.4 
non-conifers 
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Table 11.8 (concluded) 00 
Latin America and the Caribbean Nearest competitor 
Share of 
Total China's total Value 
(millions of 
dollars) 
Share of Main exporter Share of Share of 
No. SA-2002 Product Chinese imports from China's total in Latin China's total Country China's total imports Latin America imports of the America and imports of the imports of the 
and the product the Caribbean product product 
Caribbean 
11 230120 Flours, meals and 
pellets of fish 
1 239 1.6 990 79.9 Peru 55.6 United 
States 
8.1 
12 750120 Nickel oxide sinters 909 1.0 620 68.2 Cuba 68.2 Indonesia 16.8 
13 260700 Lead ores and 
concentrates 
1 658 0.9 574 34.6 Peru 27.5 United 
States 
18.1 
14 470321 Chemical wood pulp, 
conifers 
2 421 0.8 502 20.7 Chile 19.5 Canada 30.7 
15 720260 Ferro-nickel 748 0.7 468 62.6 Colombia 52.0 New 
Caledonia 
15.1 
16 740200 Unrefined copper 1 266 0.7 413 32.6 Chile 31.9 Zambia 18.7 
17 260800 Zinc ores and 
concentrates 
1 498 0.6 402 26.9 Peru 21.4 Australia 31.8 
18 240120 Tobacco 634 0.6 392 61.8 Brazil 55.0 Zimbabwe 16.0 
19 720712 Semi-finished iron 
products 
387 0.6 365 94.4 Brazil 71.0 Ukraine 83.5 
20 720293 Ferro-niobium 385 0.6 361 93.7 Brazil 93.7 Canada 6.0 
Subtotal for the 20 main products 346 983 85,7 53 982 15.6 
Other products 622 047 14,3 8 992 1.4 
TOTAL 969 030 100.0 62 974 6.5 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United Nations, Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE). 
a Excludes trade with unspecified areas. O r1 > 
O 
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However, specialization in primary products varies considerably 
and in the cases of Costa Rica, El Salvador and Mexico some high-
technology manufactured products are emerging. Where China is 
concerned, the individual export baskets of the Latin American and 
Caribbean countries remain dominated by certain primary products: 
almost all the countries (the exceptions being Mexico and, to a lesser 
degree, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) have five main items that 
account for over 80% of total exports to China (see table II.9). What this 
shows is that the Latin America and Caribbean region is faced with the 
twofold challenge of exploiting the comparative advantages its natural 
resource endowment gives it in the Chinese market in a more efficient 
and coordinated way while at the same time trying to move up any 
value chains that may be created around manufactured products. In 
view of these challenges, efforts need to be focused on capturing Asian 
investment in these value chains and stimulating intra-industry trade 
with Asia. 
The predominance of primary products is particularly pronounced 
in the case of the main traditional products, albeit with very marked 
variations. With the exception of integrated circuits and aeroplanes 
and other aircraft, the list of the top 20 items imported by China from 
Latin America consists of what are essentially traditional commodities 
exported by the region to the rest of the world. The increasing "re-
commodification" of the export basket is clear to see where China is 
concerned, especially in the case of products whose share of the Chinese 
import total increased during the last decade (especially the second 
half). The share of iron ore, the most important product in terms of the 
value imported by China in 2009, has risen steadily over the last decades 
to more than 20% of the import total, contrasting with its small share 
(just 4.5%) in 1990 (see table 11.10). Conversely, the shares of copper and 
copper products (made of refined and unrefined copper) and the soy 
complex (beans and oil) in Latin American exports to China have tended 
to diminish over time, although these products have provided the main 
basis for export growth in countries like Chile and Peru (copper) and 
Argentina and Brazil (soy). For example, the shares of soy and soy oil 
peaked in 2000 and 1995, respectively. Looked at in this light, the region's 
exports to China are slowly diversifying. 
Table 11 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: FIVE MAIN PRODUCTS EXPORTED TO CHINA, BY COUNTRY, 2006-2008 AVERAGE a 
(Percentages  of  total) 
Country Sum of 5 products First product Second product Third product Fourth product Fifth product 
Argentina 93% Soy Soybean oil Crude oil Skins Poultry offal 
(55%) (24%) (10%) (3%) (2%) 
Bolivia (Plurinational 82% Tin ores Tin Crude oil Wood from non- Base minerals 
State of) (27%) (19%) (17%) conifers (12%) (7%) 
Brazil 81% Iron ores Soy Crude oil Iron products Chemical wood pulp 
(44%) (23%) (6%) (5%) (3%) 
Chile 93% Copper Copper ores Chemical wood pulp Iron ores Meat offal 
(50%) (31%) (6%) (3%) (2%) 
Colombia 97% Crude oil Ferro-alloys Non-ferrous waste and Skins Lactams 
(50%) (40%) scrap (5%) (3%) (0.5%) 
Costa Rica 99% Integrated circuits Piezoelectric crystals Semiconductors Electrical resistors Electrical appliances 
(96%) (1%) (1%) (0.3%) (0.2%) 
Cuba 100% Nickel mattes Unrefined sugar Base minerals Crude oil Non-ferrous waste and 
(71%) (20%) (7%) (1%) scrap (1%) 
Ecuador 98% Crude oil Non-ferrous waste and Wood from non- Toiletries Meat offal 
(94%) scrap (3%) conifers (1%) (0.5%) (0.5%) 
El Salvador 96% Condensers Non-ferrous waste and Shirts Textile products Plastic waste 
(54%) scrap (38%) (2%) (1%) (1%) 
Guatemala 94% Unrefined sugar Crude oil Zinc ores Non-ferrous waste and Plastic waste 
(42%) (23%) (14%) scrap (8%) (6%) 
Honduras 92% Zinc ores Non-ferrous waste and Lead ores Plastic waste Shirts 
(34%) scrap (33%) (10%) (8%) (7%) 
Table 11. (concluded) 
Country Sum of 5 products First product Second product Third product Fourth product Fifth product 
Mexico 37% Integrated circuits Copper ores Office  equipment parts Condensers Semiconductors 
(13%) (8%) (7%) (5%) (5%) 
Nicaragua 85% Non-ferrous waste and Plastic waste Aquatic invertebrates Shirts Skins 
scrap (41%) (19%) (9%) (8%) (7%) 
Caribbean countries' 89% Alumina Wood from non-conifers Non-ferrous waste and Crude minerals Boats 
(65%) (9%) scrap (7%) (4%) (4%) 
Panama 78% Boats Skins Meat offal Frozen fish Plastic waste 
(39%) (16%) (13%) (6%) (4%) 
Paraguay 81% Cotton Wood from non-conifers Skins Plastic waste Non-ferrous waste and 
(31%) (26%) (24%) (7%) scrap (5%) 
Peru 83% Copper ores Meat offal Crude oil Lead ores Iron ores 
(39%) (16%) (10%) (9%) (8%) 
Dominican Republic 87% Ferro-alloys Non-ferrous waste and Electrical appliances Office  equipment parts Electrical appliances 
(68%) scrap (11%) (8%) (2%) (2%) 
Uruguay 81% Soy Chemical wood pulp Wool Greasy wool Skins 
(46%) (13%) (9%) (8%) (5%) 
Venezuela (Bolivarian 64% Crude oil Iron ores Spiegeleisen Crude minerals Fibres for yarn 
Republic of) (51%) (9%) (2%) (1%) (0.5%) 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United Nations, Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE). 
a In the years for which data are available in each country. The product classification used is revision 3 of the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), 
disaggregated at the four-digit  level. 
b Includes Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago. 
Table 11.10 
CHINA: 100 MAIN PRODUCTS IMPORTED FROM LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, BY VALUE IN 2009 
(Millions  of  dollars  and percentages) 
Value Share of annual total 
(millions  of  dollars)  (percentages) 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2009 1990 1995 2000 2005 2009 
Products with a share of 0.5% or over In the 2009 export total 
1 2815 Iron ore and concentrates, unagglomerated 66.7 280.2 349.2 3738.9 13 272.8 4.42 9.49 6.52 14.14 21.33 1 
2 2222 Soy 0.0 25.9 1073.9 4613.5 9320.7 0.00 0.88 20.05 17.45 14.98 0 
3 6821 Copper, refined and unrefined 5.0 89.1 760.5 2333.9 8595.1 0.33 3.02 14.20 8.83 13.82 0 
4 3330 Crude petroleum oils 11.6 43.7 1194.1 5175.5 0.00 0.39 0.82 4.52 8.32 1 
5 2871 Copper ore and concentrates 11.0 85.6 351.0 2318.4 4056.4 0.73 2.90 6.55 8.77 6.52 0 
6 7764 Integrated electronic circuits 0.0 0.0 22.3 1166.2 3064.9 0.00 0.00 0.42 4.41 4.93 1 
7 2517 Chemical wood pulp 14.7 62.7 256.7 724.8 2286.9 0.97 2.12 4.79 2.74 3.68 0 
8 4232 Soybean oil 212.5 614.1 84.7 904.9 1800.2 14.08 20.80 1.58 3.42 2.89 1 
9 2816 Iron ore agglomerates 3.8 98.9 148.5 905.0 1117.6 0.25 3.35 2.77 3.42 1.80 0 
10 0814 Meat or fish meal and granules 86.2 284.2 429.2 940.5 1079.8 5.71 9.63 8.01 3.56 1.74 0 
11 6716 Ferro-alloys 0.1 2.2 10.8 252.5 798.9 0.01 0.07 0.20 0.95 1.28 1 
12 2874 Lead ores and concentrates 4.2 171.0 708.4 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.65 1.14 1 
13 2875 Zinc ores and concentrates 4.4 0.2 14.4 660.2 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.05 1.06 1 
14 6114 Other depilated bovine and equine skins 5.0 44.3 120.6 566.2 638.7 0.33 1.50 2.25 2.14 1.03 0 
15 2879 Other base non-ferrous  metal ores 0.5 11.0 508.7 494.1 0.00 0.02 0.21 1.92 0.79 1 
16 1212 Tobacco 1.6 52.8 176.7 467.1 0.00 0.05 0.99 0.67 0.75 0 
17 6725 Iron or steel products 2.8 0.1 5.5 155.4 421.7 0.18 0.00 0.10 0.59 0.68 1 
18 7924 Aeroplanes and other aircraft 385.8 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.62 1 
19 2872 Nickel ores and concentrates 17.1 85.3 345.0 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.32 0.55 1 
20 6712 Pig Iron and splegelelsen 85.4 0.5 29.9 340.3 5.66 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.55 1 
Table 11. ( c o n u e d ) 
Value 
(millions  of  dollars) 
Share of annual total 
(percentages) 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2009 1990 1995 2000 2005 2009 
Products with a share of between 0.5% and 0.1% In the 2009 export total 
21 6713 Granules and powders of pig Iron 0.0 0.0 2.8 207.3 258.1 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.78 0.41 1 
22 0611 Sugar 245.7 352.0 66.8 217.9 253.2 16.28 11.92 1.25 0.82 0.41 0 
23 2516 Chemical wood pulp 8.9 48.4 223.1 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.18 0.36 1 
24 2877 Manganese ores and concentrates 3.1 9.0 101.9 203.5 0.00 0.11 0.17 0.39 0.33 1 
25 7649 Parts and accessories suitable for televisions 0.2 4.2 66.7 200.3 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.25 0.32 1 
26 5839 Polymerization products 0.1 0.6 13.1 123.6 190.3 0.01 0.02 0.25 0.47 0.31 1 
27 6841 Aluminium and aluminium alloys, unwrought 26.7 33.0 3.3 0.1 188.7 1.77 1.12 0.06 0.00 0.30 1 
28 2882 Other non-ferrous  base metal waste and scrap 10.9 18.0 194.6 186.7 0.00 0.37 0.34 0.74 0.30 0 
29 5832 Polypropylene 0.2 17.6 14.8 35.4 181.3 0.01 0.60 0.28 0.13 0.29 1 
30 7721 Electrical control Instruments 0.1 0.0 6.5 95.7 174.7 0.01 0.00 0.12 0.36 0.28 1 
31 7810 Passenger motor vehicles 0.1 0.0 2.7 2.6 173.3 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.28 1 
32 2483 Conifer wood 0.0 0.6 33.3 192.2 172.6 0.00 0.02 0.62 0.73 0.28 0 
33 7763 Semiconductor devices 0.0 2.4 11.7 118.1 158.0 0.00 0.08 0.22 0.45 0.25 1 
34 0114 Poultry meat 3.5 0.7 18.7 150.6 156.0 0.23 0.02 0.35 0.57 0.25 0 
35 7788 Machinery and electrical equipment n.e.s. 0.3 29.7 148.1 150.4 0.00 0.01 0.55 0.56 0.24 0 
36 7849 Vehicle parts and accessories 9.0 54.8 9.8 121.4 148.4 0.60 1.86 0.18 0.46 0.24 1 
37 5831 Polyethylene 11.6 20.3 34.2 37.2 134.6 0.77 0.69 0.64 0.14 0.22 0 
38 2731 Building or monumental stone 0.1 27.8 87.2 118.1 0.00 0.00 0.52 0.33 0.19 0 
39 5121 Acyclic monohydrlc alcohols 4.1 0.0 106.3 116.3 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.40 0.19 1 
40 4236 Sunflower oil 0.0 0.2 0.5 115.8 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 1 
41 0575 Grapes, fresh or dried 0.0 0.7 15.7 50.4 114.0 0.00 0.02 0.29 0.19 0.18 0 
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Table 11.10 (continued) 
Value Share of annual total 
(millions  of  dollars)  (percentages) 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2009 1990 1995 2000 2005 2009 
42 7525 Peripheral units, Including control and adapting 
units 
0.1 0.0 3.1 25.4 113.6 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.10 0.18 1 
43 2890 Precious metal ores, waste, scrap 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16 1 
44 2631 Cotton, not carded or combed 78.7 100.7 1.6 143.0 98.6 5.21 3.41 0.03 0.54 0.16 1 
45 0342 Frozen fish 4.0 24.6 20.3 34.1 84.4 0.26 0.83 0.38 0.13 0.14 0 
46 8720 Medical Instruments 0.0 4.2 10.3 83.0 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.04 0.13 1 
47 5221 Carbon 1.0 0.2 6.4 31.6 81.2 0.06 0.01 0.12 0.12 0.13 1 
48 7139 Parts for Internal combustion engines 0.2 19.3 60.2 73.2 0.00 0.01 0.36 0.23 0.12 0 
49 0360 Crustaceans and molluscs 3.2 30.8 29.1 40.5 73.2 0.21 1.04 0.54 0.15 0.12 0 
50 0585 Fruit or vegetable juices 0.1 0.6 5.3 47.8 72.2 0.01 0.02 0.10 0.18 0.12 1 
51 5156 Lactams 3.5 1.8 4.0 108.1 65.9 0.23 0.06 0.08 0.41 0.11 1 
52 6512 Cotton sewing thread 62.0 78.5 84.2 55.6 61.6 4.11 2.66 1.57 0.21 0.10 0 
53 1121 Wine of fresh grapes 0.0 2.2 15.1 61.5 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.06 0.10 1 
Products with a share of between 0.1% and 0.05% In the 2009 export total 
54 5834 Polyvinyl chloride 0.3 4.3 16.4 8.8 57.6 0.02 0.14 0.31 0.03 0.09 0 
55 2929 Materials of vegetable origin 0.3 0.3 4.1 14.5 57.4 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.05 0.09 1 
56 7599 Parts and accessories for data processing 
machines 
0.0 0.0 207.0 342.0 57.1 0.00 0.00 3.86 1.29 0.09 0 
57 7523 Digital processing units 0.2 3.5 57.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.09 1 
58 6727 Semi-finished products of Iron or non-alloy steel 30.6 6.4 74.5 55.4 0.00 1.04 0.12 0.28 0.09 0 
59 6746 Rolled Iron or steel 16.0 0.3 32.7 251.2 52.9 1.06 0.01 0.61 0.95 0.09 0 
60 2681 Greasy wool 0.9 13.7 15.2 22.7 52.4 0.06 0.46 0.28 0.09 0.08 0 
61 6861 Zinc and zinc alloys, unwrought 6.9 1.6 16.7 50.0 0.00 0.24 0.03 0.06 0.08 1 
Table . ( c o n u e d ) 
Value 
(millions  of  dollars) 
Share of annual total 
(percentages) 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2009 1990 1995 2000 2005 2009 
62 2482 Conifer wood, sawn 0.0 5.1 33.1 48.3 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.13 0.08 0 
63 0579 Fruit, fresh or dried 0.1 0.3 1.2 44.9 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.07 1 
64 6831 Nickel and nickel alloys, unwrought 1.3 18.8 44.5 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.07 1 
65 2331 Synthetic rubber 2.2 5.5 19.9 43.8 0.00 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.07 0 
66 4111 Fats and oils offish  or marine mammals 2.5 6.3 7.2 43.7 0.00 0.08 0.12 0.03 0.07 0 
67 7492 Gaskets of metal sheeting in combination 0.0 1.5 19.1 41.9 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.07 1 
68 8749 Machine parts and accessories n.e.s. 0.2 0.4 13.9 40.9 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.07 1 
69 5417 Medicines 1.3 0.3 2.6 20.1 40.6 0.08 0.01 0.05 0.08 0.07 1 
70 2873 Aluminium ores and concentrates 4.3 29.3 324.7 39.5 0.00 0.14 0.55 1.23 0.06 0 
71 5222 Other chemical elements 0.1 2.3 12.5 37.1 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.06 1 
72 7731 Insulated electrical conductors 0.4 1.9 22.9 35.8 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.06 1 
73 8743 Control Instruments for liquids and non-electrical 
devices 
0.0 0.8 10.6 35.0 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.06 1 
74 2671 Artificial  fibres suitable for spinning 13.1 1.4 8.4 18.0 32.1 0.87 0.05 0.16 0.07 0.05 0 
75 7712 Other electrical appliances 0.0 0.0 3.0 30.5 31.7 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.12 0.05 0 
76 6871 Tin and tin alloys, unwrought 0.0 0.0 31.4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 1 
77 2876 Tin ores and concentrates 4.4 22.4 31.0 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.08 0.05 0 
78 0574 Fresh apples 0.0 0.4 7.4 29.2 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.05 1 
79 3413 Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons 77.8 28.6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.05 1 
80 5232 Chlorides, chloride oxides and chloride hydroxides 0.1 6.2 20.3 22.3 28.4 0.01 0.21 0.38 0.08 0.05 0 
Products with a share of between 0.05% and 0.01% in the 2009 export total 
81 6418 Paper and cardboard 0.0 1.2 11.3 25.4 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.04 1 
82 2783 Pure sodium chloride and common salt 0.1 0.0 9.2 24.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.04 1 
83 7162 Direct current motors and generators 0.1 0.2 5.5 23.8 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04 1 
s> cf. 3 > 
§ PL 






Table 11.10 (concluded) o 
ON 
Value Share of annual total 
(millions  of  dollars)  (percentages) 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2009 1990 1995 2000 2005 2009 
84 5513 Essential oils 0.1 0.1 0.7 3.1 23.0 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.04 1 
85 5113 Halogenated derivatives of hydrocarbons 0.1 1.6 3.8 2.6 22.6 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.04 0 
86 7528 Off-line  data processing equipment 0.0 20.3 22.5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.04 1 
87 7493 Shafts, cranks, bearing housings 0.1 0.1 26.4 22.2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.04 1 
88 5331 Other colouring materials 0.2 0.0 0.2 4.4 21.9 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04 1 
89 5623 Potasslc mineral or chemical fertilizers 8.0 0.0 21.8 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.03 0 
90 5111 Acyclic hydrocarbons 0.0 12.4 21.2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.03 1 
91 0372 Crustaceans and molluscs, prepared or preserved 0.0 0.1 0.9 5.4 20.8 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03 1 
92 6822 Copper and copper alloys 0.3 2.8 14.6 1.1 19.8 0.02 0.09 0.27 0.00 0.03 0 
93 6673 Precious stones 0.4 5.0 3.9 13.0 19.8 0.03 0.17 0.07 0.05 0.03 0 
94 2472 Non-coniferous sawlogs and veneer logs 3.1 2.9 9.4 19.1 0.00 0.10 0.05 0.04 0.03 0 
95 5146 Oxygen-function amlno-compounds 0.4 1.5 0.8 12.2 18.8 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.03 1 
96 7431 Airorvacuum pumps 3.3 3.3 5.8 8.4 17.8 0.22 0.11 0.11 0.03 0.03 0 
97 8841 Optical fibres and optical fibre bundles 0.6 1.2 4.2 16.7 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 1 
98 7439 Parts for air pumps 0.0 0.0 2.3 16.2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 1 
99 7188 Engines and motors n.e.s. 20.9 7.2 13.6 16.1 0.00 0.71 0.13 0.05 0.03 0 
100 3354 Petroleum bitumen 16.1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 1 
Total 1 509.1 2 952.6 5 355.6 26 444 62 212 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United Nations, Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE). 
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China is importing a number of new products from the region, some 
of them primary products and others manufactures. The first group includes 
poultry meat, vegetable oils, fresh fruit (particularly grapes), frozen fish, 
crustaceans and molluscs, fruit and vegetable juices, wine of fresh grapes 
and processed wood, among others. Although these still belong to the 
primary goods category, they are no longer strictly commodities but present 
a degree of differentiation by price and quality. As family incomes continue 
to rise in China and the country's consumption pattern gradually converges 
on that of the West, Chinese demand for these products could expand very 
substantially in the near future. At the same time, the manufacturing basket 
increasingly includes parts and components associated with the machinery, 
electronics, automotive and information and communications technology 
(ICT) sectors. An increase in trade flows and investment in these high- and 
medium-technology sectors is particularly favourable to intra-industry 
trade with the countries of Asia, and China in particular. 
G. China's investment in the region 
remains limited in scope 
Although Latin America and the Caribbean is an important destination for 
Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI), this is confined almost exclusively 
to "tax havens". By destination, it is estimated that as of late 2009 some 
13% of Chinese financial and non-financial outward FDI had gone to the 
economies of Latin America and the Caribbean, with a total stock of US$ 31 
billion in the region.2 However, over 90% of this was in two economies: the 
Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands (see table 11.11). 
Despite high expectations on the part of the Latin American and 
Caribbean countries, Chinese investment has been slow to materialize, 
although a substantial number of large Chinese firms have begun 
operating in several of the region's countries. These firms are present not 
only in natural resource-related sectors but in the manufacturing sector as 
well. According to unofficial Chinese sources (see table 11.12), the country 
invested some US$ 24 billion in the region over the 2003-2009 period, not 
only in natural resource sectors but also in manufacturing and services. 
Although most Chinese FDI in the region has gone into natural resources, 
and particularly into areas related to copper, oil, iron ore and the industrial 
soy complex, Chinese investment has also emerged, for example, in the 
automotive, telecommunications and tourism sectors. These investments 
are estimated to have created jobs for over 50,000 people in the region. 
See chapter I for further details on the geographical distribution of Chinese outward FDI. 
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Table 11.11 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: STOCK OF CHINESE FDI 
IN THE REGION AS OF LATE 2009, BY COUNTRY 
(Millions  of  dollars  and percentages  of  regional  total) 
Country Value Share 
Cayman Islands 13 577.1 44.1 
British Virgin Islands 15 060.7 48.9 
Brazil 360.9 1.2 
Peru 284.5 0.9 
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 272.0 0.9 
Bermuda 175.9 0.6 
Mexico 173.9 0.6 
Argentina 169.1 0.5 
Guyana 149.6 0.5 
Ecuador 106.6 0.3 
Cuba 85.3 0.3 
Panama 81.1 0.3 
Suriname 68.8 0.2 
Chile 66.0 0.2 
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 55.7 0.2 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 23.0 0.1 
Colombia 20.5 0.1 
Paraguay 11.3 0.0 
Grenada 7.7 0.0 
Uruguay 7.2 0.0 
Jamaica 2.2 0.0 
Costa Rica 2.0 0.0 
Bahamas 1.6 0.0 
Other 8.9 0.0 
Total 30 771.4 100.0 
Source: Ministry of Commerce of China, 2009, Statistical  Bulletin  of  China's  Outward  Foreign  Direct 
Investment. 
China and Latín America and the Caribbean: Building a strategic economic. 10 
Table 11.12 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: SELECTED CHINESE INVESTMENTS, 
BY COUNTRY AND SECTOR, 2003-2008 AND 2009 
(Millions  of  dollars  and people employed) 
Estimated Estimated 
Sector investment employment 
2003-2008 2009 2003-2008 2009 
Argentina 
Automotive industry, manufacturing, distribution 
Non-automotive transport industry, manufacturing 
Total 519 0 2 142 0 
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 
Metals, sales and marketing 
Total 
Brazil 
Automotive industry, manufacturing, distribution 
Office  equipment and machinery, manufacturing 
Business services 
Coal, oil, natural gas, extraction 




Food and tobacco, sales, marketing 
Industrial machinery, equipment and tools, 
manufacturing 
Metals, extraction, manufacturing 
Non-automotive transport industry, manufacturing 
Paper, printing and packaging, manufacturing 
Transport, logistics and distribution 
Total 8 548 5 136 27 695 7 352 
Chile 
Financial services 
Industrial machinery, equipment and tools, 
manufacturing 
Total 37 0 81 0 
Colombia 
Automotive industry, manufacturing 
Communications, training 
Wood products, manufacturing 
Total 242 4 1 231 20 
Costa Rica 
Coal, oil, natural gas, production 
Total 285 1 000 171 224 
Cuba 
Electronic consumer products, manufacturing 
Total 0 52 0 694 
0 
2 0 13 0 
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2003-2008 2009 2003-2008 2009 
Ecuador 
Coal, oil, natural gas, extraction, sales 
Real estate 
Total 199 0 319 0 
Guyana 
Metals, manufacturing 
Total 1 000 0 3 000 0 
Mexico 
Automotive industry, manufacturing 
Office  equipment and machinery, manufacturing 
Communications, research and development, 
training 
Electronic consumer products, manufacturing 
Industrial machinery, equipment and tools, sales, 
marketing 
Metals, extraction, manufacturing 
Paper, printing and packaging, manufacturing 





Industrial machinery, equipment and tools, 
recycling 
Metals, extraction, sales, marketing 
Total 4 555 279 6 391 304 
Uruguay 
Automotive industry, manufacturing 
Total 100 550 
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 
Office  equipment and machinery, manufacturing 
Coal, oil, natural gas, extraction 




Total 715 31 1 241 44 
Grand total 2003-2009 17 281 6 552 48 676 8 833 
0 3 0 
0 0 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of fDiMarkets 
and Financial  Times. 
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The three main motivations driving Chinese FDI in Latin America 
in recent decades have been access to natural resources, expansion into 
foreign markets (market-seeking) and improvements in productive and 
administrative efficiency (efficiency-seeking). In the manufacturing sector, 
Chinese industries, including the textile, paper, automotive, electronics 
and information and communication technology industries, have chosen 
Mexico and the member countries of MERCOSUR to establish their first 
production bases in Latin America. Entry into Argentina, Brazil, Mexico 
and Uruguay is regarded as a first step towards breaking into and 
expanding in the dynamic markets tied together by trade agreements such 
as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and MERCOSUR. 
Furthermore, Mexico can provide access not only to the United States but 
also to the countries of Central America and the Caribbean. Producing in 
MERCOSUR can also open the door to other Latin American countries. 
Chinese FDI in Latin American natural resource sectors tends to 
acquire a systemic character that encompasses every link in the value 
chain, as can be appreciated in the case of Argentina. In search of a stable 
supply of grains, meats and meat derivatives from Argentina, China has 
signed an agreement with the country to begin importing beef, and it 
also plans to invest directly in farm production there. China has a stake 
in the Belgrano Cargas company with a railway line to transport grain to 
port. Collaboration initiatives between the two countries have also been 
undertaken at the provincial level. The provinces of Shaanxi and Tierra 
del Fuego recently signed bilateral agreements to promote trade, tourism 
and cultural exchanges between the two jurisdictions. Projects of different 
types are in progress, a prominent example being the establishment 
of a urea-producing plant in the northern part of Tierra del Fuego that 
could serve as a model for future projects with these characteristics in 
Argentina. Similarly, in October 2010 Heilongjiang province and Rio Norte 
province signed an agreement to expand the agricultural frontier thanks 
to the installation of irrigation systems supplied by China (La Tercera,  2010, 
Periodismovecinal.com). 
Latin America has increasingly attracted Chinese FDI in the 
automotive, electronics and telecommunications sectors. Automotive 
firms from China are setting up production bases in Latin America with 
a view to reducing production costs and breaking into new markets, as 
they cope with strong competition from foreign companies in their home 
markets and the continuing appreciation of the yuan. Three contributory 
factors exist in the electronics sector: (i) domestic demand has been weak 
and profits have diminished because of competition within the country, 
so that Chinese electronics firms are seeking out new markets in Latin 
America, where a large middle class is emerging; (ii) most antidumping 
cases brought against Chinese products in the region relate to white 
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goods, and the establishment of a production base in the region may help 
Chinese firms to mitigate these trade conflicts; and (iii) Chinese firms do 
not currently have the capacity to establish production bases in developed 
countries, so that Latin America and the Caribbean and Africa have come 
to be important destinations for FDI from China. 
Market-seeking FDI has essentially been channelled into the 
region's largest economies, such as Brazil and Mexico. Chile has also 
been a major recipient of investment of this type. In the goods sector, 
the automotive, food and beverages and chemical industries have been 
the main recipients, while service sector investment has gone mainly 
into finance, telecommunications, retail, electricity and natural gas 
distribution. This kind of investment can promote new local economic 
activity and increase local content by creating and enhancing productive 
linkages, strengthening local business development and improving local 
services and the systemic competitiveness of the country. The drawbacks 
with this type of FDI are that it often does not promote internationally 
competitive goods and services and that it tends to crowd out local firms. 
Chinese FDI in the region has not been oriented towards efficiency-
seeking with a view to exporting to third markets (particularly the 
United States) in the electronics, automotive and wearing apparel sectors. 
If pay levels continue to rise in China, this type of FDI could become a 
very important offshore platform for exporting to the United States, 
European and even Latin American markets. Efficiency-seeking inward 
FDI tends to increase exports of manufactures, turn the export platform 
into a manufacturing centre and foment international competitiveness, 
the transfer and assimilation of foreign technology, human resource 
training, the creation and enhancement of productive linkages, and local 
business development. Nonetheless, this type of FDI also has a number 
of drawbacks, such as the low value added "trap", concentration on static 
local comparative advantages rather than dynamic ones, high dependence 
on imported components, a lack of industrial clusters, the risk of local 
firms being crowded out, falling wage levels, problems with employment 
standards and particularly with the environment, and increased incentives 
for transnational enterprises. These shortcomings can be seen in many FDI 
projects in Latin America, whatever their origin. 
The great bulk of Latin American and Caribbean investment 
in China also comes from tax havens. Although Latin America and the 
Caribbean is the second-largest source of FDI in China, almost all this 
investment comes from three countries: the British Virgin Islands (80%), 
the Cayman Islands (14%) and Barbados (5%). FDI originating from leading 
countries such as Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Mexico and Peru was minimal 
during the 2007-2008 period (see table 11.13). 
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Table 11.13 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: FDI IN CHINA, 
2007-2008 AVERAGE, BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN 
(Millions  of  dollars  and percentages) 
Country Amount Share 
British Virgin Islands 16 253.1 79.24 
Cayman Islands 2 857.9 13.93 
Barbados 982.4 4.79 
Bahamas 243.2 1.19 
Belize 43.6 0.21 
Brazil 35.2 0.17 
Panama 30.6 0.15 
St. Kitts and Nevis 14.7 0.07 
Argentina 11.9 0.06 
Chile 5.9 0.03 
Mexico 4.8 0.02 
Peru 4.0 0.02 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 4.1 0.02 
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 2.2 0.01 
Honduras 1.9 0.01 
Paraguay 1.4 0.01 
Grenada 1.3 0.01 
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 1.1 0.01 
Dominican Republic 0.9 0.00 
Ecuador 0.7 0.00 
Dominica 0.6 0.00 
Guatemala 0.6 0.00 
Antigua and Barbuda 0.5 0.00 
Cuba 0.3 0.00 
Jamaica 0.1 0.00 
Suriname 0.1 0.00 
Dominica 0.1 0.00 
Colombia 0.1 0.00 
Uruguay 0.1 0.00 
Other 7.2 0.04 
Latin America and the Caribbean 20 510.7 100.00 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical  Yearbook,  2009. 
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Lately, however, substantial Latin American investments have gone 
into different sectors in China. By way of example, Brazilian investment 
in China during the 2002-2007 period was US$ 175 million. The largest 
Brazilian investments have gone into the aircraft manufacturing, 
electrical, information technology, agro-industry and footwear sectors,3 
while a notable Argentine investment was made in the iron and steel 
sector by Techint group (ECLAC, 2011). Arcor, a Mexican manufacturer 
of sweets, biscuits, chocolates, ice cream and miscellaneous food 
products, has set up a complex distribution network in China, covering 
50 cities. Mexican investments include one made by Bimbo, the country's 
largest food company, and Maseca group, which in 2006 opened a plant 
in Shanghai with an investment of some US$ 100 million. Although still 
very incipient, then, new Latin American investment is beginning to be 
seen in China. 
Where China's economic cooperation efforts around the world are 
concerned, Latin America and the Caribbean does not feature as one of the 
main recipients. The region received an average of just under US$ 3 billion 
during the 2007-2008 period, which represented only 7% of the worldwide 
total of US$ 57 billion. The Asia region accounted for half of this, while 
30% went to Africa. Of the three main categories of cooperation, the most 
important has been project implementation (the others are labour services 
and consultancy services of different kinds) (see table 11.14). With the 
exception of Ecuador, the main recipients of Chinese cooperation in Latin 
America and the Caribbean have been the region's largest economies, 
namely the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil and Mexico. By 
category, very little of the cooperation provided by China has taken the 
form of labour provision services, of which Africa has been the main 
beneficiary. Chinese humanitarian assistance in the region has included 
infrastructure repairs in Costa Rica, hospitals in Cuba, financial support 
for the Red Cross in the Plurinational State of Bolivia, help for earthquake 
3 Examples include: (i) Embraer, which set up Harbin Embraer Aircraft Industry in 
2002 together with a Chinese State-owned firm, Aviation Industry Corporation (AVIC 
II) to make small and medium-sized aircraft, with a 51% equity holding; (ii) Motores 
Weg, Brazil's leading manufacturer of electric motors, which set up a production 
unit in Jiangsu province in 2005, called Weg Electric Motor Manufacturing Co.; and 
(iii) Compresores Embraco, a manufacturer of compressors which set up Beijing Embraco 
Snowflake Compressor Company Ltd., a joint venture with Snowflake group of China, 
to manufacture closed refrigeration compressors; it now has a number of production 
units operating in Beijing and environs. Other examples include Politec (information 
technologies), which went into partnership with Neusoft; Bertin group, in the agro-
industrial sector, which set up a leather processing unit in Guangdong province in 
2007; the five plants operated by Strada Shoe, a footwear manufacturer; and Aeromot, 
a manufacturer of small planes, which set up a joint venture with Guizhou Aviation 
Industries Corporation in 2006 (Baumann 2009b). 
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victims in Peru, and assistance for flood victims in Uruguay. In 2008, China 
became a member country of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 
and committed US$ 350 million of financing for public- and private-sector 
infrastructure projects. 
Table 11.14 
CHINA: DISTRIBUTION OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION, BY MAIN CATEGORIES 
AND BY COUNTRY OR REGION, 2007-2008 AVERAGE 
(Millions  of  dollars  and percentages) 













Asia 28 192.1 49.9 24 627.8 3 248.2 320.3 
Africa 16 396.8 29.0 16 062.6 230.4 103.8 
Europe 3 956.3 7.0 3 442.6 494.8 18.8 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 2 985.6 5.3 2 936.7 36.8 12.2 
Argentina 125.9 0.2 125.0 0.8 -
Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of) 2.6 0.0 2.5 - 0.1 
Brazil 856.2 1.5 850.1 0.9 5.1 
Chile 38.9 0.1 37.9 1.0 -
Colombia 90.5 0.2 90.1 - 0.4 
Costa Rica 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 -
Cuba 64.6 0.1 64.5 0.1 0.0 
Dominican Republic 0.5 0.0 0.5 - -
Ecuador 129.4 0.2 129.3 0.0 -
Guatemala 0.2 0.0 0.2 - -
Honduras 0.2 0.0 - 0.2 -
Jamaica 63.9 0.1 63.0 0.8 0.1 
Mexico 484.8 0.9 478.3 6.5 0.0 
Nicaragua 3.8 0.0 - 3.8 -
Panama 42.1 0.1 27.7 14.3 0.0 
Peru 85.3 0.2 80.5 0.3 4.6 
Trinidad and Tobago 124.9 0.2 121.5 3.4 0.1 
Uruguay 1.1 0.0 1.1 - -
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of) 724.5 1.3 722.2 0.9 1.4 
Other LAC 146.2 0.3 142.1 3.7 0.4 
North America 862.9 1.5 786.8 68.1 8.0 
Oceania and Pacific 
islands 766.8 1.4 743.3 18.0 5.4 
Other 28.8 0.1 27.4 1.2 0.2 
Interior of the country 3 314.4 5.9 - 3 314.4 -
World total 56 507.9 100.0 48 627.1 7 412.0 468.8 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical  Yearbook,  2009. 
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H. Conclusions and recommendations 
For the Latin American region, and the countries of South America in 
particular, recovery from the financial crisis has largely depended on the 
economic recovery of Asia in general and China in particular. Chinese 
demand has come to the rescue of Latin American exports. Economies 
that are exporters of natural resources, such as those of South America, 
have been relatively unaffected by the crisis, as the high growth rate of 
China has kept international demand for these products high. In Mexico 
and Central America, by contrast, competition with manufactures from 
China and other Asian economies in the United States market has been 
starker, and this could precipitate structural changes in certain industries, 
especially maquila. 
The leading role of China in the global economy suggests that 
the Latin American and Caribbean countries ought to be looking for 
a strategic alliance with this trading partner and trying to use this 
relationship as a pivot to improve their positioning in the global economy. 
Given the risks that still loom over the world economy, and the way its 
geography is changing as its centre of gravity increasingly shifts towards 
the Asia and the Pacific region, particularly China, the countries of Latin 
America and the Caribbean ought to redouble their efforts to identify 
possible complementarities with China and take advantage of them. The 
immediate first step is to diversify their exports, if possible by forging 
biregional business partnerships. 
To promote trade and investment flows with China, the following 
limitations ought to be dealt with: (i) trade flows are highly concentrated 
by country and by the composition of the products commercialized; 
(ii) these flows are almost exclusively inter-industrial in nature, as 
China's exports to the region consist mainly of manufactured goods 
while exports the other way are mainly of raw materials (this makes it 
harder for the region's countries to position themselves more effectively 
in the China-centred supply chains of Asia and the Pacific, which are 
increasingly intra-industrial in character); and (iii) partly because of the 
two regions' different production and trade specializations, there is little 
FDI between them. 
Growth in sectors associated with natural resources and in the 
unskilled labour-intensive manufacturing sector has not done enough to 
create new technological capabilities in the countries of Latin America and 
the Caribbean. The trade relationship between the region and China thus 
presents both opportunities and challenges. A particular challenge is to 
ensure that the burgeoning trade between Latin America and China does 
not reproduce and reinforce a centre-periphery trade pattern between 
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the countries of the South, with China emerging as a new centre and the 
countries of the region as a new periphery. Consequently, there is a need 
to move towards a trading relationship that stimulates not growth alone, 
but growth that is reflected in greater progress with innovation, export 
diversification and employment quality. 
The economies of South America have benefited greatly from their 
trade links with China, as reflected in improving terms of trade, rising 
international reserves and higher growth rates. The downside to this 
process is a marked tendency towards "re-commodification" of the export 
pattern, something that is detrimental to export diversification and the 
incorporation of more knowledge and technology content in exports. Thus, 
the favourable effect of the "China factor" upon the external accounts 
needs to be capitalized upon in these economies in order to finance a 
major process of investment in infrastructure, logistics, connectivity and 
human resources training. 
It follows from this that the Latin American and Caribbean 
countries should adopt a twofold approach, aiming to capitalize in a more 
efficient and coordinated way on the comparative advantages their natural 
resources represent while at the same time intensifying their efforts to spur 
industrial development by improving international competitiveness in 
manufacturing sectors through further initiatives to help Latin American 
firms establish themselves in Asian supply and value chains in these 
sectors. In both cases, it is important to foster links between biregional 
trade and FDI together with domestic support services, as these are key 
components of international competitiveness. 
Innovation and competitiveness are still the fundamental challenges 
for the Latin American countries. Looking beyond the current situation, 
the aftermath of the crisis needs to be approached with a forward-looking 
attitude that emphasizes the underlying issues on which progress with 
productive transformation and equity depends. A coordinated approach to 
China with a view to learning from its experiences would make a decisive 
contribution to the attainment of this crucial goal; and in this task, the role 
of China could be very important. 
The process of halting the "re-commodification" of the export 
structure may justify a degree of protection for manufacturing industry, 
particularly in those of the region's economies where the industrial fabric 
is denser. The challenge is to achieve the right mix of protection policies 
—subject to the provisions of agreements entered into at the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) and regional or bilateral trade agreements— 
and policies to spur productive development with a view to achieving 
sustainable competitiveness that is less dependent on protection 
mechanisms. Similarly, care is needed to ensure that the latter do not 
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affect decisions about exporting or participation in global or regional value 
chains. Trade alliances with Chinese firms in third countries are also an 
avenue worth exploring. 
China, one of the main hubs of global growth, holds out many 
opportunities for Latin American countries in fields such as mining, 
energy, agriculture, infrastructure, and science and technology. If the 
comparative advantages deriving from natural resources are to be better 
exploited, there is a need to establish a greater presence in the different 
segments of the value chain associated with the natural resource concerned 
(for example, logistics, commercialization, quality and branding) by 
applying advances in new technologies, such as environmental technology 
and biotechnology, to agro-industrial, mining, forestry and fisheries 
production, among other areas. Furthermore, given the huge size of 
Chinese markets, it will only be possible to take full advantage of these 
opportunities if there is a concerted effort to create partnerships among 
the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. 
To strengthen their trading links and their production 
complementarity with China, Latin American firms should seek to 
position themselves within Asian production and export chains by 
establishing trade and investment partnerships that transcend free trade 
agreements. Although these agreements are important, they are not 
enough to generate the scale and critical mass needed to stimulate trade 
and technology partnerships between the two regions, or to overcome 
the marked asymmetry between large volumes of trade and low levels of 
investment in both directions. 
The list of products the region exports to China is diversifying 
and now includes a number of new items, such as fisheries products and 
pork, together with high-technology manufactures such as electronic 
microcircuits, telecommunications equipment and data processing 
machines. The presence of these manufactures shows that Latin America 
and the Caribbean is starting to integrate, albeit not systematically, into the 
wide-ranging networks of the supply chains that exist around China in the 
Asia and the Pacific region. Some biregional intra-industrial trade flows 
are also intensifying, although they are still incipient. The challenge is to 
persevere in these export diversification and intra-industrial trade efforts. 
The region's export basket competes with that of other countries 
and regions to supply primary products to China. Despite the heavy 
concentration of Latin American and Caribbean exports in a few products, 
the Asian countries have succeeded in diversifying their natural resource 
supply sources, so that the Latin American and Caribbean countries 
do not have a great deal of bargaining power where these products are 
concerned. There is substantial competition with a number of developing 
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economies and with neighbouring developing countries in Asia and the 
Pacific in the areas of mining, agriculture, fisheries and forestry products. 
Analysing this competition to identify opportunities for complementarity 
that might provide a basis for strategic alliances with competing partners 
could drive improvements in the scale and quality of exports to China. 
Some recent experience shows that it is possible to add value and 
incorporate knowledge into commodity exports. Although this may 
be more difficult than in manufacturing sectors, it is also possible to 
integrate primary products into the production and commercialization 
chains of Asia and the Pacific. For this, there needs to be a systematic 
approach encompassing the production process, trade logistics, sea and air 
transportation, and marketing and distribution in the final consumption 
market. If this strategy is based on alliances with investors from Asia and 
the Pacific, the starting point of natural-resource exports will turn into a 
complex of activities encompassing goods, services, investment and finance. 
This could be done by creating strategic partnerships designed to 
increase value added right along the production and commercialization 
chain, along with mutually beneficial technological partnerships. This 
would help to strengthen the ties between trade and investment and 
production and technology linkages, which would provide an incentive for 
firms in the region to join supply chains with more highly processed inputs 
and more technology and know-how by creating more highly developed 
products based on the natural resources already exported to China. 
Identifying infrastructure and energy projects where Chinese 
investment may be most necessary to speed up implementation would 
not only strengthen the trade and investment facilitation link with China, 
but would also generate externalities for the Latin American regional 
integration process itself. The development of large, unified markets with 
common standards and greater legal guarantees is also part of the region's 
competitiveness challenge. 
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Chapter III 
Divergent trends in de facto integration 
in and between Asia-Pacific and 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
A. Introduction: the lack of intra-industry trade limits 
trade and investment flows between the two regions 
China, Japan, the Republic of Korea and the members of the Association of 
South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) constitute one of the most important 
centres of intra-industry trade in the world. The efforts of ASEAN to 
consolidate its position at the hub of Asian regional integration processes 
—both de facto (in the productive base) and de jure (through trade 
agreements)— provide clear signposts for mapping out possible scenarios 
for the Latin American and Caribbean region's relationship with China. 
In terms of purchasing power parity (PPP), the Asia-Pacific 
economies are bigger than the United States and the European Union, and 
their weight in output and world growth continues to grow. The Association 
of South-East Asian Nations plus China, Japan and the Republic of Korea 
(ASEAN+3) had a GDP of US$ 12.3 trillion in 2009, or 21% of world output, 
and accounted for a little over 30% of total world population. In 2010, 
China became the world's second largest economy, surpassing Japan (in 
both current prices and PPP). In PPP terms, the GDP of ASEAN+3 greatly 
exceeds that of the United States and the European Union. The combined 
GDP of ASEAN+6 (ASEAN+3 plus Australia, India and New Zealand) 
accounts for 26% of world GDP in current prices and 31% in PPP terms. 
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A strong recovery is forecast for growth and foreign trade in 
the ASEAN countries starting in 2010. In 2009, the ASEAN members 
represented almost 2.5% of world GDP in current prices and 4.4% in 
PPP terms, while the Latin American and Caribbean shares were 6.8% 
and el 8.4%, respectively However, goods exports from ASEAN nations 
were US$ 810 billion in 2009, which exceeds the region's total of US$ 689 
billion. ASEAN is a very important trade bloc, with 6.5% of total world 
exports, versus 5.7% for Latin America and the Caribbean. According to 
the Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2010a), output did not fall in 2009 in 
the ASEAN-5 countries (made up of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Thailand and Viet Nam), and their growth rate recovered to almost 7.6% in 
2010. The ASEAN region has a population of approximately 590 million, 
which is similar to the Latin American and Caribbean population. It 
thus represents a very interesting potential market for the region. The 
ASEAN member countries are much more trade-oriented, as shown by the 
magnitude of GDP and the level of per capita income (see table III.l). 
ASEAN is playing a leading role in the Asia-Pacific regional 
integration process. Although it is relatively small in economic terms, at 
only about half the size of Latin America and the Caribbean, the association 
is moving forward with its own integration process as it takes steps toward 
the creation of the ASEAN Economic Community. Another initiative 
under consideration is the creation of an East Asian free-trade area within 
ASEAN+3, as well as the geographically more extensive Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership for East Asia (CEPEA), covering ASEAN+6. Thus, 
ASEAN is developing several economic integration mechanisms with 
other countries in the Asia-Pacific region, such as Australia, China, India, 
Japan, New Zealand and the Republic of Korea, both individually and 
jointly These elements complement the group's expansion efforts, aimed at 
guaranteeing its space in the world economy 
Intra-Asian trade has an increasingly intraindustrial in nature. As 
many authors note (ADB, 2007; Kawai and Wignaraja, 2007; World Bank, 
2007; Ando and Kimura, 2005), trade relations among the Asia-Pacific 
economies have featured an upsurge in intra-industry trade, based on 
the increasingly complementary production and trade components of 
the different countries' manufacturing sectors. This type of trade has 
expanded significantly as the specific advantages of production and 
marketing chains have been exploited more effectively The process has 
transformed the Asia-Pacific region into "Factory Asia" for the rest of the 
world, with China at the hub. Intra-industry trade has generated an ever-
wider complementary group in which development is disseminated in 
concentric circles, thanks to regional intra-industry trade and intraregional 
foreign direct investment (FDI). 
Table 111.1 
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH-EAST ASIAN NATIONS PLUS CHINA, JAPAN AND THE REPUBLIC 
OF KOREA (ASEAN+3): SELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS, 2009 
(Billions  of  dollars  and percentages) 
Population GDP Per capita GDP Total exports Total imports the world 
(millions  of  current 
dollars) 
Share in world 
(millions  of (millions  of (millions  of (millions  of (millions  of exports 
inhabitants) current  dollars) current  dollars) current  dollars) current  dollars) (percentages) 
SB Cf. 3 > 
§ PL 
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ASEAN 591.2 1 479 792 
Brunei darussalam 0.4 10 546 
Cambodia 13.9 10 804 
Indonesia 231.5 539 377 
Lao Peoples's 6.4 5 598 
Democratic Republic 
Malaysia 27.8 191 463 
Myanmar 60.0 27 553 
Philippines 92.2 160 991 
Singapore 4.8 177132 
Thailand 67.0 263 889 
Viet Nam 87.2 92 439 
China 1 334.7 4 908 982 
Republic of Korea 48.8 832 512 
Japan 127.6 5 068 059 
ASEAN+3 2 102.2 12 289 345 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of International Monetary Fund (IMF), World  economic  outlook,  October 
2010; the United Nations Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE); International Monetary Fund (IMF), Direction of Trade Statistics database (DOTS) and World Trade 
Organization (WTO). ¡-J 
OJ 
1 ECLAC 
One of the factors limiting trade and investment flows between Asia-
Pacific and Latin America and the Caribbean is the lack of intra-industry 
trade between the two regions. Although the level of intra-industry 
trade is high within each region, it is still quite scarce between the two. 
The fact that intra-industry trade flows currently represent a relatively 
small share of biregional trade not only reveals the great potential for 
future cooperation in trade and investment, but also points to enormous 
challenges. The Latin American and Caribbean region must redouble its 
efforts to enter value and supply chains in Asia. 
This process of de facto (market-led) integration in Asia-Pacific is 
now being supported by de jure (government-led) integration, whereby 
strong production and trade relations are being complemented by 
various types of free trade agreements that aim to consolidate those 
links. In view of these trends, the Latin American and Caribbean 
region should strengthen its trade links to make its production more 
complementary with that of Asia-Pacific. It should also establish trade 
and investment partnerships, as well as trade agreements, which create 
new access to these markets and facilitate entry into Asian production 
and export chains. 
B. Asia's dynamic intra-industry trade is mainly 
based on the growing integration 
of Asian firms in value chains 
In the past decades, Asia-Pacific has undergone notable technological 
advances and fragmentation of the production chain, which generated 
a marked increase in Asian intraregional trade. Intra-Asian trade in the 
ASEAN+3 countries plus Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of 
China and Taiwan Province of China grew from 40% in the early 1990s to 
50% in 2009 (see table III.2). This is higher than the level of intraregional 
trade achieved by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
and is rapidly approaching the level in the European Union. Trade 
among the ASEAN members has risen, and in 2009 it exceeded the rates 
recorded by the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) (15%), the 
Andean Community (9%) and the Central American Common Market 
(CACM) (22%). This increase in intra-Asian trade has been driven, in part, 
by the strong growth of intra-firm and intra-industry trade, thanks to the 
construction of a complex network of vertically integrated supply chains 
by transnational corporations, in which China plays a fundamental role as 
both origin and destination. 
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Table III.2 
ASIA-PACIFIC AND LATIN AMERICA: INTRAREGIONAL TRADE • 
(Percentages  of  total  trade  of  each region) 
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008 2009 
ASEAN+6 33.2 31.1 31.1 38.1 36.5 38.9 39.3 40.2 
ASEAN+3+Hong Kong (SAR of 
China) and Taiwan Province of China 36.1 35.0 40.1 49.2 47.5 50.7 48.5 50.1 
ASEAN+3 29.0 26.5 27.2 35.2 33.6 35.0 34.4 35.1 
ASEAN 17.3 18.7 18.8 24.7 22.9 25.1 25.3 24.5 
Latin America 17.4 11.1 14.6 20.0 16.3 16.8 19.6 18.3 
Andean Community 4.0 2.6 4.2 12.4 9.3 8.5 9.6 9.4 
Southern Common Market 
(MERCOSUR) 11.6 5.5 8.9 20.6 21.1 13.0 15.1 15.2 
Central American Common Market 
(CACM) 25.4 15.5 16.0 21.4 20.6 23.3 23.8 22.1 
Pro memoria 
European Union 60.2 58.6 66.7 66.2 65.6 66.0 65.4 65.0 
North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA)" 33.6 44.3 41.5 46.2 55.8 55.9 49.9 48.3 
Source: The United Nations Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE) and International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), Direction of Trade Statistics. 
a ASEAN, as an origin, does not include the Lao People's Democratic Republic or Myanmar. Data for 
1980 do not include Cambodia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Taiwan 
Province of China or Viet Nam. Data for 1985 do not include Slovakia, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
the Czech Republic or Taiwan Province of China. Data for 1990 do not include Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Latvia, Lithuania or the Czech Republic. Data for the Andean Community include Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of), in order to maintain the continuity of the historical series. Trade data for China do not 
include Taiwan Province of China, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia or Viet Nam when the source is the 
IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) database. 
b Canada-Mexico-United States. 
In terms of exports, the low level of intra-Asian trade reflects trends 
in China. With the exception of Cambodia, the ASEAN members rely 
strongly on the ASEAN+3 markets as export destinations, accounting for 
almost 50% of the total exported by each country. India and Australia have 
become important markets for some of the ASEAN countries (namely, 
Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Viet 
Nam); for example, Australia accounted for almost 8% of Viet Nam's 
total exports in 2006-2009 (see table III.3). ASEAN+3 as a whole, however, 
registers a relatively low level of internal trade, which reflects the low 
share of the Asia-Pacific region in Chinese trade: the region received just 
21% of China's exports. The share of intra-Asian trade is much higher for 
Japan and especially the Republic of Korea. China is an important export 
destination for the Republic of Korea, Japan, Australia and the Philippines. 
1 ECLAC 
Table III.3 
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH-EAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN): RELATIVE 
IMPORTANCE OF INTRA-ASIAN TRADE, AVERAGE FOR 2006-2009 ' 
(Percentages) 






Darussalam 24.8 2.3 15.1 30.6 72.8 4.9 12.2 3.0 92.9 
Cambodia 7.2 0.3 0.2 0.7 8.4 0.1 0.2 0.0 8.8 
Philippines 15.7 10.1 4.1 15.7 45.7 0.4 1.0 0.1 47.2 
Indonesia 19.8 8.8 6.9 19.6 55.1 4.9 2.9 0.3 63.2 
Malaysia 25.8 9.4 3.8 9.7 48.7 3.4 3.4 0.4 55.9 
Singapore 31.3 9.6 3.7 4.9 49.5 3.3 3.9 0.5 57.3 
Thailand 21.6 9.6 2.0 11.5 44.6 1.8 4.3 0.4 51.2 
Viet Nam 16.5 7.8 2.6 13.1 39.9 0.5 7.8 0.1 48.3 
China 8.0 4.7 8.5 21.2 2.1 1.5 0.2 25.0 
Republic of 
Korea 10.9 22.2 6.9 40.0 2.0 1.3 0.2 43.5 
Japan 12.8 16.0 7.8 36.6 0.9 2.1 0.3 39.8 
India 10.2 6.0 2.0 2.1 20.2 0.8 0.2 21.2 
Australia 10.6 15.8 8.0 20.5 54.9 6.2 4.8 65.8 
New Zealand 10.1 6.4 3.4 8.7 28.6 1.2 22.3 52.1 
Imports 
Brunei 
Darussalam 47.9 7.9 1.6 12.8 70.2 0.5 2.0 0.5 73.2 
Cambodia 38.4 21.1 5.2 2.6 67.3 2.0 0.4 0.1 69.7 
Philippines 23.4 7.7 6.0 12.7 49.8 1.0 1.5 0.6 52.8 
Indonesia 30.9 12.3 4.9 10.2 58.4 2.2 3.7 0.6 64.9 
Malaysia 24.8 12.9 4.9 12.8 55.4 1.6 2.1 0.4 59.4 
Singapore 24.5 11.1 5.2 8.1 48.9 2.3 1.5 0.2 52.9 
Thailand 19.0 11.6 3.9 19.6 54.1 1.4 2.8 0.3 58.5 
Viet Nam 25.5 19.2 8.8 10.2 63.6 2.3 1.9 0.3 68.1 
China 10.9 8.7 10.5 13.7 43.7 1.5 3.1 0.2 48.6 
Republic of 
Korea 9.7 17.0 15.3 42.1 1.3 4.0 0.3 47.7 
Japan 14.0 20.4 4.2 38.6 0.7 5.6 0.4 45.3 
India 9.0 10.5 2.7 2.6 24.8 3.7 0.1 28.6 
Australia 20.2 15.9 3.3 9.1 48.4 0.8 3.3 52.5 
New Zealand 14.0 13.4 2.9 8.5 39.0 0.7 19.3 59.0 
Source: The United Nations Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE) and International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), Direction of Trade Statistics. 
a Data for Brunei Darussalam are for 2006; for Cambodia, 2008. Data for Viet Nam do not include 2009. 
b Association of South-East Asian Nations plus China, Japan and the Republic of Korea (ASEAN+3), plus 
Australia, India and New Zealand. 
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China depends much more strongly on the ASEAN+3 as a source 
of imports, with double the share of exports. The ASEAN members, the 
Republic of Korea and Japan together account for 44% of total imports into 
China (including re-imports). Another important source of imports into 
China is Australia, more than India (see table III.3). Generally, the share 
of intra-Asian is larger for Asia-Pacific imports than exports. Thus, with 
China at the centre, the Asia-Pacific region has become one of the main 
hubs of intraregional trade at the world level. 
Asia is increasingly oriented toward manufacturing-based exports. 
Manufacturing exports represented over 90% of Asia's total exports in 2006 
and 2007, up from 78% in the early 1980s. One of the key sectors behind this 
structural change is machinery and transport equipment (as defined by the 
Standard International Trade Classification, or SITC, section 7), especially 
information and communications technology (ICT) and electronics 
products. Asia's share of global machinery and transport equipment 
exports reached 42% in 2006 and 2007, compared with a low share of 15% in 
1994 and 1995. The emerging Asian economies generated more than 80% of 
the increase in that period. At the end of the 2006-2007 period, over 58% of 
world ICT exports originated in Asia, and China accounted for 23% of the 
total (Athukorala, 2010). Consequently, network trade has intensified, with 
China becoming a centre of global assembly work. 
Medium- and high-technology products account for a substantial 
and growing share of trade within the Asia-Pacific region, at over 56% 
of total exports in 2008, despite the fact that primary products, natural-
resource-based manufactures and low-technology manufactures also 
hold significant shares of total Asia-Pacific exports (11%, 17% and 13%, 
respectively). The shares of medium- and high-technology products 
in total imports from the region to the United States, the European 
Union and even Latin America and the Caribbean are invariably high, 
at approximately 60% of total imports. The case of Japan is particularly 
noteworthy, where primary products account for one fourth of imports 
from the region (see table III.4). 
However, this view of the region as a world export platform for 
medium- and high-technology manufactures hides wide cross-country 
variation. On the one hand, Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, 
New Zealand and Viet Nam largely export primary products and natural-
resource-based manufactures. On the other, countries like China, Japan, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and, to a 
lesser extent, Thailand have established Asia-Pacific's position as a world 
manufacturing base (see table III.5). The low-technology products sector, 
including textiles and clothing, continues to be an important segment of 
manufacturing exports for several countries in the region. 
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Table III.4 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN AND ASIA-PACIFIC: TRADE BY REGION, 
PRODUCT AND TECHNOLOGICAL CONTENT, 2008 
(Percentages) 
Latin America and the Caribbeana 

















Primary products 4.9 12.4 6.9 2.9 0.6 1.5 1.2 6.7 37.1 
Natural-
resource-based 
manufactures 4.6 4.9 3.6 1.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 4.3 20.0 
Low-technology 
manufactures 2.3 4.0 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 7.5 
Medium-
technology 
manufactures 5.9 11.0 2.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.5 1.3 21.3 
High-technology 
manufactures 1.5 7.8 0.7 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.5 11.0 
Other transactions 0.1 0.7 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 3.0 
Total 19.4 40.8 13.9 4.6 1.1 2.1 2.7 15.3 100.0 
Asia-Pacificc 

















Primary products 0.1 0.4 0.7 1.1 0.7 1.7 1.6 1.4 7.8 
Natural-
resource-based 
manufactures 0.5 1.2 1.6 1.7 0.7 1.1 4.9 2.7 14.5 
Low-technology 
manufactures 0.7 3.7 3.7 1.1 0.7 1.3 3.3 3.4 17.9 
Medium-
technology 
manufactures 1.8 4.3 4.3 3.0 1.2 1.3 6.6 6.4 28.9 
High-technology 
manufactures 0.9 4.3 4.9 4.7 1.1 1.5 7.8 2.4 27.5 
Other transactions 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.1 1.1 0.6 3.5 
Total 4.2 14.2 15.8 11.9 4.5 6.9 25.4 17.1 100.0 
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Table III.4 (concluded) 
Latin America and the Caribbeana 
















25.4 30.3 49.5 62.4 52.8 71.8 45.5 44.2 37.1 
23.7 12.1 25.7 27.7 29.0 16.6 21.2 28.4 20.0 
12.0 9.8 4.2 1.9 1.0 1.2 5.8 1.9 7.5 
30.3 27.0 14.5 4.7 15.0 8.1 18.5 8.7 21.3 
7.8 19.2 4.9 3.3 2.1 2.2 8.9 3.5 11.0 
0.8 1.7 1.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 13.3 3.0 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Asia-Pacificc 
















2.9 2.9 4.2 9.3 15.7 25.2 6.4 8.2 7.8 
12.0 8.2 10.4 13.9 16.0 15.6 19.5 16.1 14.5 
16.6 25.9 23.5 9.0 15.6 18.7 13.1 20.1 17.9 
42.8 30.3 27.5 25.2 25.7 18.1 26.0 37.7 28.9 
20.9 30.6 30.9 39.2 24.3 21.1 30.5 14.2 27.5 
4.8 2.2 3.4 3.5 2.6 1.3 4.5 3.8 3.5 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: The United Nations Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE). 
a Does not include Cuba or Haiti. Data for Antigua and Barbuda and Honduras are for 2007. 
b Includes Australia, Cambodia, Brunei Darussalam, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of 
China, India, Indonesia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam. 
0 Includes Australia, Cambodia, China, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China, India, 
Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand 
and Viet Nam. 
Table III.5 
ASEAN+6: DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL WORLD EXPORTS BY TECHNOLOGICAL INTENSITY, AROUND 2008-2009» 























Australia (2009) 153 767 62.2 11.7 20 453 2.1 6.7 4.5 12.8 
Brunei Darussalam (2006) 7 636 96.4 0.2 250 1.9 0.9 0.5 0.2 
Cambodia (2008) 4 358 3.7 0.7 3 248 72.0 2.4 0.1 21.1 
China (2009) 1 201 647 2.5 8.8 1 059 761 30.1 23.5 34.5 0.5 
Philippines (2009) 38 436 5.8 12.4 31 177 7.1 13.0 61.0 0.7 
India (2009) 176 765 11.8 32.4 90 244 25.3 16.6 9.1 4.7 
Indonesia (2009) 116 510 39.7 26.5 38 423 13.6 13.5 5.9 0.9 
Japan (2009) 580 719 0.5 11.6 469 431 8.0 51.7 21.1 7.1 
Malaysia (2009) 157 195 14.1 19.5 102 684 10.1 16.4 38.8 1.0 
New Zealand (2009) 24 933 43.4 31.8 4 940 6.1 9.4 4.3 5.0 
Taiwan, Province of China 
(2009) 203 494 1.0 12.5 171 858 15.5 26.7 42.2 2.0 
Republic of Korea (2009) 363 531 0.7 14.1 305 907 9.7 42.9 31.6 1.1 
Singapore (2009) 269 832 0.9 22.5 184 296 5.5 19.4 43.4 8.3 
Thailand (2009) 152 497 10.8 20.6 97 137 13.5 27.7 22.6 4.9 
Viet Nam (2008) 62 685 39.6 7.3 32 439 35.7 9.4 6.6 1.3 
Source: The United Nations Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE). 
a The Association of South-East Asian Nations plus China, Japan and the Republic of Korea (ASEAN+3) plus Australia, India and New Zealand. The last year for which 
data are available is in parentheses. 
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Trade between Asia-Pacific and Latin America and the Caribbean 
is mainly inter-industry, which limits the potential for future biregional 
trade and investment. In 2008, almost half of all exports from Asia-Pacific 
went to countries in the same region, while other markets, like the United 
States, the European Union and Latin America and the Caribbean, were 
secondary export destinations (see table III.4). Within the region, China is 
the biggest exporter, surpassing Japan and the Republic of Korea together. 
The rest of Asia-Pacific —namely, the ASEAN countries plus India, 
Australia, New Zealand and Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
of China— together accounted for 25.4% of total exports by countries in 
the region in 2008. The trade patterns among Asia-Pacific countries feature 
an increasingly strong performance for medium- and high-technology 
products, which represent over half of the total. Until countries in Latin 
America and the Caribbean make headway in this type of product, the 
possibilities for stronger trade links are limited. 
Figure 111.1 
INTRAREGIONAL IMPORTS OF PARTS AND COMPONENTS AND THE SHARE OF 
THESE PRODUCTS IN THE TOTAL IMPORTS OF EACH REGION, 2008» 
(Percentages) 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of the United 
Nations Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE). 
a The classification of parts and components is based on Athukorala (2010) and comprises 525 product 
categories at the six-digit tariff  lines of the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System 
(HS). The analysis does not include Taiwan Province of China, due to a lack of statistics. The data for 
Honduras are for 2007. The data for China do not include re-imports. 
El In percentages of intraregional trade. 
In percentages of total imports. 
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With China at the hub, the Asia-Pacific region has become the 
"world factory" of manufacturing parts and components, and the Latin 
American and Caribbean region must find ways to integrate into these 
supply chain networks. In the last decade, Asia's manufacturing-related 
sectors, which supply various types of parts and components, have 
recorded high and growing rates of intra-industry trade. Currently, about 
68% of total imports of parts and components in Asia-Pacific comes from 
other Asian countries, and this, in turn, represents 16% of total combined 
imports in the region. This is slightly higher than the share recorded by 
the European Union (27 countries). Intra-industry trade in these sectors 
has been much less robust in the NAFTA countries, where intraregional 
trade accounts for not quite 37% of total imported parts and components. 
Intraregional imports of parts and components have been relatively 
lower in Latin America and the Caribbean (equivalent to 10% of the 
country's total imports in this segment, despite constituting over 20% of 
total imports). 
The main centres for trade in parts and components in Asia-Pacific 
are the ASEAN countries, China, Japan and, to a lesser extent, the Republic 
of Korea. ASEAN+6 imports of these products totalled US$ 330 billion in 
2008. The ASEAN countries, China and Japan exported almost US$ 100 
billion each, equivalent to 30% of the 16 countries' total imports that year. 
The Republic of Korea exported almost half the level of ASEAN, China 
and Japan, at over US$ 40 billion. The major trade axes are intraregional 
trade within ASEAN, trade between China and Japan and trade between 
China and the ASEAN bloc (see table III.6). The weight of India, Australia 
and New Zealand is still quite small, at less than 1% of the total imports 
of the 16 countries. East Asia and South-East Asia thus share the role of 
"Factory Asia." To attract more investment to the region, the countries of 
Latin America and the Caribbean must promote supply chain networks 
in these sectors. 
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Table III.6 
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH-EAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN): INTRAREGIONAL 
PARTS AND COMPONENTS TRADE MATRIX, 2 0 0 8 ' 
(Billions  of  dollars  and percentages) 




Destination (Billions  of  dollars) 
ASEAN 40.8 32.4 32.3 8.0 1.6 1.0 113.4 
China 29.4 - 46.0 23.2 0.4 0.4 98.5 
Japan 17.5 35.5 - 6.0 0.3 0.1 59.0 
Republic of Korea 3.4 15.9 13.3 - 0.2 0.4 32.7 
India 2.9 8.5 2.1 2.7 - 0.1 16.1 
Australia 3.3 5.6 2.2 1.0 0.2 0.5 12.2 
New Zealand 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.6 1.4 
ASEAN+6b 97.7 98.6 96.2 40.9 2.7 3.1 333.4 




Destination (Percentages  of  total  ASEAN+6  parts  and components imports) 
ASEAN 12.2 9.7 9.7 2.4 0.5 0.3 34.0 
China 8.8 13.8 7.0 0.1 0.1 29.6 
Japan 5.3 10.7 1.8 0.1 0.0 17.7 
Republic of Korea 1.0 4.8 4.0 0.1 0.1 9.8 
India 0.9 2.5 0.6 0.8 0.0 4.8 
Australia 1.0 1.7 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.1 3.6 
New Zealand 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 
ASEAN+6b 29.3 29.6 28.9 12.3 0.8 0.9 100.0 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of the United 
Nations Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE). 
a The classification of parts and components is based on Athukorala (2010) and comprises 525 product 
categories at the six-digit tariff  lines of the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS). 
b Association of South-East Asian Nations plus China, Japan, the Republic of Korea (ASEAN+3), plus 
Australia, India and New Zealand. 
One example is the computer components sector, in which China 
has become the ASEAN countries' main trade partner. Between 2004 
and 2008, ASEAN exports to China in this sector increased 93%, from 
US$ 7.7 billion to US$ 14.9 billion, while world exports of these products 
grew from 13% to 27% in the same period. Similarly, ASEAN imports 
from China grew 51%, to a share of 40% of total imports; this exceeded 
134 ECLAC 
the combined imports from the United States (19%), the European Union 
(9%) and Japan (5%) in 2008 (see figure III.2). This change in the trade 
pattern took place when the sector was hit by a strong recession at the 
world level (USITC, 2010). During that period, assembly operations were 
steadily relocated from the main ASEAN countries to the east coast 
of China. In the automotive parts and components sector, China has a 
much smaller share of the ASEAN markets, while Japan remains strong 
with 44% as a destination for extraregional exports and 57% as an origin 
for extraregional imports in 2008. Last year, intraregional exports in 
the automotive parts and components sector were US$ 1.9 billion, while 
extraregional exports equalled 7.4% of the total; that is, exports to other 
ASEAN members represented one fourth of total exports to extraregional 
markets (USITC, 2010).1 
The Asia-Pacific supply chain networks have expanded and 
deepened in a wide range of industrial sectors, including manufactures 
and natural-resource-based products. A detailed analysis of the 
intraregional trade structure in this region shows that the 20 main 
products exported worldwide in 2008 (which correspond to four categories, 
namely, electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances; petroleum and 
derivatives; office machines and automatic data-processing machines; and 
telecommunications and sound reproduction equipment) are among the 
most important export products at the intraregional level (see table III.7).2 
These sectors have been especially dynamic in China, but the growth of 
these exports in all the East and South-East Asia groups has far exceeded 
the growth of world trade in these products. The top 20 products also 
include some natural-resource-based manufactures other than petroleum 
and derivatives, such as iron and steel, artificial resins and plastic 
materials, chemical products, non-ferrous metals, and non-metal mineral 
manufactures, among others. 
Several Latin American countries are world exporters of automotive parts and 
components. For example, Mexico was the largest exporter of these products in 2006, 
surpassing China. That same year, Brazil was the third-largest exporter of these 
products, and Argentina was the eleventh-largest (Van Biesebroeck and Sturgeon, 2010). 
For example, almost 70% of total electrical machinery exports went to the Asia-Pacific 
region. This sector represented almost 18% of total intraregional trade in 2008. 
2 
China and Latín America and the Caribbean: Building a strategic economic. 1 
Figure III.2 
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH-EAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN): COMPUTER 
COMPONENT TRADE BY MAIN DESTINATION 
AND SOURCE MARKETS, 2004-2008 
















European Union (27) 
I China 
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Source: Authors' elaboration, on the basis of International Irade Commission (USITC), "ASEAN: regional 
trends in economic integration, export competit iveness, and inbound investment for selected industries," 
Investigation,  N° 332-511, USITC Publication 4176, tables 3.1 and 3.2, August 2010. 
Table III.7 
ASIA-PACIFIC: INTRAREGIONAL TRADE • 
(Millions  of  dollars  and percentages) 
Position Product description 
Value of intraregional exports in Share of intraregional exports in Asia-
Asia-Pacific Pacific in total regional exports 
(millions  of  dollars)  (percentages) 
Share in total intraregional trade 
(percentages) 
1990 2000 2008 1990 2000 2008 1990 2000 2008 
1 Electrical machinery, apparatus and 
appliances 32 502 187 814 431 222 47.5 60.8 70.1 9.8 21.3 18.2 
2 Petroleum, petroleum products and 
related materials 26 289 45 143 198 769 79.6 82.0 75.0 7.9 5.1 8.4 
3 Office  machines and automatic data-
processing machines 10 789 80 269 169 573 21.5 41.9 47.9 3.3 9.1 7.2 
4 Telecommunications and sound 
reproduction equipment 18 311 48 162 168 762 30.1 39.5 47.9 5.5 5.5 7.1 
5 Iron and steel 12 868 25 998 106 541 62.8 69.4 60.0 3.9 2.9 4.5 
6 Miscellaneous manufactured articles, 
n.e.c. 12 930 30 379 74 805 33.3 35.1 39.7 3.9 3.4 3.2 
7 Professional, scientific, and 
monitoring instruments and devices, 
n.e.c. 2 967 14 985 74 024 34.9 51.7 61.4 0.9 1.7 3.1 
8 Road vehicles (including hovercraft) 16 425 25 126 73 367 21.0 20.2 23.5 5.0 2.8 3.1 
9 Artificial resins, plastic materials and 
cellulose 7 319 27 389 69 726 72.2 78.6 73.2 2.2 3.1 2.9 
10 General industrial machinery and 
equipment 10 871 24 018 68 815 47.5 49.0 45.4 3.3 2.7 2.9 M O r1> 
O 
Table . (concluded) 
Position Product description 
Value of intraregional exports in 
Asia-Pacific 
(millions  of  dollars) 
Share of intraregional exports in Asia-
Pacific in total regional exports 
(percentages) 
Share in total intraregional trade 
(percentages) 
1990 2 0 0 0 2008 1990 2 0 0 0 2008 1990 2 0 0 0 2008 
11 Specialized machinery for specific 
industries 12 578 27 027 65 860 55.4 60.7 53.2 3.8 3.1 2.8 
12 Non-ferrous metals 7 498 19 124 62 686 76.0 79.5 78.1 2.3 2.2 2.6 
13 Organic chemical products 5 581 18 271 61 701 56.5 62.2 63.0 1.7 2.1 2.6 
14 Textile yarn, fabrics and made-up 
articles 23 941 45 872 61 120 60.2 60.3 48.0 7.2 5.2 2.6 
15 Metalliferous ores and metal scrap 4 700 7 409 55 212 50.4 61.2 82.9 1.4 0.8 2.3 
16 Charcoal, coke and briquettes 4 087 6 851 47 570 70.2 72.4 75.3 1.2 0.8 2.0 
17 Clothing and accessories 13 096 32 636 47 033 27.0 34.9 24.4 3.9 3.7 2.0 
18 Metal manufactures, n.e.c. 5 730 13 140 40 501 37.8 38.9 38.4 1.7 1.5 1.7 
19 Power-generating machinery and 
equipment 5 442 14 179 38 604 40.0 45.8 48.0 1.6 1.6 1.6 
20 Non-metallic mineral manufactures, 
n.e.c. 6 578 12 855 34 742 49.8 46.9 47.3 2.0 1.5 1.5 
Other 89 287 174 776 415 755 49.3 51.1 47.7 26.9 19.8 17.6 
Total 331 780 883 424 2 368 396 43.5 50.1 52.4 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of the United Nations Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE). 
a Includes Taiwan Province of China; does not include Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China, in accordance with the International Standard Industrial 
Classification, revision 2 (ISIC, Rev. 2) (two-digit level). 
OJ 
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C. Trade in Latin America and the Caribbean also has 
a significant intra-industry component 
Despite the image of the Latin American and Caribbean region as a primary 
products and natural-resourced-based manufactures exporter, its export 
structure is fairly diversified at the regional level (Durán and Lo Turco, 
2010). Countries like Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica and Mexico 
and, to a lesser extent, El Salvador and Guatemala have a significant share of 
manufacturing exports, especially low- and medium-technology products. 
Consequently, there is considerable intra-industry trade among the members 
of MERCOSUR, the Andean Community and CACM. 
Manufactures, especially medium- and high-technology products, 
also represent a substantial share of intraregional trade in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, although to a much lower degree than in Asia-Pacific. 
These manufactures account for more than half of total exports in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. The combined share of medium- and high 
technology manufactures is 38% of total intraregional trade (see table 
III.4). The regional export basket to the United States and, to a lesser extent, 
the European Union also contains manufactures, especially medium-
technology products. In contrast, trade with Asia-Pacific is generally 
inter-industry. Latin America and the Caribbean mainly exports primary 
products to that region, which in turn exports relatively high technology 
manufactures to Latin America and the Caribbean.3 
Asia-Pacific intraregional trade is relatively similar to that of 
Latin America and the Caribbean in terms of product composition. Road 
vehicles, petroleum, iron and steel and various machinery products are 
among the top 20 product classes (see table III.8). In 2008, these 20 products 
represented over 74% of total intraregional trade in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. This overlapping of the main intraregional trade products in 
Asia-Pacific and in Latin America and the Caribbean could point to the 
existence of biregional trade opportunities in these areas. 
In the case of Latin America and the Caribbean, however, natural-
resource-based products have a greater weight in total intraregional trade. 
The region records a significant volume of exports in petroleum products, 
natural gas, cereals, paper and paper products, chemical products, essential 
oils, yarns and fabrics, and medicinal and pharmaceutical products. 
Half of these products are exported within the region. The share of 
machinery products is generally low, while medicinal and pharmaceutical 
products —another high-technology category— is fairly high at 72%. The 
intraregional trade of textiles and clothing is also significant (see table III.8). 
For more detail on trade between Latin America and the Caribbean and Asia-Pacific, see 
chapter II. 
Table III.8 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: INTRAREGIONAL TRADE 
(Millions  of  dollars  and percentages) 
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Position Product description 
Value of intraregional exports in 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
(millions  of  dollars) 
Share of intraregional exports in 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
in total regional exports 
(percentages) 
Share in total intraregional trade 
(percentages) 
1990 2000 2008 1990 2000 2008 1990 2000 2008 
1 Petroleum, petroleum products and 
related materials 3 144 10 662 24 922 10.2 18.4 13.3 16.0 18.0 14.6 
2 Road vehicles (including hovercraft) 851 5 601 19 703 17.1 15.9 30.5 4.3 9.5 11.5 
3 Iron and steel 877 1 872 7 812 14.6 23.8 29.3 4.5 3.2 4.6 
4 Cereals and prepared cereals 865 2 336 6 403 46.6 61.2 44.6 4.4 4.0 3.7 
5 Non-ferrous metals 547 1 781 6 089 6.6 15.9 15.6 2.8 3.0 3.6 
6 Natural and manufactured gas 293 807 6 027 57.5 64.0 54.8 1.5 1.4 3.5 
7 Telecommunications and sound 
reproduction equipment 98 1 011 5 273 18.9 4.8 11.1 0.5 1.7 3.1 
8 Artificial resins, plastic materials and 
cellulose 480 1 931 4 926 38.4 58.0 56.8 2.4 3.3 2.9 
9 Electrical machinery, apparatus and 
appliances 391 1 512 4 617 28.1 5.3 12.4 2.0 2.6 2.7 
10 Metalliferous ores and metal scrap 551 916 4 558 8.7 9.0 8.6 2.8 1.5 2.7 
11 Specialized machinery for specific 
industries 301 700 4 111 29.0 26.0 39.4 1.5 1.2 2.4 
OJ 
Table 11.8 (concluded) 
Position Product description 
Value of intraregional exports in 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
(millions  of  dollars) 
Share of intraregional exports in 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
in total regional exports 
(percentages) 
Share in total intraregional trade 
(percentages) 
1990 2 0 0 0 2008 1990 2 0 0 0 2008 1990 2 0 0 0 2008 
12 Paper, cardboard, pulp and related 
articles 374 1 798 3 938 29.7 56.8 61.4 1.9 3.0 2.3 
13 General industrial machinery and 
equipment 417 1 203 3 520 28.0 17.1 20.5 2.1 2.0 2.1 
14 Miscellaneous manufactured articles, 
n.e.c. 411 1 459 3 440 31.7 21.8 26.7 2.1 2.5 2.0 
15 Essential oils and perfumes; toilet and 
cleaning preparations 170 1 153 3 357 49.9 62.7 65.7 0.9 2.0 2.0 
16 Textile yarn, fabrics and made-up 
articles 446 1 552 3 352 22.5 32.4 53.2 2.3 2.6 2.0 
17 Medicinal and pharmaceutical products 207 1 677 3 322 57.9 76.4 71.5 1.0 2.8 1.9 
18 Metal manufactures, n.e.c. 381 1 194 3 282 33.8 21.8 30.9 1.9 2.0 1.9 
19 Meat and meat preparations 391 660 3 160 17.7 17.7 15.1 2.0 1.1 1.8 
20 Organic chemical products 475 994 3 052 26.4 27.2 28.7 2.4 1.7 1.8 
Other 6 038 16 280 44 043 13.1 13.1 16.7 30.7 27.5 25.8 
Total 19 698 59 096 170 915 16.0 17.0 19.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of the United Nations Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE). 
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In contrast to forecasts, the growing productive integration of Asia 
with China does not necessarily eliminate opportunities for other Asian 
countries to deepen their productive and trade specialization. Rather, it 
creates opportunities for those countries to integrate into regional and global 
value chains and, at the same time, to increase their exports of parts and 
components all along the more fragmented chains. They can thus export 
unfinished products indirectly to extraregional markets, in particular the 
industrialized economies, through "Factory Asia" with China at the hub. 
D. Intra-industry trade between the two regions 
is limited, but growing 
Latin America conducts substantial intra-industry trade with the United 
States and the European Union, but the level remains low with Asia-
Pacific. A brief analysis of the trend for intra-industry trade from 1990 to 
2008 in Asia-Pacific and Latin America, both within each region and with 
other regions of the world, reveals substantial changes, particularly in 
Asia-Pacific. This conclusion is based on calculations of the Grubel-Lloyd 
index (GLI)4, which indicates the following (see table III.9): 
(i) The intra-industry trade coefficient has increased in both regions 
over the years: from 0.13 to 0.29 in Latin America and from 0.22 
to 0.37 in Asia-Pacific; 
(ii) the biggest increases were recorded in Asia-Pacific; 
(iii) although they have grown, the intra-industry trade coefficients 
for biregional trade remain very low, at under 0.05 and 0.06; and 
(iv) the intra-industry trade coefficients of both regions with 
the European Union and, especially, the United States have 
increased substantially. 
In this case, the GLI is calculated based on bilateral trade flows in order to analyse 
whether there are import and export flows of the same products between two countries. 
Formally, the trade index is defined as follows: 
? |X e -MJ 
IGL = 1 - • 
where Xit and Mit are exports and imports of product i in year t. The numerator of 
the second term, which reflects the sum of the trade balances by product, provides an 
indicator of the value of trade that is not offset by an opposite flow of goods in the same 
industry. After dividing that sum by total trade and deducing the resulting ratio from 
the unit, the index varies from 0 to 1. The higher the value of the index, the larger the 
share of intra-industry trade in total trade. To capture larger increases and differentiate 
the degree of depth in intra-industry relations, three levels are defined: 
i) level 1: Igl > 0,33 (with intra-industry trade); 
ii) level 2: 0,10 < Igl < 0,33 (with potential intra-industry trade), and 
iii) level 3: Igl < 0,10 (inter-industry trade ratio). 
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Table III.9 
LATIN AMERICA AND ASIA-PACIFIC: INTRA-INDUSTRY TRADE, 
1990, 1995, 2000 AND 2008 
(Grubel-Lloyd  index) 
Region/country 
Latin America and Asia-Pacific Latin America and Asia-Pacific with other regions and countries 
Latin America Asia-Pacific European Union (27 countries) United States 
1990 
Latin America 0.13 0.03 0.08 0.23 
Asia-Pacific 0.04 0.22 0.19 0.30 
1995 
Latin America 0.22 0.04 0.10 0.37 
Asia-Pacific 0.04 0.30 0.26 0.37 
2000 
Latin America 0.27 0.06 0.12 0.44 
Asia-Pacific 0.07 0.36 0.27 0.39 
2008 
Latin America 0.29 0.05 0.20 0.36 
Asia-Pacific 0.06 0.37 0.27 0.21 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of the United 
Nations Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE). 
Of the four regional groupings considered (Latin America, Asia-
Pacific, the United States and the European Union), intra-industry trade 
within Asia-Pacific has the highest GLI, whereas intra-industry trade 
between Asia-Pacific and Latin America and the Caribbean is the lowest. 
The GLI of China, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, 
Singapore and Thailand with their main Asian trade partners is high. The 
GLIs are also high within ASEAN and between ASEAN members and 
each of the three main Asian trade partners (namely, China, Japan and the 
Republic of Korea) (see table 111.10). In 2009, after the international financial 
crisis, the coefficient fell relative to 2000, which had a strong effect on the 
intra-industry trade networks in Asia. Despite this reduction, the high GLI 
levels support the findings in the existing literature regarding the role 
that China and other emerging Asian countries are starting to play in the 
integration of the Asian region (Wakasugi, 2007; IMF, 2007; Ando, 2006; 
Kinoshita, 2004; Fukao, Ishido and Ito, 2003; Durking and Kryegier, 2000). 
One of the factors behind this dynamic is the fragmentation of production 
processes beyond national borders, driven by different forms of business 
associations (such as FDI and joint-venture firms) and intra-firm trade. 
Table 111.10 
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH-EAST ASIAN NATIONS PLUS CHINA, JAPAN AND THE REPUBLIC 
OF KOREA (ASEAN+3): INTRA-INDUSTRY TRADE INDEX, 2000 AND 2009» 
(Grubel-Lloyd  index) 
Lao 
People's 
Cambodia Philippines Indonesia „ Malaysia 
Democratic 
Republic 




2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 
Philippines 0.10 0.01 015 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.53 0.47 0.05 0.01 0.44 0.24 0.06 0.12 0.27 0.46 0.40 0.40 0.50 0.39 
Indonesia 0.02 0.02 0.16 0.16 0.00 0.12 0.35 0.41 0.01 0.03 0.34 0.34 0.14 0.26 0.20 0.16 0.18 0.15 0.12 0.19 
Malaysia 0.03 0.05 0.51 0 44 0.45 0.36 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.55 0.46 0.10 0.17 0.37 0.42 0.38 0.25 0.32 0.31 
Singapore 0.02 0.29 0.45 0.38 0.24 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.70 0.78 0.04 0.03 0.49 0.53 0.06 0.13 0.52 0.50 0.60 0.71 0.42 0.55 
Thailand 0 01 0.02 0.45 0.38 0.38 0.34 0.02 0.10 0.54 0.46 0.03 0.01 0.07 0.17 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.38 0.38 
China 0.00 0.02 0.34 0.31 0.21 0.21 0.02 0.01 0.30 0.32 0.04 0.02 0.35 0.35 0.07 0.18 0.33 0.38 0.32 0.35 
Republic of 
Korea 
0.02 0.03 0.42 0.45 0.16 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.48 0.29 0.02 0.00 0.42 0.33 0.11 0.15 0.42 0.49 0.42 0.45 
Japan 0.01 0.01 0.47 0.38 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.02 0.37 0.29 0.02 0.02 0.36 0.37 0.16 0.31 0.30 0.34 0 44 0.47 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of the United Nations Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE). 
a The index is calculated based on the exports and imports recorded by each country, which can vary between the same partners. The calculations were made using 













Trade between countries in Latin America also has a strong intra-
industry component. The countries with a high GLI are Argentina, Brazil, 
Colombia and Mexico. In Brazil and Mexico, the high level of intra-
industry trade is centred on bilateral trade with the United States. In 
particular, Mexico's high GLI is determined by the United States, which 
is the destination for nearly 80% of its exports. Only Mexico exceeds 
the threshold for the first level of the GLI, defined as over 0.33 for total 
trade (see table 111.11). In the case of bilateral intraregional trade, three 
countries display high levels of intra-industry trade (Argentina, Brazil 
and Colombia), nine are at the second level, and the remaining five are 
dominated by inter-industry trade. In terms of trade with the European 
Union, only four countries are at the second level. 
Table 111.11 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): INTRA-INDUSTRY 
TRADE WITH MAIN TRADE PARTNERS, 2 0 0 8 a 
(Grubel-Lloyd  index) 





Argentina 0.41 0.03 0.28 0.14 0.27 
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 0.10 0.00 0.07 0.02 0.08 
Brazil 0.36 0.08 0.36 0.30 0.28 
Chile 0.17 0.02 0.11 0.05 0.09 
Colombia 0.43 0.02 0.17 0.07 0.23 
Costa Rica 0.32 0.08 0.26 0.23 0.25 
Ecuador 0.20 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.09 
El Salvador 0.28 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.18 
Guatemala 0.27 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.1 
Honduras 0.15 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.1 
Mexico 0.28 0.07 0.49 0.18 0.38 
Nicaragua 0.04 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.04 
Panama 0.08 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.04 
Paraguay 0.17 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.11 
Peru 0.08 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.06 
Uruguay 0.32 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.22 
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.03 
Latin America 0.29 0.05 0.36 0.20 0.27 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of the United 
Nations Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE). 
a According to data from the Standard International Trade Classification, Revision 2 (SITC, Rev. 2) at 
three digits. 
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There are several axes of intra-industry trade in Latin America. The 
strongest intra-industry relations involve bilateral trade between El Salvador 
and Guatemala, on the one hand, and Costa Rica and Guatemala, on the 
other. These already ranked as intra-industry relations (with a GLI over 
0.33) in 2000, and data for 2009 show a substantial increase (nearly 0.50 in 
both cases). The bilateral relation with the highest GLI in 2009 was between 
Argentina and Brazil, at 0.51; it also recorded the strongest growth in the 
period. Other bilateral relations that ranked as intra-industry in 2009 are 
between El Salvador and Costa Rica, Mexico and Brazil, and Ecuador and 
Colombia. A second group of countries has the potential for intra-industry 
relations as of 2009 (a GLI between 0.10 and 0.32); this group includes Mexico 
and Argentina, Colombia and Peru, and Argentina and Uruguay The 
indices between Brazil and Uruguay, Colombia and Costa Rica, and Ecuador 
and Costa Rica are also noteworthy, albeit to a lesser extent (see table 111.12). 
The lack of intra-industry trade between the two regions is one of 
the main reasons for the scarce biregional investment and trade flows. 
While intra-industry trade is substantial within the regions, it continues to 
be scarce between the two regions. In 2009, the GLIs for biregional cross-
country trade were fairly low (see table 111.13). In Asia-Pacific, biregional 
intra-industry trade is almost non-existent in most cases, with an index 
of less than 0.10. Current intra-industry trade flows represent a relatively 
small share of biregional trade. This implies that there are not only 
abundant possibilities for the future, but also big challenges for biregional 
cooperation in the area of trade and investment. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to identify some bilateral flows that point 
to the existence of intra-industry trade, although this is a nascent trend (see 
table 111.13). In general, Mexico has a higher GLI for trade with Asia-Pacific 
than do the other Latin American economies. Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica 
and other Central American countries are beginning to show some degree 
of intra-industry trade, albeit inconsistently, with all the Asian trade 
partners. In Asia-Pacific, Singapore and Australia are adopting this type 
of trade with Latin America. In sum, the regions have made significant 
progress from totally inter-industry trade toward a trade structure that is 
somewhat more oriented toward intra-industry trade. 
In addition, the products that promote intra-industry trade between 
the regions generally have a medium to high technological content, 
including electrical equipment, parts and accessories, micro-circuits, 
automatic data-processing machines, measuring, monitoring and testing 
instruments, and pharmaceutical products. The Asia-Pacific countries have 
made big strides in these areas at the world level. Medium-technology 
products include various plastic products, road vehicles with their parts 
and motors, and various other products that fall under the category of 
general machinery. Low-technology products include yarns, textiles and 
iron and steel products (ECLAC, 2008a). 
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Table 111.12 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): INTRA-INDUSTRY 
TRADE RELATIONS, 2000-2009 
(Grubel-Lloyd  index) 
BOL BRA CHL COL CRI ECU SLV 
2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 
Argentina 0.03 0.05 0.41 0.51 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.03 
Bolivia 
(Plurlnational 
State of) 0.04 0.01 0.10 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.01 
Brazil O.O'I 0.01 0.12 0.11 0.16 0.16 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.01 
Chile 0.08 0.07 0.12 0.11 0.17 0.10 0.06 0.08 0.13 0.10 0.05 0.04 
Colombia 0.01 0.01 0.18 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.10 0.10 0.31 0.30 0.02 0.07 
Costa Rica 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.16 0.08 0.17 0.14 0.17 0 , 0 0.16 0 44 0.41 
Ecuador 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.11 0.12 0.32 0.30 0.11 0.18 0.01 0.00 
El Salvador 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.43 0.40 0.01 0.00 
Guatemala 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.44 0.43 0.00 0.01 0.50 0.46 
Honduras 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.16 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.29 
Mexico 0.05 0.03 0.29 0.44 0.27 0.14 0.31 0.17 0.14 0.09 0.10 0.05 0.08 0.11 
Nicaragua 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.17 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.08 
Panama 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.24 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.17 0.03 
Paraguay 0.02 0.08 0.11 0.15 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.10 0.01 0.03 0.26 0.01 0.05 0.01 
Peru 0.13 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.27 0.26 0.12 0.27 0.06 0.05 0.10 0.11 0.02 0.03 
Uruguay 0.01 0.01 0.25 0.20 0.26 0.22 0.03 0.20 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 
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Table 111.12 (concluded) 
2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 
0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.20 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.41 0.27 0.06 0.02 
0.01 
0 . 0 2 
0.00 
0.03 
0 . 0 2 
0.01 
0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.06 
0.00 0.00 
0.02 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.01 
0.00 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.06 
0.01 
0 . 0 6 
0.00 
0.22 0.02 0.03 





GLI > 0.33 
0.10 < G L I < 0.33 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of the United 
Nations Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE). 
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Table 111.13 
LATIN AMERICA AND ASIA-PACIFIC (SELECTED COUNTRIES): 
INTRA-INDUSTRY TRADE RELATIONS, 2000-2009 
(Grubel-Lloyd  index) 
AUS BRN KHM CHN PHL IND IDN 
2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 
Argentina 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 
Bolivia 
(Plurinational 
State of) 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Brazil 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.11 0.11 0.06 0.06 
Chile 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Colombia 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 
Costa Rica 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 
Ecuador 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
El Salvador 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Guatemala 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 
Honduras 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Mexico 0.10 0.23 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.05 0.02 0.03 014 0.10 0.03 0.07 
Nicaragua 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Panama 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 
Paraguay 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Peru 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 
Uruguay 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.09 
Venezuela 
(Bolivarian 
Republic of) 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 
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Table 111.13 (concluded) 
2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 
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0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.04 0.04 0.05 
0.02 0 .00 0.01 
0.02 0 .00 0.01 
0.01 0 .00 0.01 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.93 0.01 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.05 0.01 0.04 
0.00 0 .00 0.11 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0 .00 0.01 
0 .00 0 .00 0.01 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 O.O'I 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
GLI > 0.33 
• 0.10 < GLI < 0.33 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of the United 
Nations Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE). 
Note: In the case of El Salvador and Viet Nam. trade between the two countries involves a single product; 
in the case of Peru and the Lao People's Democratic Republic, there are five products. The intra-industry 
relation is strong in the case of the one product traded by El Salvador and Viet Nam (shoes), but there is no 
deeper relation. In the case of Peru and the Lao People's Democratic Republic, trade centres on clothing, 
and here again this product class carries more weight, by volume, than the other four exports, for which 
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Everything seems to indicate that in the past several years, Latin 
American firms have begun to participate in diverse Asian value and supply 
chains. The appearance of intra-industry trade between the regions, with 
the participation of an increasing number of countries and sectors, suggests 
that there are interesting opportunities and possibilities for expanding 
this trade in the future. Biregional intra-industry trade could be promoted 
in some manufacturing sectors. Nevertheless, to take advantage of these 
opportunities, business contacts need to be strengthened through FDI and 
other types of association and through free trade agreements in both regions. 
E. China has become an export platform to 
developed countries for its Asian neighbours 
An important characteristic of intra-Asian trade and FDI dynamics, which 
are at the core of the world economy, is the spectacular eruption of China 
as a key player. China has a trade deficit with the ASEAN countries, 
the Republic of Korea and Japan because these countries are the main 
suppliers of capital goods and intermediate inputs for its manufacturing 
industry. Chinese manufactures are later exported to other trade partners, 
mainly the United States and the European Union, with which it has a 
more favourable trade balance in low- and high-technology manufactures. 
China is thus becoming an export platform to markets in the United 
States and Europe for many of its Asian neighbours. While Latin America 
continues to provide China with primary products and natural-resource-
based manufactures, the level of these exports to China is much lower 
than the region's competitors. Latin America competes with the ASEAN 
countries, the United States, Australia, India and New Zealand in primary 
products and with Japan and the Republic of Korea in natural-resource-
based manufactures. 
Japan's main trade partners are its Asian neighbours, in particular 
China, and a large share of Japanese machinery imports come from 
Asia. In 2009, Asia-Pacific countries, including India, Australia and New 
Zealand, supplied 51% of Japan's imports and absorbed an even greater 
percentage of its exports (57%). China and the ASEAN countries, in 
particular, supplied over 22% and 14% of total imports, respectively. Japan's 
ASEAN imports exceeded imports from the United States (11%) and the 
European Union (11%) considered separately. Electrical machinery and 
other manufactured products for general use make up a large percentage 
of the goods that Japan imports from its Asian neighbours. This is the case 
not only in its imports from China and the recently industrialized Asian 
economies —Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China, the 
Republic of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan Province of China— but also in 
its trade with the ASEAN members (JETRO, 2010 and various years). 
T a b l e 111.14 
C H I N A : C O M P O S I T I O N O F T H E I N T E R N A T I O N A L T R A D E D E F I C I T A N D S U R P L U S 
B Y P R O D U C T T E C H N O L O G Y C O N T E N T , 2 0 0 7 - 2 0 0 9 » 
(Millions  of  dollars) 
Manufactures 











Latin America and 
the Caribbean 59 518 62 184 (2 666) (16 424) (1 418) 3 460 5 241 3 736 
Asia-Pacific 322 810 407 776 (84 966) (8 057) (4 018) 13 374 (8 682) (21 488) 
Association of 
South-East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) 105 110 110 742 (5 631) (6 263) (1 060) 4 512 5 153 (7 854) 
Australia and New 
Zealand 22 549 36 194 (13 645) (8 786) (319) 2 323 1 458 1 723 
Republic of Korea 61 348 106 147 (44 799) 1 337 (2 067) 1 944 (4 888) (10 659) 
India 28 434 16 197 12 238 (5 685) 717 979 2 742 3 228 
Japan 105 369 138 496 (33 127) 2 554 (1 608) 5 940 (11 690) (6 203) 
United States 235 769 76 296 159 473 (3 607) 2 248 22 157 7 379 20 837 
European Union 258 455 123 794 134 661 1 389 844 16 992 (2 118) 22 055 
SB CT. 3 > 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of the United Nations Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE). 
a Total exports and imports include the category "Other," not included in the table. 
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China is Japan's main supplier of different types of machinery. A 
large share of the products that Japan imports from its Asian neighbours 
is made up of electrical machinery and other manufactures for general 
use. This can be seen not only in the country's imports from China and 
the recently industrialized Asian economies, but also in its trade with 
the ASEAN-4 members. The United States has a strong presence in the 
food and transport equipment sectors; the European Union is prominent 
in industrial chemical products, transport equipment and a range of 
durable consumer goods. The only sector in which the Latin American 
and Caribbean region has a strong presence in Japan's imports is crude 
materials (see table 111.15). China depends largely on Japan as a supplier of 
high-technology parts and components, and Japan has been able to take 
full advantage of China's international trade expansion in recent years. 
China's main trade partners are also its Asian neighbours. Japan 
and China thus form an anchor of intra-industry trade in the region. Asian 
countries account for a large share of China's total trade (see chapter l).5 
As discussed above, the Grubel-Lloyd indices for China with the Republic 
of Korea and Singapore increased considerably through the mid-1990s. 
In the current decade, China has expanded its intra-industry trade with 
Japan, Malaysia and Thailand and, to a lesser extent, with Indonesia and 
Viet Nam. Foreign capital firms, especially those based out of Asia, are 
the main drivers of China's foreign trade: Asian foreign capital firms were 
responsible for almost a quarter of the country's foreign trade.6 These 
companies import large amounts of components and inputs from their 
headquarters in their countries of origin, which reflects the high degree of 
intra-industry trade. 
Exports destined for Asia-Pacific represented 43% of the country's total exports in 
2009, with the exception of Hong Kong (SAR of China), which was 28%. This greatly 
exceeds the level of exports to the European Union (20%) and the United States (18%). 
Japan (8%), ASEAN (9%) and the Republic of Korea (6%) are among the top ten export 
destinations. In terms of imports, in 2009 Asia-Pacific countries were the biggest source 
of China's foreign purchases, with 48% of total imports, versus 13% for the European 
Union and 8% for the United States. 
The contribution of foreign capital firms from the United States and Europe to China's 
exports is fairly low in comparison with their Asian competitors. At the same time, the 
presence of Asian firms is a determining factor in China's import orientation: firms from 
ten selected Asian countries imported US$ 291 billion in 2006, equivalent to 62% of total 
imports of foreign-owned firms in China. This far exceeds the share of firms from the 
United States and the European Union, at just 7% and 10%, respectively. 
Table 111.15 
JAPAN: IMPORTS BY REGION AND SECTOR, AVERAGE FOR 2007-2009 




























products for direct 
consumption 27.2 10.0 27.5 4.6 9.7 13.2 2.2 9.2 0.2 1.8 21.9 100.0 54 897 
Industrial supplies 5.2 6.9 24.0 5.1 11.8 7.1 3.1 4.7 36.2 3.8 16.0 100.0 340 413 
Crude 
materials 7.4 4.3 26.7 3.6 19.3 3.9 1.9 26.2 0.5 2.6 30.4 100.0 40 755 
Mineral fuels 0.6 0.2 14.9 2.0 11.6 1.4 3.3 0.2 62.0 3.2 15.5 100.0 196 258 
Industrial 
chemical 
products 19.6 34.5 30.5 10.8 5.7 14.0 0.3 3.9 1.9 0.3 9.1 100 0 48 191 
Metals 5 1 7 5 32 9 15 2 4 6 13 2 112 7.7 1 3 18 5 15 7 100 0 27 547 
Textiles 4.0 10.7 76.5 12.0 10.4 54.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.2 7.6 100.0 5 197 
Capital goods 19.3 12.9 62.8 17.6 12.1 33.1 0.0 1.3 0.3 0.1 3.3 100.0 147 273 
Non-electrical 
machinery 18.0 15.6 62.2 11.5 9.9 40.8 0.0 1.0 0.2 0.1 3.0 100.0 53 477 
Electrical 
equipment 15.2 8.2 71.5 24.5 14.6 32.3 0.0 1.2 0.4 0.0 3.5 100.0 69 294 
Transport 







































consumer goods 6.1 15.6 71.9 1.5 3.4 67.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3 5.8 100.0 41 154 
Textile 
products 0.7 5.9 86.9 1.2 3.3 82.3 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.3 5.9 100.0 26 117 
Non-perishable 
consumer goods 6.2 20.1 65.4 8.0 10.2 47.3 0.0 1.0 0.1 1.3 5.7 100.0 43 602 
Household 
equipment 3.9 24.7 67.6 8.7 5.9 53.0 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.0 3.2 100.0 1 515 
Domestic 
electrical 
equipment 1.4 3.4 94.0 3.1 25.2 65.7 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.8 100 0 7 222 
Passenger 
vehicles 6.6 80.0 1.2 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.0 2.9 0.0 8.7 0.5 100.0 6 327 
Motorcycles 
and bicycles 12.9 9.6 76.3 18.8 5.2 52.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.1 100.0 1 764 
Toys and 
musical 
instruments 5.4 4.4 88.0 4.0 4.9 79.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 2.0 100.0 7 030 
Other 17.9 9.4 62.8 28.9 17.3 16.6 1.4 1.6 0.4 0.6 5.9 100.0 15 800 
Total 10.7 10.1 40.0 8.5 11.2 20.3 1.9 3.7 19.3 2.3 12.0 100.0 643 141 
Over 20% 
• Over 10% but less than 20% 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official  data from the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) [online] 
http://www.jetro.go.jp/en/reports/statistics. 
a Includes China, four recently industrialized Asian economies (Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China, Republic of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan Province 
of China) and ASEAN-4 (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand). 
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Trade with the Asia-Pacific region represents more than half of the 
Republic of Korea's total trade and exceeds its trade with the European 
Union and the United States. China's share in the Republic of Korea's 
trade has increased briskly, receiving 24% of the country's exports 
in 2009 and sourcing 17% of its imports. Korean exports to China are 
concentrated in medium- and high-technology manufactures, which 
represented 32% and 42%, respectively, of shipments to China in 2009, 
while imports feature a large share of low-technology manufactures. In 
2009, the ASEAN countries as a group were more important than Japan 
as a destination for Korean exports. 
The main trade partners of the ASEAN countries are China, Japan 
and the Republic of Korea (ASEAN+3), which provide around a third of 
the FDI inflows to the ASEAN group. Asia-Pacific, including the Republic 
of Korea, Australia, India and New Zealand, represented 57% of total trade 
for ASEAN as a whole in 2009. China ranks first as a supplier and third as 
a destination for trade with the ASEAN countries. ASEAN intraregional 
trade constitutes the most important trade axis for the group.7 The share 
of trade within ASEAN, for both exports and imports, was 25% of the total 
in 2009, which is higher than the intraregional trade recorded under the 
different integration schemes in Latin America and the Caribbean. The 
ASEAN-5 countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand) have succeeded in increasing their Grubel-Lloyd indices with 
China and Japan, because their intra-industry trade represents a significant 
share of reciprocal manufacturing exports (ECLAC, 2008a). 
The regional trade network centred in China developed outside 
the realm of regional trade agreements. The so-called "Factory Asia" 
grew out of the unilateral trade liberalization of parts and components, 
in conjunction with FDI flows and a favourable investment climate, which 
are the key elements of intraregional trade in Asia-Pacific. This assumed 
a significant change in the Asian development model before China 
emerged as an economic power. An important factor in the fragmentation 
of manufacturing processes in the region was Japan's loss of comparative 
advantages in manufacturing production, which led Japanese firms to 
break down production processes and subcontract out the more labour-
intensive phases in neighbouring East Asian countries. The process of 
hollowing out the Japanese economy was repeated in Taiwan Province of 
China, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China, the Republic 
of Korea and Singapore, which boosted the creation of "Factory Asia." 
Total trade between ASEAN members in 2009 —with imports and exports together 
totalling US$ 376 billion— was more than double the volume of trade with the region's 
other most important trade partners, including China (US$ 178 billion), the European 
Union (25 countries) (US$ 171 billion), Japan (US$ 161 billion) and the United States 
(US$ 150 billion). 
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Finally, China's entry into the international economic sphere further 
eroded the industrial comparative advantages of higher-income countries 
in East Asia and increased the attractiveness of offshore production. 
Rising wages in China are now leading Asian countries to invest in other 
areas both within and outside Asia. 
F. Intraregional foreign direct investment: key for 
intraregional and intra-industry trade 
The ASEAN+3 countries have become an increasingly important source 
of world FDI. A decade ago, only 5% of total world FDI originated in 
the ASEAN+3 countries, and two thirds of that came from Japan. Since 
then, this group of countries has increased its share in world FDI flows 
to 12% (see figure III.3), thanks to an active internationalization process 
by companies in China, the Republic of Korea and Singapore. Currently, 
40% of these capital flows come from Japanese firms. ASEAN+3 
investment became relatively more significant after the recent financial 
crisis. In relative terms, the recent financial crisis had a stronger effect 
on the United States and Europe than the Asian countries, in their role as 
foreign investors. Thus, in the two-year period 2008-2009, the ASEAN+3 
economies' contribution to total world flows rose to 16% (see figure III.4). 
Figure III.3 
TOTAL WORLD FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FLOWS ORIGIN, 
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Figure 111.3 (concluded) 
2000-2009 
Other 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information 
from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 
Figure III.4 
TOTAL WORLD FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FLOWS ORIGIN, 2008-2009 
(Percentages) 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information 
from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 
FDI inflows to China from its three main sources (ASEAN, Japan 
and the Republic of Korea) increased sharply.8 The ASEAN countries 
thus represent an important source of FDI for China, although the largest 
share of these investment flows is from Singapore (between US$ 3 billion 
As indicated in chapter I, these three sources represented around 14% del total FDI, on 
average, in 2007 and 2008. 
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and US$ 4 billion a year). At the same time, the developing countries, 
especially in Asia, have been the main destination for FDI outflows from 
China, absorbing more than two thirds of the total. Asia-Pacific, including 
Australia, accounted for 78% of China's world FDI stock at year-end 2009. 
Japan's FDI stock abroad at year-end 2009 was equivalent to 20% of 
the stock held by the United States, four times that of China and five times 
that of the Republic of Korea. By destination, 70% of Japanese FDI abroad 
went to developed countries (basically the United States and Western 
Europe), while half of Korean FDI went to emerging countries. In the case 
of China, two thirds went to Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of 
China; when this region is excluded, Chinese FDI is more oriented towards 
the emerging economies of Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean 
than towards the more advanced economies (see table 111.16). 
Table 111.16 
CHINA, UNITED STATES, JAPAN AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA: 
OVERSEAS FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI) 
STOCK BY DESTINATION, DECEMBER 2009» 
(Millions  of  dollars  and percentages) 
Overseas FDI Share 
China 
Japan United States China 
Republic 









Total 740 364 3 508 142 183 971 142986 100 100 100 100 100 
Asia 175 645 399 169 128 007 63 739 7.4 11.4 69.6 17.9 44.6 
China 55 045 49 403 - 29 913 - 1.4 - 20.9 
Japan - 103 643 510 3 178 - 3.0 0.3 0.7 2.2 
Recently 
Industrialized 
Asia economies 58 607 173 808 120 030 12 790 7.9 5.0 65.2 6.1 8.9 
Hong Kong 




(ASEAN 4) 48 441 45 506 1 428 7 525 6.5 1.3 0.8 2.1 5.3 
Viet Nam 3 353 - 522 5 730 0.5 - 0.3 0.8 4.0 
India 8 982 18610 222 1 839 1.2 0.5 0.1 0.3 1.3 
North America 240 246 259 792 3 659 34 539 32.4 7.4 2.0 5.4 24.2 
United States 230 948 - 2 390 30 110 31.2 - 1.3 3.5 21.1 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 99 056 678 956 32 242 10 827 13.4 19.4 17.5 47.3 7.6 
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Table 111.16 (concluded) 
Overseas FDI Share 
Japan United States China 
Republic 










Brazil 31 337 56 692 217 1 182 2.9 1.6 0.1 0.3 0.8 
Oceania 36 173 112 186 3 816 3 437 4.9 3.2 2.1 5.6 2.4 
Western Europe 174 939 1 925 781 2 882 18 119 23.6 54.9 1.6 4.2 12.7 
Eastern Europe 4112 50 443 4 217 8 074 0.6 1.4 2.3 6.2 5.6 
Russian 
Federation 954 21 328 1 838 1 470 0.1 0.6 1.0 2.7 1.0 





34 979 7 672 1 675 0.8 1.0 4.2 11.3 1.2 
South Africa 1 730 5 922 3 049 169 0.2 0.2 1.7 4.5 0.1 
Developed 
countries or 
regions 509 968 2 575 210 130 897 72 062 68.9 73.4 71.2 22.1 50.4 
Source: Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), "Figure 111.12," 2010 JETRO  Global  Trade  and 
Investment  Report.  A Global  Strategy  for  Japanese Companies  to Open New  Frontiers  in Overseas  Markets, 
Tokyo, 2010. 
a The geographic classification by country and region is from the Ministry of Finance of Japan and 
the Central Bank of Japan, "Balance of Payments" [online] http:/ /www.mof.go.jp/engl ish/ internationaL 
policy/reference/balance_of_payments/index.htm.  Data for Japan, the United States and China are 
based on the balance of payments. Data for the Republic of Korea are cumulative investments by 
investors starting in 1960. Data for Japan are originally published in yen, and converted to United 
States dollars at the end of each quarter, using the interbank exchange rate of the Central Bank of 
Japan. In this table, developed countries or regions include Japan, the recently industrialized Asian 
countries, North America, Oceania and Western Europe. 
In more recent decades, Asia-Pacific's weight as a destination for 
Japanese FDI has increased. In the last decade (2000-2009), Asia-Pacific, 
including Oceania, absorbed 30% of Japanese FDI abroad, pushing North 
America (27%) and the European Union (25%) into second and third place 
(see figure III.5). Currently, Japan continues to be the primary foreign 
investor in the ASEAN+3 economies (see figure III.6). 
Almost 60% of the foreign affiliates of Japanese firms are located in 
Asia and only 5% in Latin America and the Caribbean; the majority are in 
the manufacturing sector. According to a study carried out by the Japanese 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI, 2007), there were around 
16,000 Japanese affiliates operating overseas in 2006. Approximately 
58% of these affiliates were located in Asia (20% in China), around 13% 
had operations in the three recently industrialized countries (Taiwan 
Province of China, Republic of Korea and Singapore), and 17% were in 
the ASEAN-4. About 800 Japanese affiliates (5% of the world total) were 
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operating in Latin America and the Caribbean, primarily in Argentina, 
Brazil and Mexico. Broken down by industry, around 50% of the affiliates 
were involved in the manufacturing sector. The top three sectors were 
chemical products, communications equipment and transport equipment, 
followed by general machinery and electrical machinery. In these cases, 
the production bases were mainly located in Asia. In Latin America and 
the Caribbean, about 570 Japanese affiliates were in the non-manufacturing 
sector, primarily in activities tied to transport and retail trade, while 250 
were in the manufacturing sector (with about 70 of these in transport 
equipment production) (ECLAC, 2008d). Relatively few affiliates were 
associated with natural-resource-based sectors. The surprising presence 
of Japan in Asia's machinery sector reflects the flourishing and complex 
supply chain network in that region.9 
Figure III.5 
JAPAN: DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESMENT (FDI) 












Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official  data 
from the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) [online] http://www.jetro.go.jp/en/reports/statistics. 
0 The performance of Japanese affiliates in Asia is particularly noteworthy in terms of the 
number of firms, sales, benefits and number of employees. At the same time, Japanese 
FDI in Latin America and the Caribbean has an exceptionally high rate of return, 
although it represents a small percentage of the world total in terms of number of firms, 
employees and sales (ECLAC, 2008b). Almost 12% of the total profits of Japanese foreign 
affiliates originated in Latin America and the Caribbean in the 2007 fiscal year. China 
has not necessarily been the centre of profits and sales for the Japanese multi-national 
corporations: it only contributed 9.2% of total sales of Japanese foreign affiliates and 
12.6% of net benefits in that fiscal year (JETRO 2010, p. 95). 
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Figure III.6 
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH-EAST ASIAN NATIONS PLUS CHINA, JAPAN 
AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ASEAN+3): DIRECT INVESTMENT 
ABROAD BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN, 2000-2009 
(Billions  of  dollars) 
Japan Republ ic of Korea 
Ch ina A S E A N 
Hong Kong (SAR of China) 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official  data 
from the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) [online] http://www.jetro.go.jp/en/reports/statistics. 
The Republic of Korea's foreign direct investment has largely been 
directed towards its Asian neighbours, especially China, although the 
ASEAN countries have recently been seeing more investment. Asia's share 
of the FDI coming from the Republic of Korea totalled 69% in terms of 
projects undertaken and 46% in terms of the stock of FDI as of December 
2009, with a world stock of US$ 146 billion (see figure III.7). These figures 
far exceed the share of the United States or Europe. In addition to China, 
the biggest beneficiaries of Korean FDI in Asia are the ASEAN countries, 
including several developing countries such as Viet Nam and Indonesia. 
The manufacturing sector, which accounted for 40% of the total stock, has 
been the driving force of Korean FDI, whose main objectives are to support 
overseas production facilities and to secure markets (Yoon, 2007). In the 
1990s, the primary motivation for large Korean firms to invest in China 
was to take advantage of the huge Chinese market and save in labour costs, 
which were starting to rise in the Republic of Korea. Given the current 
level of idle capacity in the Korean industrial sector, it appears that, as 
occurred in Japan, the rise of FDI flows to China could be generating an 
industrial vacuum in the country of origin. 
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Figure III.7 
REPUBLIC OF KOREA: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, 1980-DECEMBER 2009s 
(Millions  of  dollars  and percentages) 










B. Main destinations in Asia 
India 
di 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information 
from Export-Import Bank of Korea [online] http://www.koreaexim.go.kr. 
a Data for 1980 are cumulative from 1968 to 1980. 
The second most important source of FDI for ASEAN countries (in 
terms of flows) is other countries in the group. FDI inflows to ASEAN 
countries in 2007-2009 totalled IBS' 163 billion, of which 21% came from 
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the European Union, 11% from Japan, 15% from other ASEAN countries 
and 10% from the United States. Other important sources included the 
Republic of Korea (4% of total investments in the period), China (3%), 
India (2%) and Australia and New Zealand (2%, considered jointly). 
That is, the ASEAN+6 as a whole was the biggest source of FDI for the 
ASEAN group in this three-year period (see figure III.8). China's role 
as an investor has been relatively limited, although it has increased in 
recent years. 
Figure III.8 
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH-EAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN): MAIN SOURCES 
OF FDI FLOWS BY REGION AND COUNTRY, 2007-2009 
(Percentages) 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information 
from the ASEAN Secretariat [online] http://www.aseansec.org/18144.htm. 
Intraregional sources thus provide 15% of total FDI in ASEAN, and 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore are the main destinations 
of these funds, based on the average net value of FDI inflows in 
2007-2009. Singapore is the top destination for FDI from extraregional 
sources, absorbing 36% of extraregional inflows to group members, 
followed by Thailand, Viet Nam, Indonesia and Malaysia. In particular, 
Viet Nam has received an increasing share of the FDI inflows to ASEAN 
countries. With the exception of Viet Nam, the new members have had 
relatively little involvement in this area, while the five original members 
—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand— have 
been the main sources and destinations. 
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Table 111.17 
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH-EAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN): FOREIGN 
DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI) FLOWS RECEIVED BY COUNTRIES 
IN THE GROUP, AVERAGE FOR 2007-2009 
(Millions  of  dollars  and percentages) 
2007-2009 (annual average) 




Intraregional Extraregional Total net 
FDI FDI income 
(Millions  of  dollars) (Percentages  of  the total) 
Brunei 
Darussalam 21 204 225 0.0 0.4 0.4 
Cambodia 228 510 738 0.4 0.9 1.4 
Indonesia 1 962 5 079 7 041 3.6 9.3 12.9 
Lao People's 
Democratic 
Republic 68 221 290 0.1 0.4 0.5 
Malaysia 1 706 4 040 5 746 3.1 7.4 10.5 
Myanmar 72 684 756 0.1 1.3 1.4 
Philippines 55 2 081 2 136 0.1 3.8 3.9 
Singapore 1 360 19 622 20 982 2.5 36.0 38.5 
Thailand 1 492 7 127 8 619 2.7 13.1 15.8 
Viet Nam 1 227 6 746 7 973 2.3 12.4 14.6 
Total 8 191 46 315 54 506 15.0 85.0 100.0 
ASEAN (5)3 6 575 37 949 44 524 12.1 69.6 81.7 
BCLMVb 1 616 8 366 9 982 3.0 15.3 18.3 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information 
from the ASEAN Secretariat [online] http://www.aseansec.org/18144.htm. 
3 Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. 
b Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Myanmar and Viet Nam. 
The Latin American and Caribbean region received just 4% of the 
FDI from Japan, the Republic of Korea and China. In contrast, the region 
absorbed around 8% of world FDI —that is, Asia's investment trend 
in Latin America and the Caribbean is much lower than the rest of the 
world (see figure III.9). Historically, the United States has been the most 
important source of FDI in Latin America and the Caribbean. Spain began 
to play a very prominent role in the 1990s, becoming the top FDI source 
for several Latin American countries. In the current decade, Spain's weight 
in the FDI inflows to the region fell from 23% in 1997-2001 to 10% in 2002-
2006. The Asia-Pacific region has made negligible investments, providing 
just 2.8% of total FDI in Latin America and the Caribbean in 1997-2001 and 
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3.5% in 2002-2006, with an estimated sum of US$ 8.9 billion in each period. 
Intraregional FDI has risen sharply in Latin America and the Caribbean: 
the intraregional share of total FDI inflows to the region doubled between 
the two periods, from 5% to 10%. This reflects the emergence of a number 
of Latin American corporations, the so-called trans-Latins. Japanese FDI 
has also increased sharply in the last two years, driven by investment in 
natural resources. It is hoped that Chinese investors will show the same 
enthusiasm, although the official data from the countries do not necessarily 
confirm this trend. 
Figure III.9 
CHINA, JAPAN AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA: TOTAL FDI, 2009 
(Percentages) 
Japan Republic of Korea China 
Other Europe H Latin Amer i ca and the Car ibbean 
S North Amer i ca As ia 
Source: Own elaboration, on the basis of official  information from the countries. 
G. The inter-industry trade model translates into an 
imbalance in the maritime transport system 
The inter-industry nature of trade between Asia-Pacific and Latin America 
and the Caribbean causes freight imbalances. The merchandise that Latin 
America and the Caribbean imports from Asia-Pacific is predominately 
manufactures, most of which are unitized (that is, stored in containers). 
These goods are transported by shipping companies that provide 
regular services and whose ships are designed exclusively for container 
transport. In contrast, Latin American exports to Asia-Pacific are mostly 
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made up of commodities that require bulk ocean shipping, which is 
contracted through a rental service (called a time charter). In several Latin 
American countries, exports to Asia-Pacific are primarily goods classified 
as inedible crude materials or food and live animals. Copper, soybean, 
edible oils and coffee are the top four commodities exported to the 
ASEAN+3 countries; they account for over 80% of total volume, and they 
are mostly transported in bulk carriers, with the exception of coffee. This 
trade pattern translates into a clear imbalance between the number of 
containers exported by the Asia-Pacific region and the number exported 
in the opposite direction (see table 111.18). 
Table 111.18 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES) AND ASIA-PACIFIC: 
INTERREGIONAL CONTAINER TRADE, 2007 
(Twenty-foot  equivalent  units  and percentages) 
Central 
America Colombia Chile Mexico Ecuador Peru 
Exports (A) 18 281 12 470 304 842 131 456 8 125 43 063 
Imports (B) 260 088 142 194 213 797 619 099 56 671 133 698 
Balance -241 807 -129 724 91 045 -487 643 -48 546 -90 635 
(A)/(B) 7% 9% 143% 21% 14% 32% 
Source: United  Nations  Conference  on Trade  and Development  (UNCTAD),  Review  of  Maritime  Transport  2008 
(UNCTAD/RMT/2008),  Geneva, 2008. United Nations publication, Sales N°: E.08.II.D.26. 
The trade imbalance raises the cost of the region's exports and 
imports. This imbalance increases the number of ports of call that each 
ship must make, due to the low volume of container shipments in the 
region. It also increases the possibility that these ships will have to return 
to Asia-Pacific with idle capacity, with the resulting inefficiency and 
higher costs that this implies. Container exports from Asia-Pacific to the 
region are growing faster than exports in the opposite direction, which 
suggests that the imbalance will not disappear without changes in the 
Latin American and Caribbean export model (see figure 111.10). This aspect 
of trade in the countries of the region has a strong impact on the price that 
regional exporters must pay for ocean transport services, which reduces 
their competitiveness. 
Facilitating trade would improve port efficiency in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, which would heighten competitiveness. A recent 
study (World Bank/ECLAC/IDB, 2010) indicates that shipping delays due 
to customs inefficiencies in the region increase transport costs between 
4% and 12% of the export value, which is more than the tariffs in many 
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destination markets. The effect on total shipping costs is clear. According 
to the same study, if the physical distance to the destination is increased 
by 100%, the shipping cost will increase between 8.5% and 18.7%. Even 
further, shortening the dispatch time by four days would reduce logistical 
costs up to 16%. Although the countries in the region cannot do much about 
ocean freight costs or the freight imbalance —variables that determine 
high shipping costs and, therefore, trade competitiveness— they could 
move forward in implementing trade facilitation measures, which also 
play a fundamental role in the systemic competitiveness of exports. 
Figure 111.10 
ASIA-PACIFIC AND LATIN AMERICA: SHIPPING ROUTES AND TRADE 
(Millions  of  twenty-foot  equivalent  units  and annual  growth  rates) 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information 
from Global Insight, 2009; Sociedad Portuaria Regional de Buenaventura; Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Maritime profile of Latin America and the Caribbean [online] http:/ / 
www.cepal.cl/perfi l/default.asp. 
H. Conclusions and recommendations 
Intra-industry and intra-firm trade has been the driving force 
behind intra-Asian trade, thanks to the construction of a complex vertical 
supply chain network by transnational firms, with China playing a key 
role as both origin and destination. A decisive factor in the Asia-Pacific 
region in recent decades is the realization of technological advances and 
the fragmentation of production, which generated a marked increase 
in intraregional Asian trade. The share of intra-Asian trade among the 
ASEAN+3 countries plus Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of 
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China and Taiwan Province of China has grown from 40% in the early 
1990s to 50% in 2009. This is higher than the level of intraregional trade 
achieved by NAFTA and is quickly approaching the level recorded by the 
European Union. Trade within ASEAN (10) has expanded, and in 2009 it 
exceeded the level observed in MERCOSUR, the Andean Community and 
the CACM. 
With China at the hub, Asia-Pacific has become the "world factory" 
for machinery and transport equipment, and the Latin American and 
Caribbean region must enter these supply chain networks. The Asia-
Pacific supply chain networks have been expanded and deepened in a 
wide range of industrial sectors, including electrical machinery, apparatus 
and appliances, office machines and automatic data-processing machines, 
road vehicles and precision machinery. For example, almost 70% of parts 
and components exports are shipped to other countries in the Asia-Pacific 
region. In contrast, the intraregional trade of parts and components is 
much lower in Latin America and the Caribbean, accounting for just 10% 
of total parts and components exports. To attract more investment, Latin 
American and Caribbean countries must promote supply chain networks 
in these sectors. That represents a big challenge for the subregional 
integration schemes. 
The Latin American and Caribbean region shows a relatively high 
level of intra-industry trade with the United States and the European 
Union, but not with Asia-Pacific. Despite some increases, the GLI 
coefficients for Asia-Pacific and Latin America and the Caribbean in 
1990-2008 (which reflect intra-industry trade both within each region and 
with other regions of the world) remain very low (less than 0.06 and 0.07) 
—much lower than the GLI coefficients of either region with the European 
Union and, in particular, the United States. From the perspective of the 
region's links to Asia-Pacific, in most cases, intra-industry trade is almost 
non-existent. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to identify some bilateral flows that point 
to the existence of intra-industry trade, although this is a nascent trend. 
This implies that the regions have made significant progress from totally 
inter-industry trade towards a trade structure that is somewhat more 
oriented towards intra-industry trade. The appearance of intra-industry 
trade between the regions, with the participation of an increasing number 
of countries and sectors, suggests that there are interesting opportunities 
and possibilities for expanding this trade in the future. Biregional intra-
industry trade could be promoted in some manufacturing sectors. To 
take advantage of these opportunities, business contacts need to be 
strengthened through FDI and other types of association and through free 
trade agreements in both regions. 
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It is necessary to launch efforts to incorporate Latin America and 
the Caribbean into the de facto regional production integration process 
underway in Asia, which is increasingly evident in some productive 
sectors in the region. Greater intra-industry trade between the two 
regions would provide Latin America and the Caribbean with new access 
channels to the Asian markets, while also fostering the incorporation of 
new technologies, raising workers' skill level and improving business 
management techniques, thanks to production quality requirements, 
technical assistance and the exchange of experience and best practices. 
China has become an export platform to developed countries for 
its Asian neighbours. An important characteristic of intra-Asian trade 
and FDI dynamics, which are at the core of the world economy, is the 
spectacular eruption of China as a key player. China has a trade deficit 
with the ASEAN countries, the Republic of Korea and Japan because these 
countries are the main suppliers of capital goods and intermediate inputs 
for its manufacturing industry. Chinese manufactures are later exported 
to other trade partners, mainly the United States and the European Union, 
with which it has a more favourable trade balance in low- and high-
technology manufactures. The ASEAN countries have a lot of influence 
as suppliers and compete closely with other centres, such as Japan, the 
Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China. The deficit would be 
much greater if the inputs that China imports from Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region of China were taken into account. China is a net 
exporter of different types of manufactures to India; it also has a trade 
deficit with South America because it imports large quantities of primary 
products and natural-resource-based manufactures. 
There is a growing concern in Latin America about being 
excluded from the benefits of the Asian dynamism, which could lead 
to the formation of an informal trade bloc (de facto) in Asia-Pacific, now 
supported by a formal integration (de jure). In this area, development is 
diffused in concentric circles, thanks to regional intra-industry trade and 
intraregional FDI. Given these trends, the countries of Latin America and 
the Caribbean should strengthen their trade links to make their production 
more complementary with that of Asia-Pacific and establish trade and 
investment partnerships, as well as trade agreements, which create new 
access to these markets and facilitate entry into Asian production and 
export chains. 
The low level of intra-industry trade is both a cause and effect of the 
low level of biregional FDI. The low level of Asian FDI in Latin America and 
the Caribbean in the last two decades is related to intra-industry business 
activity in East Asia and to the fact that the countries of the region have 
not participated in the trade-FDI integration process. The latter process is 
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a useful step for moving production outside national borders and creating 
bidirectional or even triangular trade flows between the participating 
countries. Industrialization in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s 
fostered a very different relationship between trade and investment: Latin 
American firms continue to pursue an international strategy based on the 
respective advantages of their countries of origin, such as the abundance 
of natural resources, knowledge of the development and processing of 
those resources, and their ability to sell processed resources or industrial 
commodities in the international market. In the service area, large firms in 
the region have expanded their business on an international scale in two 
or more countries in sectors such as energy, communications, transport 
and financial services. Asian investors have rarely participated in the 
privatization process in these sectors. 
Moreover, FDI aimed at identifying markets in Latin America and 
the Caribbean has been too inwardly oriented and has not contributed 
enough to creating local manufacturing capacity and international 
competitiveness. One of the main reasons for the low level of trade and 
investment between the two regions is the lack of FDI oriented towards 
improving efficiency, which is the most common type of FDI in Asia-
Pacific. In addition, wherever this type of FDI is found in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, it displays the typical deficiencies of a tendency 
towards specialization, the low-value-added trap and the absence of 
industrial agglomerations. Consequently, to promote trade and investment 
relationships with Asia-Pacific, the Latin American and Caribbean region 
must nurture this type of FDI and address the problems that are usually 
raised for the national economies (ECLAC, 2008d). 
Without delay, the countries of the region must take advantage of 
Asia-Pacific's current dynamism, particularly in China, and mutually 
strengthen trade and investment links, as well as productive and 
technological linkages, innovation, competitiveness and cooperation 
in various aspects of trade facilitation, including a better maritime 
transport system between the two regions. This raises an interesting 
challenge, namely, identifying the infrastructure, energy and research 
and development projects in which Asian investment is most needed, in 
order to accelerate their implementation. This would not only strengthen 
the region's links with China and with Asia-Pacific, thereby facilitating 
trade and investment, but also generate externalities that would favour the 
regional integration process. 
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Chapter IV 
Strategic aspects of trade relations between 
China and Latin America and the Caribbean 
A. Introduction 
The Asia-Pacific region has become not only "factory Asia" for the entire 
world, but also a battleground for preferential trade agreements. As 
discussed in chapter III on Asian integration, until recently integration 
in the region was driven by burgeoning intraregional trade spurred by 
growing complementarities between manufacturing production and trade 
in the countries. Intra-industry trade surged and the countries tapped 
the advantages of production and trade chains. But governments in the 
Asia-Pacific region are increasingly aware that greater market-driven 
economic integration will not happen without measures to promote and 
support it, including harmonization of policies, standards and rules of 
trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). Free trade agreements (FTAs) 
may therefore be viewed as part and parcel of a policy of support for 
broadening production networks and value chains based mainly on intra-
industry or intra-company trade. Yet the current wave of trade accords 
proposed and under negotiation and the countries' varying economic and 
political interests within the Asia-Pacific region and beyond have given 
rise to two phenomena: a proliferation of agreements (what is known as 
the "spaghetti bowl") and a domino effect, which are both generating 
serious convergence and coordination issues. 
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Asia-Pacific is engaged in a second wave of economic integration 
and is seeking greater synergies between de facto and de jure integration. 
Other regions are keen to lock into these promising processes and defend 
their own interests in Asia-Pacific. But Latin America could stand to lose 
out from the current process of trade- and investment-driven economic 
integration in Asia-Pacific which is now being leveraged by trade accords. 
The countries in the region must therefore adopt a positioning strategy in 
Asia-Pacific that includes agreements between the two regions. 
The number of trade agreements in Asia-Pacific is soaring. At the 
end of 2009, 25 trade agreements were in effect in the region comprising 
the 10 member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) plus China, Japan and the Republic of Korea (ASEAN+3), as 
well as Australia, India and New Zealand (ASEAN+6). Trade among 
parties to those agreements represents 54% of all trade by ASEAN+6 
countries, which is significantly more than the figure of 35% in 2005. The 
liberalization of goods trade in the region would be fully completed by an 
FTA between the three largest economies, China, Japan and the Republic 
of Korea, whose combined trade represents 33% of regional trade in Asia-
Pacific (JETRO, 2010). 
The existing web of FTAs will make it difficult to set up a 
free trade area encompassing the entire Asia-Pacific region. The 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East Asia (CEPEA) proposal, 
which would include all the countries of ASEAN+6, will be harder to 
bring to fruition than a free trade area in East Asia in the framework of 
ASEAN+3 (EAFTA). But it would be even more difficult to achieve the 
Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) proposed within the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. The first step towards 
the formation of a free trade area such as these would therefore be to 
consolidate the many FTAs already existing or under negotiation and, 
possibly, to conclude a more transregional accord such as FTAAP or 
establish an Asia-Europe free trade area.1 ASEAN would certainly play 
a prominent part as the centre and major driver of any process, while 
China, Japan and the Republic of Korea would have to coordinate their 
1 The CEPEA proposal includes the 10 member countries of ASEAN (Brunei Darussalam, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam) plus China, Japan, Republic of Korea, 
Australia, India and New Zealand; the EAFTA proposal includes the 10 member 
countries of ASEAN plus China, Japan and Republic of Korea; the FTAAP proposal 
includes the 21 countries or territories belonging to APEC: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, 
Canada, Chile, China, Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of 
China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, 
Philippines, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Singapore, Thailand, United States 
and Viet Nam; and the proposed Asia-Europe free trade area would comprise the 10 
member countries of ASEAN plus the member countries of the European Union. 
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trade and investment policies. India, on the other hand, which until 
recently maintained a fairly protectionist stance, will have to continue 
implementing structural and regulatory reforms encompassing not only 
tariff and non-tariff issues, but also matters beyond market access (those 
known as "WTO-plus" issues). 
B. The "noodle bowl" of free trade agreements 
in Asia-Pacific 
Preferential and free trade agreements, both bilateral and regional 
in scope, have proliferated in Asia-Pacific in the past decade. This 
phenomenon has come to be known as the "noodle bowl", in an Asian 
cultural twist to the previously coined term "spaghetti bowl". Although 
Asia was not the first region to see trade agreements proliferate, this 
was where the pattern peaked in the second half of the 1990s (Menon, 
2006a). Data from the Asia Regional Integration Center of the Asian 
Development Bank show that in August 2010, 61 trade agreements had 
been signed in Asia, of which 47 were in effect. This pattern seems 
likely to continue in the next few years: another 79 agreements have 
been proposed or are already under negotiation. Asia-Pacific has more 
agreements per country (an average of 3.8) than the Americas (2.9 on 
average) (Kawai and Wignaraja, 2010a). FTAs signed by Asian countries 
tend to be bilateral rather than plurilateral: bilateral accords represent 
77% of the total concluded. 
The largest economies, China, Japan and the Republic of Korea, 
together with the ASEAN members, have been prolific instigators of FTAs 
and this grouping has come to form a regional axis for trade accords in 
Asia-Pacific. A hallmark of these new regionalist trends in Asia-Pacific is 
that, in a departure from their traditional reluctance to sign preferential 
trade agreements or form part of trade blocs, large economies such as 
China, Japan, Taiwan Province of China and the Republic of Korea have 
signed bilateral or plurilateral accords with other economies in the region 
and beyond. The country with the largest number of FTAs signed up to 
August 2010 was Singapore (20), followed by China (12), India (11), Japan 
(11), Thailand (11) and Malaysia (10). The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 
has been very important in the region as a catalyst of this process and 
has become a focal point for the emergence of a new category of accords 
between trade blocs, such as ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6, ASEAN and the 
European Union, and ASEAN, Australia and New Zealand. 
Singapore stands out in terms of both the number of FTAs it has 
signed and their geographical coverage. With its strategic geographical 
location, open trade policy and world-class infrastructure and logistics, 
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Singapore is seeking broader access to new markets, especially for services 
and investments. The country has become a regional hub for financial 
services, transport, telecommunications and education. Singapore 
has, generally speaking, gone beyond the stipulations of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) in its commitments on services 
and is thus considered to both profess and practice the concept of open 
regionalism, and to act as a unifying element of the multilateral system 
(Zhai, 2006; Menon, 2006b). It is one of the AFTA founding countries 
and has entered into bilateral agreements not only with Asian countries, 
including China, India, Japan and the Republic of Korea, but also with 
several on the American continent (Chile, Costa Rica, Panama, Peru and 
the United States), with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) 
and, in the Middle East, with Jordan. Recently, Singapore also began FTA 
negotiations with Colombia. 
China and India have also been active in signing FTAs. China 
has entered into FTAs separately on goods and services with ASEAN 
member countries and is finalizing negotiations with the grouping 
on investments. China also has comprehensive economic partnership 
agreements with Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China 
and with Macao Special Administrative Region of China, has signed 
FTAs with Chile and Pakistan and is party to the Asia-Pacific Trade 
Agreement.2 It also signed an FTA with Singapore and New Zealand in 
2008 and an Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with 
Taiwan Province of China in 2010. India is a party to the Asia-Pacific 
Trade Agreement and has an FTA with Singapore and neighbouring 
South Asian countries and a partial agreement with the Southern 
Common Market (MERCOSUR). 
Japan and the Republic of Korea also represent important links 
in the network of FTAs in Asia-Pacific. Japan has rapidly established a 
complex network of bilateral economic cooperation agreements with 11 
countries —Brunei Darussalam, Chile, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Philippines, Singapore, Switzerland, Thailand and Viet Nam— and has 
an accord with ASEAN (ASEAN+1). It is also negotiating an economic 
cooperation agreement with Australia and is scheduled to reopen 
negotiations with the Republic of Korea which, in turn, has finalized 
negotiations on an FTA with the United States and signed another with the 
European Union in October 2010. The Republic of Korea has agreements 
in place with the countries of the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement, ASEAN 
Signed in 1975 and originally known as the Bangkok Agreement, this agreement was 
renamed in November 2005. It was the first preferential trade agreement between 
developing countries in the Asia-Pacific region. 
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and Singapore within Asia, as well as FTAs with Chile and the member 
countries of EFTA, and its agreements have a much broader geographical 
coverage than those of Japan. Japan has an FTA in effect with India as of 
August 2011, and India and the Republic of Korea have had an agreement 
in force since January 2010. Both Japan and the Republic of Korea are 
negotiating FTAs with Australia, but the Korean negotiations are moving 
more quickly. Japan has an economic partnership agreement with Mexico, 
with which the Republic of Korea continues to negotiate for an FTA. 
Given the similarity of the two countries' trade specializations, Japanese 
business sees the Republic of Korea's progress in negotiating FTAs as a 
threat (JETRO, 2010). 
1. Trade under preferential  agreements is increasing 
rapidly in Asia-Pacific 
With so many FTAs now operational in Asia, the proportion of 
trade covered by some type of preference has increased substantially. 
The coverage rate (the percentage of a country's or region's total trade 
conducted with trade partners with which trade agreements are in force) 
is 14.4% for the Republic of Korea, 16.% for Japan, 34.4% for the United 
States and 68.4% for Canada. China's coverage rate remains quite low 
in comparison with these countries, at just 11.2% in 2009 (see table IV.l), 
reflecting the general orientation of the Chinese economy as a platform 
for neighbouring countries' exports to developed-country markets, such 
as the United States and Europe (see chapter III). 
Almost half of Asia-Pacific trade flows are covered by some kind 
of trade preference and this proportion will be even higher when the 
negotiations under way are concluded. Much of the trade of several Pacific 
Rim countries (the countries of North America, Latin American APEC 
countries, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) already enjoys tariff preferences. 
In August 2009, tariff preferences applied to 49% of total exports through 
the network of FTAs in place in the Pacific Rim, with most of this trade 
(65%) revolving around the ASEAN countries. The growing interests of 
China, Japan and the Republic of Korea (ASEAN+3), and Australia, India 
and New Zealand (ASEAN+6), together with those of Canada, the United 
States and some Latin American countries (Chile, Mexico and Peru) are 
reflected in the proposal to establish a broad agreement in the framework 
of APEC (FTAAP). This could take the coverage rate to 85% in the ASEAN 
area and to 57% in FTAAP; for ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6, coverage could 
rise to 49% and 50%, respectively (see figure IV.l). 
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Table IV.1 
PROPORTION OF TRADE CONDUCTED UNDER TRADE AGREEMENTS, 




imports Exports Imports 
Japan 16.5 16.3 16.6 
United States 34.4 40.1 30.5 
Canada 68.4 77.7 59.2 
Mexico 81.5 93.0 70.2 
Chile 90.0 88.6 91.9 
Peru 57.6 51.8 64.6 
European Union (total) 73.8 75.6 72.0 
European Union 
(extraregional agreements) 25.0 27.3 22.9 
Republic of Korea 14.4 14.6 14.2 
China 11.2 10.1 12.6 
Singapore 65.9 66.3 65.4 
Thailand 55.8 52.2 59.8 
Indonesia 63.9 63.4 64.6 
Malaysia 60.2 59.5 61.1 
Philippines 51.5 45.2 57.2 
Australia 28.0 20.1 35.7 
New Zealand 45.0 43.2 46.8 
Source: Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), 2010 JETRO  Global  Trade  and Investment  Report.  A 
Global  Strategy  for  Japanese Companies  to Open New  Frontiers  in Overseas  Markets,  Figure II.5, Tokyo, 
2010. 
Note: The coverage rate refers  to the percentage of a country's or region's trade conducted with trading 
partners with which an FTA is in place, in relation to the country's or region's total trade. The total figure 
for China does not include Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China (7.9%) or Macao Special 
Administrative Region of China (0.1 %). When both are included, the figure is 19.2%. Data on FTAs between 
ASEAN and India and between ASEAN and Australia and New Zealand include countries in which the 
respective FTAs have not yet gone into effect.  The total figure for the European Union includes the value 
of intraregional trade. 
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Figure IV.1 
PACIFIC RIM: PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS. AUGUST 2009 
(Percentages  of  total  exports  covered  by  tariff  preferences) 
Signed agreements awai t ing rati f ication 
Agreements under negot iat ion 
Agreements in effect 
S No agreement 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United 
Nations Commodi ty Trade Database (COMTRADE) and agreements in effect,  signed or under negotiation 
between the countries of the Pacific Rim (including India. Pakistan and Sri Lanka). 
a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (initiative currently under study). 
b ASEAN+3 plus Australia, India and New Zealand. 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations plus China, Japan and Republic of Korea. 
d Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 
2. Several regional integration initiatives 
exist in Asia-Pacific 
ASEAN is moving towards the formation of an Economic 
Community. ASEAN has made gradual headway with implementing 
its Charter, which came into effect in December 2008 and includes a 
series of instruments for building the ASEAN Economic Community. 
The Economic Community is one of three pillars of a broader ASEAN 
Community —the others are political security and a sociocultural pillar— 
due to be completed by 2015. 
The economic pillar of the ASEAN Community is being built 
through AFTA. The ASEAN Economic Community is intended to 
establish a single market and production base, with free circulation of 
goods, services, investments, capital and skilled workers. If this initiative 
is to be successful, it may also need a single currency and common 
financial institutions (Rajan, 2005; Ferguson, 2004). As a first step towards 
forming the Economic Community, AFTA was established in January 1992 
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to work towards the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers between 
member countries, with the overall objective of integrating the ASEAN 
economies and creating a single market of more than 570 million people 
by implementing the Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential 
Tariff (CEPT). 
The tariff reduction programme has made very satisfactory 
progress. By 1 January 2010, tariffs had been eliminated for 99% of 
goods items, except for the four less developed countries (Cambodia, 
Lao People's Democratic Republic, Myanmar and Viet Nam), where total 
tariff elimination is planned for 2015. By then, tariffs should have been 
eliminated on almost all goods from those four countries for trade within 
ASEAN. AFTA has made substantial progress with the liberalization 
of services trade as well, and an extensive list of duty-free services 
was expected towards the end of 2010. ASEAN is also negotiating a 
comprehensive investment agreement, although there is no certain date 
for conclusion of the negotiations. 
Although it is difficult to forecast timescales and architecture of 
regional integration in Asia, the main variants under discussion are the 
following: 
• ASEAN+1: This model represents the negotiation of an FTA by 
ASEAN, separately, with the six largest Asia-Pacific economies: 
Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand and the Republic 
of Korea. Five such agreements are already in place, treating 
Australia and New Zealand as a single signatory (see greater 
details of the advances in each process in tables IV.2 and IV.3); 
• ASEAN+3: Once ASEAN concludes negotiations with each 
of the three largest markets (China, Japan and the Republic of 
Korea), the ground will be prepared to set up a free trade area 
encompassing them all, structured around ASEAN. Unless 
headway is made in the free trade negotiations between the main 
actors, however, this initiative is viewed as fairly difficult to bring 
to fruition. Japan prefers this architecture to ASEAN+6; and 
• ASEAN+6: This is the most ambitious formula, encompassing 
not only ASEAN, Japan, China and the Republic of Korea, 
but also Australia, India and New Zealand. It seems a distant 
prospect for the moment, because it would require very complex 
negotiations, especially with India. Nevertheless, some progress 
has been made down that road with China's negotiation of an 
FTA with Australia and New Zealand, and with the negotiations 
under way between those two countries, Japan and the Republic 
of Korea. China's preference is for this alternative. 
China and Latín America and the Caribbean: Building a strategic economic. 17 
Table IV.2 
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH-EAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN): PROGRESS WITH THE 
ASEAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (AFTA) AND ASEAN + 1 
Free trade 
agreement 
Date of entry 
into effect State of play, tariff  reduction schedule and other provisions 
AFTA 1993 
Average tariffs  applied between original ASEAN member 
countries (Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) decreased from 
12.8% in 1993, when the FTA came into effect,  to 0.9% 
in 2009. 
From January 2010 on, original ASEAN member 
countries eliminated tariffs  on 99% of items. 
Cambodia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Myanmar 
and Viet Nam are scheduled to eliminate tariffs  on almost 
all items in 2015. 
• Agreement notified to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) under Enabling Clause. 
• In January 2004, the "Early Harvest" programme came 
into effect  for agricultural and fishery products (SA 01-08). 
• In July 2005, tariff  reduction began for non-agricultural/ 
fisheries and other agricultural/fisheries  products. 
• The negotiations included differential  treatment for the 
less developed countries. For Cambodia, Lao People's 
Democratic Republic and Myanmar tariff  reduction will 
China 2004 last until 2018, while for the other countries the process 
(for non-excluded products) will be concluded in 2012. 
• As of 2010 China and ASEAN members eliminated tariffs 
on 90% of items. 
• Cambodia, Myanmar, Lao People's Democratic Republic 
and Viet Nam are scheduled to eliminate tariffs  on most 
items from 2015. 
• China has bilateral FTAs with Thailand and Singapore. 
• After the agreement on goods, another was signed on 
services and investments. 
Two tracks for tariff  reduction. For products on the normal 
track, tariffs  will be eliminated over four years between 
ASEAN originating countries (the 10 members minus 
Cambodia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Myanmar 
and Viet Nam) and the Republic of Korea, over 10 years 
for Viet Nam and over 12 years for Cambodia, Lao 
People's Democratic Republic and Myanmar. The special 
track, which also includes a subcategory of "highly 
sensitive" products, involves only partial tariff  reduction. 
As a result, at the end of this transition period tariffs  will 
remain on 5%-10% of items. 
From 2010, Republic of Korea and the original ASEAN 
members eliminated tariffs  on 90% of items. 
From 2016, Viet Nam is scheduled to eliminate tariffs  on 
nearly all items. 
Cambodia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Myanmar 
and Viet Nam are slated to eliminate tariffs  on nearly all 
items from 2018. 
In May 2009 the agreement on services came into effect 
and in June that year the agreement on investments was 
signed. 
UJ tn < 
Republic „„„-, 2007 of Korea 
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Table IV.2 (concluded) 
Free trade Date of entry , , , , 
„ , State of play, tariff  reduction schedule and other provisions agreement into effect 
<n < 
Japan 
• WTO was notified under Article XXIV of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs  and Trade (GATT) and Article V of 
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 
• Most of the baskets defined in the countries' schedules 
include linear tariff  reduction over 3-10 years. Each 
country identifies between 5 and 10 baskets. The 
products covered in the negotiations with Cambodia, Lao 
People's Democratic Republic and Myanmar will be fully 
tariff-free  in 2026, after a 16-year transition period. 
• Some products will see only partial tariff  reduction and 
others are excluded from the negotiations altogether. 
2008 • The FTA includes a flexibility provision in the form of 
extended cumulation of origin through a convergence 
agreement between Japan and all ASEAN members. 
• ASEAN and Japan have an FTA for Brunei Darussalam, 
Cambodia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand, Singapore and Viet Nam. 
• Japan has separate bilateral FTAs with Brunei 
Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand and Viet Nam. 
• The provision of professional services is included for 
Indonesia and the Philippines, especially for the health 
sector. 
• The agreement establishing the free trade area between 
ASEAN, Australia and New Zealand (AANZFTA) 
came into force in January 2010 for Australia, Brunei 
Darussalam, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, 
Australia Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam. 
and New 2010 • With the entry into force of this agreement, Australia and 
Zealand New Zealand eliminated tariffs  on almost 90% of items. 
• The original ASEAN members will eliminate tariffs  on 
around 90% of items beginning in 2013. After 2020, 
Cambodia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia 
and Myanmar will eliminate tariffs  on around 90% of items. 
India 2010 
1 In effect  as of January 2010 for India, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam. 
1 India and the original ASEAN member States (excluding 
the Philippines) will eliminate tariffs  on normal track items 
by the end of 2013 and on special track items by the end 
of 2016. India and the Philippines will eliminate normal 
track tariffs  by the end of 2018 and those on special 
sensitive items by the end of 2021. 
Source: Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), 2010 JETRO  Global  Trade  and Investment  Report.  A 
Global  Strategy  for  Japanese Companies  to Open New  Frontiers  in Overseas  Markets,  Figure II.5, Tokyo, 
2010; Yue Siow Chia, "Trade and investment policies and regional economic integration in East Asia", 
ADBI Working  Paper  Series,  No. 210, Tokyo, Asian Development Bank Institute, April 2010 and Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) , "El Arco del Pacífico Latinoamericano: 




















Malaysia Myanmar Singapore Thailand Viet Nam 
China 89 88 89 89 88 89 89 89 89 89 
Japan 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 
Brunei 
Darussalam 93 99 79 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
Cambodia 4 0 4 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Philippines 82 95 65 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
Indonesia 84 91 38 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
Lao People's 
Democratic 
Republic 5 0 0 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 
Malaysia 85 90 69 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
Myanmar 2 0 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Republic of 
Korea 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 
Singapore 100 100 100 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 
Thailand 84 45 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 
Viet Nam 36 0 28 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 









Source: inter-American Development Bank, on the basis of data from the Integration and Trade Sector (INTrade-BID). 
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To this range of alternatives under discussion in Asia-Pacific must 
be added another two significant initiatives: 
(i) The Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), established 
within the framework of APEC, encompasses 21 economies, 
including three in Latin America (Chile, Mexico and Peru). It 
is a non-binding forum for dialogue and cooperation, with no 
institutional structure or mandate for formal trade negotiations. 
APEC will continue to promote political dialogue with a 
view to trans-Pacific integration and to broker the adoption 
of commitments to facilitate trade and investment flows, but 
FTAAP will probably not become an institutional forum for 
formal trade negotiations; and 
(ii) Another alternative for trans-Pacific negotiations is through the 
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (Brunei 
Darussalam, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore), with whose 
signatories Australia, Malaysia, Peru, the United States and Viet 
Nam have expressed interest in entering negotiations with a 
view to enlarging the Agreement into platform for integration. 
However, given that, at least thus far, this initiative is limited to 
the APEC members, it is probably not the best suited instrument 
for fostering joint convergence between the Latin American and 
Caribbean region and Asia-Pacific. 
With respect to ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6, in 2009 the governments 
began talks on rules of origin, tariff classification, customs procedures and 
economic cooperation. The administrations are now aiming to harmonize 
the many systems of standards coexisting in the different FTAs in place 
within the Asia-Pacific region. For example, the criteria applicable on rules 
of origin in the different FTAs in Asia include: (i) regional value content 
(RVC); (ii) changes in tariff classification; (iii) equivalence, which may be 
based on either of the two previous criteria, and (iv) dual criteria, under 
which both must be satisfied (see point 7 under section B for greater detail). 
Substantial progress on ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6 is not possible 
without an FTA encompassing the three main actors (China, Japan and 
the Republic of Korea), be it a trilateral agreement or three bilateral FTAs 
(see table IV.4). Indeed, China is interested in forming an FTA with Japan 
and the Republic of Korea. The creation of a free trade area in East Asia 
could hold major benefits for China, although perhaps not as great as 
those accruing from the establishment of a system of agreements centred 
on China. An East Asian FTA would bring China greater intraregional 
trade and investment and would foster its integration into the regional 
production network by eliminating tariff barriers and reducing transaction 
costs (Chia and Soesastro, 2006). 
Table IV.4 
ASIA-PACIFIC: BILATERAL AND PLURILATERAL FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS 
BY COUNTRY AND STAGE OF NEGOTIATION, FEBRUARY 2011 
ASEAN Japan China Republic of Korea India Australia New Zealand 
ASEAN In force In force In force In force In force In force 
Japan In force Feasibility study Under 
negotiation 
In force Under 
negotiation 
Feasibility study 
China In force Feasibility study Feasibility study In force Under 
negotiation 
In force 
Republic of Korea In force Under 
negotiation 




India In force In force Feasibility study In force Feasibility study Feasibility study 






Feasibility study In force 
New Zealand Feasibility study In force Under 
negotiation 
Feasibility study In force 
SB Cf. 3 > 
§ PL 






Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of official  data from the countries. 
Note: Australia and New Zealand have a joint agreement with ASEAN. Japan and the Republic of Korea began official  talks in December 2003, but suspended them in 
November 2004. A new feasibility study on an FTA between China, Japan and the Republic of Korea was announced in May 2010. The reopening of consultations on an 
FTA between Japan and the Republic of Korea is expected to be announced in the near future. 
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But Japan and the Republic of Korea have reservations about an 
FTA with China. Japan's administration is concerned by China's growing 
competitiveness in manufacturing and in some agricultural products. Japan 
is unwilling to recognize China as a market economy, preferring to continue 
to apply safeguard measures against growing imports from China in its 
markets. Japan also asks that China make clearer progress in implementing 
the commitments of accession to WTO, especially in the areas of interest to 
Japanese firms, i.e. protection of intellectual property and food safety rules. 
From the perspective of the Japanese authorities, the first step towards an 
economic partnership agreement with China would be an agreement on 
investments. The Republic of Korea is also concerned over its economy's 
heavy reliance on China and lack of an integrated trade and investment 
strategy vis-à-vis China, as well as China's growing competitiveness in the 
agricultural sector. Although Japan and the Republic of Korea have both 
expressed an interest in reopening talks on an FTA, Japan has reservations 
in relation to agriculture, and Republic of Korea views as problematic its 
growing trade deficit with Japan, especially in the parts and components 
industry (Dent 2010, Kawai and Wignaraja 2010a). 
Any agreement involving one of the three largest Asian economies 
(China, Japan and Republic of Korea) would produce a shift in the relative 
competitiveness of firms exporting to the signatory countries. As Asia's 
manufacturing sectors began to feel the competitiveness shifts resulting 
from such an agreement, firms in countries not party to the agreement 
would put pressure on their respective governments to join the FTA race. 
United States and European firms would do likewise and the domino 
effect would multiply. 
The transition from ASEAN+3 to ASEAN+6 would be more 
problematic, since it would require greater efforts towards consolidation 
and convergence of coverage in terms of merchandise trade issues, services, 
lists of exceptions, rules of origin, technical barriers, standards, mutual 
recognition of service providers, investments and WTO-plus provisions. 
Even if the structure of ASEAN+3 were used as a base, it would be difficult 
to get Australia, India and New Zealand to align with it: it would not be in 
the interests of these three countries, which have recently joined the talks, 
to assume the commitments already negotiated. It would also take longer 
to build a shared political vision of the need to deepen integration in the 
region by means of a trade accord. 
In light of these considerations, in the event that a free trade area 
such as that proposed in the framework of APEC does emerge, China's 
administration would not abandon the negotiations under way or the 
prospect of future agreements. China's preference would be to maintain 
those agreements which offer it some flexibility in preferential and 
China and Latín America and the Caribbean: Building a strategic economic. 1 
differential treatment. Even more importantly, it would not suit China 
to allow areas of bilateral conflict with the United States —such as the 
growing United States trade deficit, China's rigid exchange-rate regime, 
the new measures the United States has applied to imports from China and 
the prohibition on FDI in strategic sectors of the United States economy— 
to be addressed in such a broad regional forum covered by a free trade 
area. In other words, it would run against China's interests to allow the 
United States to "corner" or "contain" it on these sensitive bilateral issues 
(Bin, 2006). China is more likely to continue concluding a range of different 
types of trade agreement in order to retain as much economic and political 
leverage as possible (Kwei, 2006). 
Be this as it may, a free trade area in East Asia would have 
advantages for ASEAN, especially in terms of economies of scale and 
scope, and would offer members an incentive to reform and restructure 
their economies to tackle the challenges of globalization. This should 
help to remove trade and investment barriers and pave the way for freer 
movement of capital and labour, which would have a direct impact on 
regional production networks and supply chains. Rules of origin and 
other technical requirements would also have to be harmonized and 
standardized, and this would contribute to simplifying the existing web 
of agreements which pushes up costs and discourages FDI (Menon, 2006b). 
Furthermore, as the situation stands, the economies' diversity and varying 
levels of development could be damaging for countries or sectors which 
are unable to match the efficiency of the other members, and this could 
lead to governments refusing to free certain sectors without safeguards or 
guarantees of assistance. 
ASEAN+3 could be a keystone for building an open multilateral 
trade system. The report of the Track Two Study Group on Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership in East Asia (2009) concluded that ASEAN+3 would 
have to meet a number of basic requirements, including: (i) provision of 
high-quality access to goods and services markets and world-standard 
investment agreements; specific, comprehensive trade and investment 
facilitation measures; economic cooperation with less developed countries; 
and a simple, non-restrictive regime for rules of origin; (ii) incorporation of 
the 13 countries with ASEAN+1 as a frame of reference; (iii) consolidation 
of existing FTAs (AFTA, AFTA-China, ASEAN-China, ASEAN-Japan 
and ASEAN-Republic of Korea), using them as a starting point instead 
of negotiating tariff reduction programmes from square one; and (iv) 
greater harmonization of rules and provisions on services and investment 
(ASEAN+1 already has agreements in both areas with China, Japan and 
Republic of Korea). The Study Group considers that negotiations should 
begin in some areas in 2012 (Chia, 2010). 
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One of the many challenges is to build mutual trust among the Asian 
countries. They need to develop the conviction of sharing a common destiny 
as well as improving their international position. The proposed East Asia 
free trade area must be a complement to multilateralism, not a substitute for 
it. Accordingly, it must establish broader concessions that those of the WTO 
agreements and keep exclusions and limitations to a minimum. 
There are two new traits in the recent wave of FTAs: the trans-Pacific 
scope of the latest accords and the participation of the main economies 
of North-East Asia (China, Japan and the Republic of Korea), the United 
States and the European Union in de jure integration involving not only 
trade, but also monetary and financial measures (ADB, 2010b, Rana, 2006; 
Lamberte, 2005). The proliferation of bilateral preferential agreements also 
appears to be a response to the need for faster progress on market opening, 
since neither the negotiations in the framework of WTO nor those in APEC 
have produced sufficient progress to meet the needs of the Asian region's 
economies. The Asian economies also have to guard against competitiveness 
losses arising from the consolidation of regional agreements in other 
parts of the world. Lastly, the many trade agreements in the region reflect 
the intensification of Asian intraregional trade and production links and 
—especially— the strengthening of supply and value chains, which now 
need greater integration and formal regional forums in step with this 
growing interdependence (Chia, 2010, Kawai and Wignaraja, 2010a). 
3. The strategic positions of the main actors 
The domino effect seen in Asia-Pacific is the outcome of a 
geopolitical and economic chess game at the global level. Given the great 
many trade agreements signed by the European Union around the world 
and the growing influence of China and resulting rivalry with Japan for 
leadership in the region, the United States feels the need to strengthen its 
presence in different parts of the world, including Asia-Pacific. 
Japan is seeking to become established as a leader of economic 
integration in Asia-Pacific. Japan's formerly multilateralist stance began 
to shift towards bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements within the 
Asian region and beyond in 2002, when former Prime Minister Junichiro 
Koizumi proposed the comprehensive economic partnership agreement 
between Japan and ASEAN. This sea-change came in response to China's 
growing economic prominence in Asia, as Japan sought to contain 
China's influence on the direction of regional integration centred on 
ASEAN, which is a key subregion for Japan, not only as a supplier of 
natural resources and manufactures (especially parts and components), 
but also as a major industrial platform for Japanese transnational firms. 
In other words, ASEAN is crucial from the point of view of Japan's 
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international competitiveness, owing to the increasing ties between trade 
and investment. Japan has invested massively in the ASEAN economies 
and has lent considerable economic assistance there. Accordingly Japan 
feels threatened by China's growing presence in the subregion and has 
responded by proposing a regionwide FTA. 
Japan views South-East Asia as still hampered by substantial trade 
and investment barriers, a poor all-round framework for business and a 
weak supply infrastructure and industry Japan therefore seeks to increase 
cross-border logistical efficiency and promote support industries in the 
ASEAN area. The economic partnership agreement Japan has negotiated 
with ASEAN is seen as a good model for moving ahead with legal 
integration, since it is comprehensive enough to encompass liberalization 
and facilitation of trade and investment; rules on investment, competition, 
certification and protection of intellectual property; and economic 
alliances and cooperation (Dent, 2010). 
The FTA between the United States and the Republic of Korea 
is encouraging Japan to resume its own suspended negotiations on an 
agreement with the Republic of Korea and to move towards an accord 
in the framework of the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership 
Agreement. Substantive progress towards materializing these trans-
Pacific initiatives among major actors would shift the balance of economic 
and trade power not only between China and Japan in the sphere of 
Asia-Pacific, but also between China and the United States, and would 
significantly alter the outlook for integration in Asia-Pacific. A decision by 
Japan to join negotiations in the framework of the Trans-Pacific Strategic 
Economic Partnership Agreement would heavily reduce the possibilities 
of a trade agreement among the three largest Asian economies. 
The United States is resuming its efforts to develop trade with Asia-
Pacific. Until recently, the United States pursued a strategy of bilateral 
accords in the manner of ASEAN+1, concluding a number of separate 
bilateral FTAs with Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand as part 
of the "ASEAN initiative", whose negotiations have come a standstill for 
the moment. Yet the United States is showing an increasing interest in 
restarting talks on FTAs with the Asia-Pacific countries either bilaterally or 
with several partners, as in the case of the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic 
Partnership Agreement. The United States has agreements in force with 
Australia, Canada, Chile, Mexico, Peru and Singapore, as well as the FTA 
with the Republic of Korea and with five Central American countries and 
the Dominican Republic (CAFTA-DR) and with Colombia and Panama. It 
has also proposed agreements with Brunei Darussalam, Pakistan, Taiwan 
Province of China and Sri Lanka, among others. As well, the Framework 
Agreement on Trade and Investment signed in August 2006 with the 
ASEAN member countries is viewed as the forerunner to an FTA. 
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From the standpoint of the United States, FTAs with the countries of 
Asia-Pacific serve to promote its trade and policy interests both tactically 
and strategically, as well as to support democratic institutions and 
economic reforms in the signatory countries, strengthen security in the 
area, establish a benchmark for negotiations with other countries on deep 
integration encompassing non-transboundary trade issues and expedite 
regionwide trade liberalization through alliances with political leaders in 
the area (Dent, 2010; Feinberg, 2006). 
For the United States, the importance of FTAs lies not so much in 
promoting merchandise exports as in expanding services and investments, 
protecting intellectual property and pushing forward labour and 
environmental issues. The agreements the United States has signed are 
broader in scope and coverage than those of the European Union, which 
makes them more difficult to expand. And since the trade agreements 
emerging in various parts of the world include behind-border issues, 
the United States sees bilateral agreements as an effective instrument for 
safeguarding its trade interests. A recent landmark in this connection 
was the signature of an FTA with the Republic of Korea, the world's tenth 
largest economy with per capita income of US$ 17,000 in current dollars. 
The Republic of Korea is a key trading partner for the United States 
and the agreement is therefore considered the most important after the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Its chapters not only 
cover tariff reduction for merchandise, but also include issues related to 
services, investment, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, countervailing 
measures, technical barriers to trade, intellectual property and dispute 
settlement mechanisms. 
The new open regionalism in Asia needs closer ties between the 
European Union and Asia-Pacific. The European Union is increasingly 
keen to sign FTAs with Asia. Late in 2006, the European Commission 
officially requested its member States for a mandate to negotiate bilateral 
FTAs with India, the Republic of Korea and ASEAN. The mandate was 
given in April 2007, with the instruction that the agreements should 
be broad spectrum and include liberalization of goods, services and 
investments. These endeavours are aligned with the new slant of European 
Union trade policy, which is aimed at forging bilateral FTAs to secure new 
markets. The rationale the European Commission offers for the agreement 
signed with Republic of Korea and the agreement the bloc is preparing 
to negotiate with ASEAN and India is that these markets have major 
potential but high levels of protection (Plummer, 2010). 
Asia-Pacific has become a very important trade and investment 
partner for the European Union. The European Union has risen 
considerably in importance as a trading partner for Asia, notwithstanding 
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the steady rise in intraregional Asian trade in the past few decades. Asia's 
weight in European trade is also increasing. As with intra-Asian trade, a 
large proportion of Asia's trade with the European Union consists of parts 
and components. And on the investment front, the European Union has 
been the foremost investor in Asia, with over 100 billion euros (€) in FDI 
between 1995 and 2006, more than Japan and the United States together 
(Plummer, 2010). 
The European Union has also engaged in more active trade 
diplomacy with China following the sharp increase in its bilateral trade 
deficit. In 2009, China was the European Union's second largest trading 
partner: the European Union exported over € 82 billion in merchandise to 
China that year, 4% up on 2008; and between September 2009 and August 
2010 those exports were 40% up on the year-earlier period. The European 
Union posted a merchandise trade deficit of € 133 billion in 2009 and is 
now seeking to position its exports better in China's various markets. 
Conversely the European Union registered a € 4.7 billion surplus in its 
services trade with China in 2008, rising to € 5.3 billion in 2009. With a 
view to correcting its trade imbalances with China and dealing with 
outstanding issues between the two parties, the European Union began in 
mid-2006 to adopt a more active policy stance in its relations with China. 
The deliberations have taken place in the framework of the High-Level 
Economic and Trade Dialogue between the European Union and China, 
set up in 2007 under the auspices of WTO, where the European Union has 
traditionally conducted its trade diplomacy with China. The main areas of 
mutual concern are strategies for trade, investment and cooperation, trade 
disequilibria, market access, intellectual property rights, the environment, 
high technology and energy and the related trade possibilities (European 
Union, 2010). 
The European Union could pay a high price for its reluctance to 
participate in trade negotiations with Asia-Pacific. Steering clear of the 
frenzy of FTA negotiation with Asia-Pacific could result in significant 
trade diversion for the European Union, given the intensity of de jure 
integration within Asia and the United States' growing interest in 
setting up a network of FTA agreements in the region. The sectors that 
are of most interest to the European countries, such as automobiles and 
aeronautics, could see substantial trade and investment diversion not only 
in the markets of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea, but also in some 
ASEAN members (Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand). Furthermore, the 
multiple and complex systems of rules of origin in Asia could encourage 
European firms to invest directly in that region and thus avoid the 
possibility of investment diversion (Plummer, 2010). 
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Malaysia and Singapore are negotiating bilateral FTAs with the 
European Union. In December 2009, the European Union gave the green 
light to free trade negotiations with 10 ASEAN members, starting in March 
and October 2010 with Singapore and Malaysia, respectively. From the 
point of view of the two Asian countries, a bilateral FTA with the European 
Union would help not only to promote trade in goods and services and 
investments, but also to improve cooperation on trade facilitation, reduction 
of technical barriers and sustainable development. These FTAs would 
also foster economic integration in Asia, paving the way for an accord 
between the European Union and ASEAN. The trade relationship between 
European Union and Malaysia is fairly uneven: they are each other's fourth 
and twenty-second largest trading partners, respectively. 
4. The rising number of extraregional free trade 
agreements in Asia 
Many of the FTAs signed by China, India and Singapore have been 
with countries outside Asia-Pacific, including several in Latin America. 
And if agreements still under negotiation are included, the pattern 
becomes even more pronounced. This reflects not only these countries' 
preference for conducting open trade relations with the rest of the world, 
but also the fact that, except for Singapore, most of their trade is conducted 
with partners outside their own region. 
The list of trans-Pacific accords is becoming rapidly longer. 
Examples include the agreement between Chile and China (China's first 
trade accord with a Western country), those signed by Chile with Japan 
and India, and Panama's agreements with Singapore and with Taiwan 
Province of China. The first broad-spectrum accord Japan has signed 
thus far, the Agreement between Japan and the United Mexican States for 
the Strengthening of the Economic Partnership, came into force in April 
2005. Other initiatives have been carried forward by Pacific Rim countries 
in Asia and Latin America: the FTA between Chile and the Republic of 
Korea (the first trans-Pacific FTA); the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic 
Partnership Agreement between Brunei Darussalam, Chile, New Zealand 
and Singapore; and an FTA between Peru and Thailand, on which 
negotiation was concluded in 2005 but which has yet to come into effect. 
Chile has signed an FTA with Malaysia and has concluded negotiations 
with Viet Nam. Costa Rica signed bilateral FTAs with Singapore and 
China in 2010 (see table IV.5). These initiatives all reflect efforts by the 
Latin American countries to conduct their relations with Asia-Pacific 
with a long-term view, but they do not yet amount to a strategic approach 
to that region. 
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Table IV.5 
TRANS-PACIFIC FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS, JANUARY 2011 
Agreements in force Date of entry into effect 
Taiwan Province of China-Panama 01/01/2004 
Republic of Korea-Chile 01/04/2004 
Japan-Mexico 01/04/2005 





Nicaragua-Taiwan Province of China 01/01/2008 






Republic of Korea-Peru 21/03/2011 
China-Costa Rica 01/07/2011 
Agreements signed but not yet in vigour Date of signature 
Singapore-Costa Rica 06/04/2010 






Republic of Korea-Mexico Negotiations suspended 
Republic of Korea-Colombia 
Singapore-Mexico 
Proposed agreements 
Republic of Korea-MERCOSUR 
Republic of Korea-Panama 
Indonesia-Chile 
Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of information from the Organization of American States 
(OAS), Foreign Trade Information System [online] http://www.sice.oas.org, and official  sources in the 
countries. 
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5. Most free trade agreements are fairly narrow in scope 
Generally speaking, the trade agreements in place in Asia are fairly 
narrow in scope. Although they contain commitments on behind-borders 
issues, they tend to be confined to tariff reduction on goods trade and to 
exclude a large number of sensitive products. As well, the coverage and 
depth of commitments on behind-borders issues appear to be limited. 
Most FTAs in Asia contain only inadequate coverage of the agricultural 
sector.3 Greater coverage would be obtained, for example, with an FTA 
that encompassed at least 85% of tariff items in the sector and excluded 
no more than 150 items (Kawai and Wignaraja, 2010a). The agreements in 
place and under negotiation are also very varied as to timelines for tariff 
reduction, lists of exceptions, systems of rules of origin and modalities of 
implementation. In addition, many of the trade accords signed by Asian 
countries do not adequately address the Singapore issues (competition 
policy, investment, trade facilitation and government procurement) since 
they do not include WTO-plus issues (Baldwin, 2006; Evenett, Venables 
and Winters, 2004; Dent, 2006). 
Both Japan's and Singapore's FTAs tend to be more comprehensive 
than those signed by other Asian countries. China and India have 
traditionally been more cautious in the scope and coverage of their FTAs, 
focusing on liberalization of goods and services. More recently, however, 
both countries have tried to include some of what they consider to be 
WTO-plus issues, as in the FTAs between China and New Zealand and 
between India and Singapore. Generally speaking, Asia-Pacific FTAs 
signed between industrialized and developing countries have a more 
"WTO-plus" format, for example, the FTAs between ASEAN and Japan, 
between the United States, Singapore and Republic of Korea, and between 
China and New Zealand. Republic of Korea and Singapore have tended 
to negotiate fuller and more comprehensive FTAs, as exemplified by the 
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement, the FTA between 
China and Singapore and the FTA between Republic of Korea and Chile. 
Some FTAs take a gradual approach in which WTO-plus issues are 
scheduled for inclusion at a later date, for example, services and investment 
are to be incorporated at a future date into the FTA between China and 
Chile, the ASEAN-Republic of Korea FTA and the ASEAN-China FTA 
(Kawai and Wignaraja, 2010a; Wignaraja and Lazaro, 2010). Nevertheless, 
there is scope for including more WTO-plus-type provisions, particularly 
the four Singapore issues (investment, competition policy, transparency in 
government procurement and trade facilitation). Proper treatment of the 
3 For example the FTA between Chile and the Republic of Korea is considered to be 
comprehensive with respect to agriculture, since the Republic of Korea's list excludes 
only 21 agricultural products. AFTA is also comprehensive on agriculture since it 
excludes only 20 agricultural products (Kawai and Wignaraja, 2010a). 
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first three categories of issues is vital for the Asian economies to continue 
deepening their de facto integration, which has become a global showcase 
(Kawai and Wignaraja, 2010a; Chia, 2010). 
The FTAs in force in Asia show differing coverage and commitments 
on trade in services. As a rule, most of the FTAs signed with developed 
countries are more comprehensive; they establish commitments on a 
larger number of service areas, adhere more closely to the basic principles 
of GATS —such as market access (elimination of quotas), national 
treatment, the most-favoured nation (MFN) clause, domestic standards, 
transparency and mutual recognition— and assume commitments that go 
beyond GATS (GATS-plus). For example, in the agreement establishing a 
free trade area between ASEAN, Australia and New Zealand (AANZFTA), 
six ASEAN members broadened their liberalization commitments in the 
telecoms sector, while four countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and 
Singapore) included some commitments on financial services. Developing 
Asian countries' FTAs generally have narrower commitments, mainly 
because: (i) liberalization is still focused mainly on goods; (ii) liberalization 
of services trade is still incipient, even at the multilateral level; (iii) there 
is a lack of capacity to handle the complexity of services trade in the 
international negotiations; and (iv) data on market access for services is 
insufficient (Wignaraja and Lazaro, 2010). 
ASEAN+l's five agreements on goods with China, Japan, India, 
Republic of Korea and Australia/New Zealand are in force, but much 
remains to be achieved in terms of convergence and harmonization. 
As well as the rapid implementation of the free trade area (AFTA) and 
the five agreements of ASEAN+1, much headway still has to be made 
on more ambitious projects. Convergence and harmonization between 
agreements as regards coverage of issues and provisions has been slow. 
The main problem is the lack of a common template, especially for 
matters relating to rules of origin, standards and lists of exemptions, 
which tend instead to reflect the sensitive areas and bargaining power 
of each signatory country. This is causing an acute convergence problem 
and magnifies the noodle bowl effect. In some cases negotiations concern 
a single undertaking, while in others, issues are negotiated sequentially, 
i.e. negotiations and implementation take place in stages: first goods, 
then services and investment. 
Multiple structures coexist in Asia-Pacific, with different 
memberships and often overlapping goals. There is still no shared political 
vision in the region on a possible regional FTA. Any such agreement would 
also have to include measures and provisions to narrow the economic 
and social gaps between and within the Asian subregions. It would be 
immensely difficult to reach a consensus on the main features of a high-
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quality FTA and the pace of implementation while also addressing issues 
of special and differential treatment. A major impediment to a broad-
scope regional FTA is the lack of an FTA between the region's three largest 
economies. Much of Asia's intraregional trade is conducted between 
China, Japan and the Republic of Korea, yet the trade of the other Asia-
Pacific countries continues to be conducted in general outside the region, 
especially with the United States and the European Union. Despite the 
high degree of intraregional trade in parts and components within Asia, 
the main markets for trade in final products are still outside the region. 
6. Little use is being made of the FTAs within Asia 
Increasing use is being made of the preferences provided in FTAs in 
Asia-Pacific, but from a very low initial level, according to a set of studies 
conducted by ADB and researchers in several Asian countries. Of a sample 
of 841 Asian firms, some 28% make use of the preferences extended 
under FTAs, rising to 53% when those expressing interest in doing so 
in the future are included. Firms in Japan and especially in China make 
the most use of FTAs (Zhang, 2010); almost half of Chinese firms already 
access preferential treatment, contrasting with the much lower utilization 
rate —defined as the ratio between the value of exports conducted under 
FTAs and the total value of exports— shown by firms in the Republic of 
Korea (Cheong and Cho 2009), Philippines and Singapore. Most of the 
firms interviewed, especially those in China, Japan and the Republic of 
Korea, expressed an interest in using FTA preferences in the future (Kawai 
and Wignaraja, 2010a). In general, however, these percentages are low in 
comparison with those of countries on the American continent, including 
Canada, Chile, Dominican Republic, Mexico and Peru (JETRO, 2010). 
Firms from China make extensive use of preferential treatment, 
especially in the framework of the country's FTA with ASEAN. In the case 
of China specifically, of a sample of 232 firms surveyed, this agreement 
showed the highest utilization rate; of 102 firms which reported using 
preferential treatment in general, 67 (66%) used the treatment extended 
under the ASEAN-China FTA and 50 more expressed an interest in 
doing so in the future. The FTAs between China and Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region of China and between China and Chile also show 
relatively high utilization rates. In the latter case, 33 of 102 firms reported 
making use of the FTA, while 28 expressed an interest in doing so in the 
future (Zhang, 2010). The importance of the China-ASEAN FTA reflects 
the growing weight of ASEAN as a trading partner for Chinese firms. 
However, some ASEAN countries continue to make very little use 
of preferences extended under the FTA between ASEAN and China. 
According to data for Malaysia and Thailand, which keep detailed records 
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of preference uptake, the utilization rate of the ASEAN-China FTA remains 
quite low, although it has risen in the past few years. In 2009, Malaysia and 
Thailand exported US$ 6.4 billion to China using the preferences extended 
under the agreement. This figure represented only 18.1% of the two 
countries' combined exports to China, although it was a considerable jump 
with respect to the 7.9% recorded in 2008. The figures for the FTAs between 
Malaysia and Japan and between Japan and Thailand were higher (21.3%). 
Malaysia and Thailand continue to make relatively little use of AFTA in 
their trade with other ASEAN members, with a utilization rate of 20.4%. 
Much higher ratios are seen in trade by Indonesia, Philippines and Viet 
Nam (JETRO, 2010). 
There are a number of reasons for the low utilization rate. The 
greatest obstacle is the lack of information on FTAs, followed by the small 
margins of preference, the delay and administrative costs associated with 
making use of rules of origin provisions and the fact that exemptions 
can be obtained by other means: through special preferences for export 
processing zones and tariff reduction extended under the Information 
Technology Agreement, of which many Asian countries are signatories 
(JETRO, 2010; Kawai and Wignaraja, 2010b; Chia, 2010; Hiratsuka and 
others, 2007; Manchin and Pelkmans-Balaoing, 2007). 
Utilization rates also vary considerably by company size: most 
of the firms making use of these preferences are large concerns. 
Using preferences generates huge overhead costs: among other things, 
companies need to spend money on gaining knowledge of the provisions 
offered by the respective accord, adapting their business plans to complex 
tariff systems and obtaining rules of origin certificates. Large firms can 
usually devote greater financial and human resources to increasing their 
utilization of preferential schemes than SMEs can (Kawai and Wignaraja, 
2010a; Chia, 2010). Much remains to be done in this area to enable firms of 
all sizes to tap the tariff preferences extended under FTAs. 
7. Much of this problem is caused by the 
complex rules of origin system 
A less complex and restrictive scheme of rules of origin in Asia 
would do much to increase the uptake of FTA benefits. A comparative 
analysis of the four FTAs centred on ASEAN (AFTA and the FTAs between 
ASEAN and the Republic of Korea, ASEAN and China, and ASEAN and 
Japan), shows that: 
(i) AFTA has a relatively straightforward application system and 
has made the existing system simpler and more liberal, by 
expanding or easing standards; 
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(ii) The FTAs in Asia are more or less consistent with AFTA rules, 
which as a basic principle require a minimum RVC of 40%. Of 
the three FTAs, the agreement between ASEAN and Republic of 
Korea is the simplest and least restrictive; 
(iii) Automobiles and textiles and clothing are among the most 
sensitive sectors for the signatory countries. Moreover, various 
rules are applied across countries and across specific commodity 
classifications; 
(iv) Tariff classification change is being used increasingly as an 
alternative rule for certain products; 
(v) Japan is beginning to adopt a simpler and less restrictive system, 
allowing alternative rules in most cases in its FTA with ASEAN; 
the ASEAN-China agreement is considered simpler than the 
ASEAN-Japan agreement, which requires 40% regional value 
added in most cases. The lack of alternative methodologies 
could be considered restraining, however; and 
(vi) In general, there is a trend towards a less restrictive scheme of 
rules in Asia (see table IV.6) (Medalla and Barboa, 2009). Be that 
as it may, however, Asia-Pacific still has multiple systems of 
rules, which worsens the administrative noodle bowl issue. 
Table IV.6 
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH-EAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN): FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENTS, BY AGREEMENT AND TYPE OF REQUIREMENT 
(Number  of  tariff  lines) 
Free Trade Area of 

















merchandise 169 465 8 3 
Change in tariff  chapter 61 1 1 344 
Change in tariff  heading 2 434 
Change in tariff 
subheading 
Regional value content 
(RVC) (>40%) 36 
Regional value content 
(RVC) (40%) 146 22 4 659 219 
Regional value content 
(RVC) (<40%) 2 
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Table IV.6 (concluded) 
Free Trade Area of 
















Change in tariff  chapter 
plus RVC (40%) 2 1 
Change in tariff  heading 
plus RVC 4 
Change in tariff  chapter 
or RVC (40%) 564 487 7 126 
Change in tariff  heading 
or RVC (>40%) 4 
Change in tariff  heading 
or RVC (40%) 2 583 4 078 122 3 056 
Change in tariff 
subheading or RVC 
(40%) 689 61 33 
RVC (40%) or textile 
rules 427 
Change in tariff  chapter 
or RVC (40%) or textile 
rules 300 
Change in tariff  heading 
or RVC (40%) or textile 
rules 327 
Total with alternative 
rules 4 463 4 630 556 3215 
Data unavailable 446 
Total 5 224 5 224 5 224 5 224 
Source: M. Medalla, Erlinda and Jenny Balboa, "ASEAN rules of origin: lessons and recommendations for 
best practice", ERIA  Discussion  Paper  Series,  N° 17, 2009. 
The criterion of value added (the simplest) was adopted in AFTA 
and in the ASEAN-China FTA, which requires a minimum regional value 
added for all manufacturing sectors. This is a difficult criterion for AFTA 
members to meet, however, especially Cambodia, Lao People's Democratic 
Republic, Myanmar and Viet Nam, owing to the high proportion of inputs 
imported from non-ASEAN members. It is, moreover, harder for low-
wage economies to meet the value added criterion than for high-wage 
economies, because labour makes a smaller contribution to value added 
in the first group of countries. The administrative costs of complying with 
the value added criterion can also be high —for obtaining certificates of 
origin and invoicing, among others, especially for SMEs. This criterion 
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is also sensitive to exchange-rate variations. In view of these issues, 
ASEAN has shifted the basis of its system of origin from value added to 
change in tariff classification (CTC). Although CTC is easier to implement, 
especially for SMEs, a question arises over which level of disaggregation 
of the Harmonized System (HS) should be used for the "substantial 
transformation" criteria to be satisfied. ASEAN is also further refining its 
cumulation rule and developing a "partial" cumulation approach in which 
goods of partial origin (i.e. which do not satisfy the 40% content threshold), 
can accumulate 20% as part of regional value added (Medalla and Barboa, 
2009; Chia, 2010). 
Intra-Asian agreements employ similar definitions for rules of 
origin to those in Latin American agreements. Their requirements are 
worded similarly and are based mainly on CTC and RVC criteria. The 
main features of rules of origin schemes in Latin America include the 
following (ECLAC, 2010b) (see table IV.7): 
• Rules of origin based on "wholly obtained merchandise" criteria 
are not extensively used, inasmuch as they are not required 
in any of the agreements analysed, except for the agreement 
between Peru and Thailand, in which it is applied to 3% of the 
rules negotiated; 
• The CTC criterion, defined variously as changes in tariff 
chapters, headings and subheadings, is the main system 
employed in the agreements between Peru and Thailand, 
Mexico and Japan, Chile and the Republic of Korea, and Chile 
and Japan, as well as in the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic 
Partnership Agreement. These agreements also include 
exceptions to the changes stipulated; 
• RVC requirements are used extensively in the China's FTAs 
with ASEAN and with Chile, and in combination with CTC in 
the FTA between the Republic of Korea and ASEAN; 
• Specifications as to productive process or inputs are little used: 
of the six agreements which cite such specifications, only five 
apply them to at least 7% of rules and the other (the agreement 
between ASEAN and the Republic of Korea) uses it for less than 
15%; and 
• The ASEAN-Japan FTA mainly uses versatile formulations of 
CTC and, in some cases, RVC. RVC is used sometimes as a sole 
requirement to determine product origin, and sometimes in 
combination with CTC. 
Table IV. 
ASIA AND LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): CRITERIA FOR DEFINING PRODUCT ORIGIN IN TRADE AGREEMENTS 
(Number  of  tariff  headings  and percentages) 
Criteria used for 





Chile- Trans-Pacific Strategic 







SB CT. 3 > 
Wholly obtained merchandise 3.3 131 - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Change 
in tariff 
Change in tariff 
chapter 22.3 886 46.79 2 455 35.21 1 800 11.16 583 34.37 1 797 24,67 1 289 10.5 551 
classification Change in tariff 
heading 46.4 1 842 42.02 2 205 60.19 3 077 0.88 46 49.37 2 581 54,54 2 849 _ _ 3.2 168 
Change in tariff 
subheading 27.3 1 083 10.69 561 4.01 205 _ _ 14.56 761 20,79 1 086 _ _ 1.1 60 
Other tariff 
changes 0.1 4 1.81 95 0.04 2 - - - - - - - - - -
Subtotal 96.1 3 815 99.5 5 222 99.4 5 082 12.0 629 98.3 5 139 100 5 224 - - 14.9 779 
Exception to tariff  change 10.41 413 31.12 1 633 22.26 1 138 - - 19.19 1 003 6.11 319 - - 1.49 78 
Value content requirement 1.1 43 3.98 209 9.43 482 87.96 4 595 0.48 25 16.37 855 100 5 224 76.5 4 000 
Specified process or input 2.7 107 5.96 313 5.77 295 - - 6.92 362 5.57 291 - - 14.7 765 
Total tariff  lines 100 3 968 100 5 247 100 5 112 100 5 224 100 5 228 100 5 224 100 5 224 100 5 227 
§ PL 







Source: Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), on the basis of information from the Integration and Trade Sector (INTrade-BID). 
Note: The percentage shown refers  to each rule criterion as a proportion of all positions reported. Since one rule may have more than one criterion, the sum of the shares 
may be greater than 100%. 
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The existence of multiple rules of origin schemes in Asia is an 
impediment to greater use of FTAs. Generally speaking, the rules of origin 
contained in FTAs signed by developing countries in the region (South-
South FTAs) tend to raise greater barriers to the use of the respective 
agreements than the rules established in agreements with industrialized 
countries (North-South FTAs). Rules of origin schemes in North-South 
FTAs tend to be better designed and administered (Wignaraja and 
Lazaro, 2010). In a survey of 688 firms, 20% (138 firms) reported that the 
multiplicity of rules of origin in the Asian region significantly increased 
their business costs, while the majority surveyed said that rules of origin 
were not a problem. But this overall response masks large variations from 
one country to another. A large proportion (38%) of firms from Singapore 
had negative perceptions of the multiple rules of origin in Asia, compared 
with only 6% of Chinese firms. Firms from Japan, Philippines, Thailand 
and the Republic of Korea lay between the two extremes. By company 
size, the largest firms tended to take a more negative view of the multiple 
rules of origin than SMEs, probably because large firms work with several 
markets and must therefore adjust their business plans to the various 
preferences extended under different FTAs (Kawai and Wignaraja, 2010b). 
SMEs work with more limited markets of origin and destination and tend 
to use fewer imported inputs. 
C. China's agreements as an integral part of trade 
diplomacy and strategic alliances 
1. China's trade strategy 
Starting in 2001, China began to take more rapid measures to lay 
down its network of trade agreements with the signature of the first 
agreement with other signatories of the Bangkok Agreement, which 
signalled that its trade policy would henceforth combine the multilateral 
pillar with regional and bilateral agreements. China then signed an FTA 
with ASEAN in 2004, which was notified to WTO under the Enabling 
Clause. This agreement began with a three-year early harvest scheme 
centred mainly on the agricultural sector. First the parties negotiated and 
implemented an agreement on goods, followed by progress on services 
and investments. Significantly, ASEAN as a group recognized China as a 
market economy. 
China has negotiated several trade agreements in the past few 
years. First, special agreements were concluded with Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region of China and Macao Special Administrative Region 
of China, then an FTA was negotiated with Chile and an early harvest 
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agreement was concluded with Pakistan. China also began to reduce 
its tariffs on trade from ASEAN countries. China has now signed or is 
negotiating FTAs with at least 31 countries (MOFCOM, 2010). At the end 
of September 2009, China had signed 113 bilateral investment protection 
agreements and 94 agreements on elimination of double taxation, including 
12 with Latin American countries and 7 with Caribbean nations. China 
has the following FTAs in force, under negotiation or at the proposal stage: 
(i) China: free trade agreements implemented or signed: 
- Free trade area encompassing China and the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
- Free trade agreement between China and Pakistan 
- Free trade agreement between China and Chile 
- Free trade agreement between China and New Zealand 
- Free trade agreement between China and Singapore 
- Free trade agreement between China and Peru 
- Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement between China 
and Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China 
- Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement between China 
and Macao Special Administrative Region of China 
- Free trade agreement between China and Costa Rica 
- Economic Framework Cooperation Agreement between 
China and Taiwan Province of China 
(ii) Trade agreements under negotiation 
- Free trade agreement between China and the Gulf Cooperation 
Council 
- Free trade agreement between China and Australia 
- Free trade agreement between China and Iceland 
- Free trade agreement between China and Norway 
- Free trade agreement between China and the South African 
Customs Union 
(iii) Proposed agreements under study 
- Free trade agreement between China and India 
- Free trade agreement between China and the Republic of 
Korea 
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- Free trade agreement between China, Japan and the Republic 
of Korea 
- Free trade agreement between China and Switzerland 
Several features set China's agreements apart from those signed 
by other Asian and non-Asian countries (Bin, 2006). First of all, China 
takes a fairly pragmatic approach, adapting to the varying interests of 
its trading partners. China has no single model for all its agreements; its 
coverage of different trade issues and depth of commitments varies from 
one to another. Second, implementation takes place in stages starting, for 
example, with the early-harvest scheme and, later, incorporating other 
disciplines such as services, investments and trade facilitation measures, 
as in the agreements with ASEAN (Kwei, 2006) and with Chile. Lastly, 
several of China's agreements exclude sensitive products and sectors, 
such as the protection of intellectual property, sectoral liberalization, and 
labour and environmental issues. 
China treats these agreements as instruments of trade diplomacy, 
such as the "one country, two systems" model applied in the cases of 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China, Macao Special 
Administrative Region of China and Taiwan Province of China. In this 
last case, the two economies signed the Economic Framework Cooperation 
Agreement in June 2010, consisting mainly in tariff reduction on certain 
goods in an early-harvest format. The agreement between ASEAN and 
China is viewed as an instrument of diplomacy aimed at mitigating the 
mounting competition between the ASEAN countries and China in trade 
and investment. Other agreements, such as those signed with Chile, India, 
Pakistan, Peru and South Africa, are seen as diplomatic efforts to start 
or consolidate strategic partnerships and guarantee supplies of natural 
resources. Another important objective is to gain recognition of market 
economy status on the part of trading partners (ECLAC, 2005). 
China has made active efforts to secure recognition of market 
economy status from its main trading partners (including the European 
Union, Japan and the United States) before the 2016 deadline established in 
the framework of WTO, to avoid future antidumping cases being treated 
according to the ad hoc and often discriminatory methodology applied to 
non-market economies. By March 2009, 79 countries had recognized China 
as a market economy, including 10 from the Latin American and Caribbean 
region —among them Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Peru, and Trinidad and Tobago. The 
Government of China is lobbying in several forums for the review of its 
non-market economy status and, in this connection, has concluded a series 
of bilateral FTAs in which it is explicitly recognized as a market economy 
Australia and New Zealand also recognize China as a market economy 
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Recognition by the 10 members of ASEAN was crucial for facilitating the 
conclusion of an FTA with these countries late in 2004. 
Nevertheless, at the end of 2008, imports from China were 
undergoing numerous antidumping investigations in the Latin American 
and Caribbean region. Since the outbreak of the recent global economic 
crisis, Chinese imports have been a frequent target for antidumping 
investigations throughout the world and Latin America and the Caribbean 
has been no exception. In the recent period, in fact, over half of new 
investigations begun in most countries and almost 60% of those begun 
in Latin America and the Caribbean have involved China, with 58 cases 
between the fourth quarter of 2008 and the fourth quarter of 2009. The 
greatest numbers of antidumping investigations against China in this 
period have been brought by countries which have recognized China as a 
market economy: 20 of a total of 33 investigations in the case of Argentina, 
and 6 of 11 investigations in the case of Brazil. In Mexico, which does not 
extend market economy treatment to China, both cases brought referred to 
dumping (see figure IV.2). The main sectors involved have been iron and 
steel products, textiles, footwear, domestic appliances and tyres; and the 
great majority of cases have been initiated by Argentina and Brazil. 
Figure IV.2 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): ANTIDUMPING INVESTIGATIONS 
INITIATED, TOTALAND THOSE INVOLVING PRODUCTS FROM CHINA, 
FOURTH QUARTER 2008-FOURTH QUARTER 2009 










Argentina Brazil Colombia Mexico Peru 
• Total China 
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of Information from the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
ECLAC 
2. Implications of Asia's free trade agreements for Latin 
America and the Caribbean 
The formation of a free trade area in Asia encompassing ASEAN, 
China, Japan and the Republic of Korea (and which could come to 
include India as a trading partner) poses a challenge for Latin America 
and the Caribbean, inasmuch as integration in Asia tends towards the 
intraregional, with a larger share of intraregional exports in the scheme 
of tariff preferences. As discussed in chapter II, imports from the Latin 
American and Caribbean region consist mainly of primary goods and 
natural resources, while those from ASEAN correspond more to high-
tech sectors, such as information and communications technologies (ICTs), 
whose tariffs have come down considerably in recent years. 
Latin American exporters compete heavily in the Chinese market 
with suppliers from ASEAN. Little competition might be assumed to 
exist in Asian markets between the exports of the Latin American and 
Caribbean region and ASEAN, given the differences in the two regions' 
export structure. Yet today China relies more on the Latin American and 
Caribbean countries for primary products than on ASEAN (see table 
IV.8), while ASEAN accounts for a much larger share than Latin America 
in China's imports of natural-resource-based manufactures. Around 17% 
of China's high-tech manufacturing imports come from ASEAN and 8% 
of China's exports of high-tech goods, along with over 11% of its natural-
resource-based manufactures, go to ASEAN. These fairly high percentages 
indicate that China and ASEAN have a trade network not only within but 
also between industries and that a large proportion of raw materials and 
natural-resource-based manufactures are from sectors in which the Latin 
American and Caribbean region faces stiff competition with Asian countries. 
Table IV.8 
CHINA AND INDIA: COMPOSITION OF TRADE WITH THE ASSOCIATION OF 
SOUTH-EAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) AND LATIN AMERICA 
AND THE CARIBBEAN, AVERAGE FOR 2006-2009 
(Percentage  share  in trade  flows  for  each group  of  products) 
China India 
Imports Exports Imports Exports 
Primary ASEAN 6.8 12.7 7.4 11.8 
products 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 17.0 1.8 5.9 0.5 




Latin America and 
the Caribbean 9.2 6.0 2.8 3.7 
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Table IV.8 (concluded) 
China India 
Imports Exports Imports Exports 
Low-tech ASEAN 6.3 5.7 7.9 3.1 
manufactures 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 1.8 4.3 0.9 2.9 
Medium-tech ASEAN 6.0 9.6 7.9 12.4 
manufactures 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 1.1 5.8 1.7 4.5 
High-tech ASEAN 17.0 7.9 11.1 10.6 
manufactures 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 1.3 3.4 0.6 5.4 
Other ASEAN 4.2 6.9 2.6 17.2 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 0.1 1.7 0.3 0.8 
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of information from the United Nations Commodity Trade 
Database (COMTRADE). 
As trade barriers between the Asian countries continue to be 
lowered, Latin America and the Caribbean could see more of its trade 
diverted. Latin America and the Caribbean would lessen the disadvantage 
vis-à-vis ASEAN in Chinese markets if the countries of the region were to 
sign FTAs with ASEAN members. If effective tariffs remain high, the Latin 
American and Caribbean countries will face the toughest competition 
in primary products and natural-resource-based manufactures, where 
ASEAN maintains competitive advantages (see table IV.9). 
The Asian countries continue to apply high tariffs in sectors that 
are of export interest for Latin America and the Caribbean, especially in 
agriculture. ASEAN, China, Japan and the Republic of Korea (ASEAN+3) 
still apply high tariffs to agricultural products, textiles and clothing and 
some categories of machinery (see table IV.9). Accordingly, these countries 
would benefit —and the Latin American and Caribbean countries would 
lose out— from a reduction in tariffs in the framework of ASEAN+3, the 
agreements between ASEAN and each of the three other countries, or even 
the FTAs between China and ASEAN and ASEAN and India. 
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Fruit, vegetables and plants 
Coffee  and tea 
Cereals and cereal preparations 
Vegetable oils and fats 
Sugar and confectionary 
Beverages and tobacco 
Cotton 
Other agricultural products 
Fish and fisheries products 
Minerals and metals 
Petroleum 
Chemical products 
Wood, paper, etc. 
Textiles 
Clothing 
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The countries with the highest average MFN tariffs are Viet 
Nam, Republic of Korea and Thailand. The most protected sector is 
agriculture, particularly dairy products, cereals and cereal preparations, 
and beverages and tobacco, although fruit and vegetables, coffee and 
tea, vegetables fats and oils and sugar and confectionary also show quite 
high levels of protection. This, combined with the tariff advantages 
enjoyed by competitors such as Australia, New Zealand and other Asian 
countries thanks to preferential trade agreements either in place or under 
negotiation, makes it difficult for Latin American and Caribbean producers 
to expand their agro-industrial exports to Asia. 
Although some Latin American countries are among the foremost 
suppliers of primary products, competition between countries is intensifying 
and Latin America could see substantial trade diversion unless the countries 
actively pursue bilateral or subregional trade agreements. They should also 
strengthen links with businesses in Asia by forging alliances and promoting 
different sorts of business cooperation, in order to bolster exports of primary 
and semi-processed goods to the Chinese and Asian markets, which will 
require efforts to deepen knowledge of these markets. Such an approach 
would have a positive impact on Latin America and the Caribbean through 
FDI flows and trade creation in sectors which export to China. 
3. China's and Latin America's free trade agreements: 
similar in scope but with subtle differences 
Chile was the first Western country with which China signed a 
partial scope agreement, mainly concerning goods. One key to the success 
of the negotiations between the two countries was the positive outcomes 
of Chile's agreements with the European Union, the Republic of Korea and 
the United States, which aroused the interest of the Chinese authorities 
and coincided with their wish to make headway in trade talks with their 
ASEAN neighbours. From China's point of view, a closer knowledge of 
Chile's negotiating experience was seen as useful for refining its own trade 
negotiations, first with its Asian partners and later with the rest of the 
world. And the two countries had historical ties, with diplomatic relations 
since 1970 and trade links developed during the 1990s. Chile was the first 
Latin American country to establish diplomatic relations with China, the 
first to conclude bilateral negotiations for China's accession to WTO and 
the first to recognize China as a market economy. 
For Chile, the FTA with China not only represented a significant 
step in its international strategy, but also brought major trade benefits. The 
China FTA is very important for Chile, inasmuch as China has become its 
largest export market. Chilean consumers have also reaped the benefits of 
broader access to a large variety of consumer goods from China at more 
competitive prices. The faster growth spurred by the FTA should promote 
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job creation, as well. Three years after the FTA between Chile and China 
entered into force, bilateral trade has benefited amply (DIRECON, 2010).4 
The agreement between Peru and China is viewed as a natural 
development, given China's importance for Peru's export sector and 
substantial Chinese emigration to Peru, which has had a strong influence 
on the Peruvian culture. China is now Peru's second largest export market 
after the United States and its largest source of imports (see chapter II). 
The FTA between the two countries is China's first broad scope agreement 
with a developing country which includes simultaneous provisions on 
goods, services and investment. 
The FTA between China and Costa Rica was also a natural step 
following the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two 
countries in June 2007. Since that date, the Government of Costa Rica has 
recognized the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate government 
representing the whole of China and Taiwan Province of China as an 
inalienable part of Chinese territory.5 After six rounds of talks over a period 
of 13 months, China and Costa Rica signed an FTA in April 2010, China's 
third such agreement with a Latin American country after those with Chile 
in 2006 and Peru in 2010. At that time, Costa Rica had just signed its first FTA 
with an Asian country: Singapore. In the past few years, China has become 
Costa Rica's largest export market, while Costa Rica is China's ninth largest 
trading partner in Latin America. Costa Rica runs a trade surplus with China, 
chiefly owing to its exports of electronic components. The country hopes the 
FTA will diversify its exports to China, especially in the agricultural sector, 
which will now have preferential access to the huge Chinese market, and 
aspires to attract more Chinese investment in Costa Rica. 
The FTA between China and Chile established the framework for 
the negotiations on China's next two agreements with countries in the 
region: Peru and Costa Rica. The China-Chile agreement not only frees 
trade in goods, but also regulates the related disciplines, with 14 chapters 
on trade, institutional and cooperation issues in areas as wide-ranging as 
science and technology, social security, education, investment promotion, 
culture, SMEs, intellectual property and the environment. The agreement 
also has eight annexes covering tariff elimination lists, geographical 
indications, product-specific rules of origin and certificates of origin, 
among others. It also provides for a dispute settlement mechanism. The 
agreements with Peru and Costa Rica included three additional areas 
(services, temporary entry of business persons and investment) from the 
start of the negotiations (see table IV.10). 
During the first year of tariff reduction, Chile's exports to China doubled and its imports 
from China jumped 40%. Although exports fell off somewhat in the second and third year 
owing to the global crisis, China has become Chile's main trading partner, representing 
over 20% of its total exports, i.e. more than twice its trade with China before the FTA. 
This is a landmark for China, because precisely half of the 24 States which still recognize 
the Government of Taiwan are in Latin America and the Caribbean and seven of these 
are Spanish-speaking. 
Table IV. 10 
CHINA: FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS WITH CHILE, PERU AND COSTA RICA, BY CHAPTER 
China-Chile China-Peru China-Costa Rica 
Preamble Preamble Preamble 
Chapter 1: Initial provisions Chapter 1: Initial provisions Chapter 1: Initial provisions 
Chapter 2: General definitions Chapter 2: Definitions of general application 
Chapter 3: National treatment and 
market access for goods 
Chapter 2: National treatment and market access for goods 
Annex 1: Exceptions to national treatment and import and 
export restrictions 
Annex 2: Tariff  elimination 
Schedule of China 
Schedule of Peru 
Annex 3: Price band system 
Chapter 3: National treatment and market access for 
merchandise trade 
Annex 1: Exceptions to national treatment and import and export 
restrictions 
Annex 2: Tariff  elimination 
List of China 
List of Costa Rica 
General notes on the schedule of Costa Rica 
Chapter 4: Rules of origin 
Chapter 5: Procedures related to 
rules of origin 
Chapter 3: Rules of origin and related operational 
procedures 
Annex 4: Product-specific rules of origin 
Annex 5: Certificate and declaration of origin 
Chapter 4: Rules of origin and related operational procedures 
Annex 3: Product-specific rules of origin 
Annex 4: Certificate of origin 
Chapter 4: Customs procedures and trade facilitation Chapter 5: Customs procedures 
Chapter 6: Trade remedies Chapter 5: Trade remedies Chapter 8: Trade remedies 
Chapter 7: Sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures 
Chapter 6: Sanitary and phytosanitary measures Chapter 6: Sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
Annex 5: Contact points for sanitary and phytosanitary matters 
Chapter 8: Technical barriers to 
trade 
Chapter 7: Technical barriers to trade Chapter 7: Technical barriers to trade 
Annex 6: Contact points for technical barriers to trade 
Chapter 8: Trade in services 
Annex 6: List of specific commitments 
List of China 
List of Peru 
Chapter 9: Investment, trade in services and temporary entry of 
business persons 
Annex 7: Schedules of specific commitments 
Section 1: Schedules of China 
Section 2: Schedules of Costa Rica 
Annex 8: Working group on temporary entry of business persons 
SB Cf. 3 > 
§ PL 








Table IV. 10 (concluded) K> 
O 
China-Chile China-Peru China-Costa Rica 
Chapter 9: Temporary entry for business persons 
Annex 7: Commitments for temporary entry for business 
persons 
Chapter 10: Investment 
Annex 8: Public debt 
Annex 9: Expropriation 
Chapter 11: Intellectual property rights 
Annex 10: Geographical indications 
Chapter 10: Intellectual property 
Annex 9: Geographical indications as referred  to in Article 116.1 
(geographical indications of China) 
Annex 10: Geographical indications as referred  to in 
Article 116.2 (geographical indications of Costa Rica) 
Chapter 13: Cooperation Chapter 12: Cooperation Chapter 11: Cooperation, promotion and enhancement of trade 
relations 
Chapter 9: Transparency Chapter 13: Transparency Chapter 12: Transparency 
Chapter 11: Administration of the 
agreement 
Chapter 14: Administration of the agreement 
Annex 11: Free Trade Commission 
Chapter 13: Administration of the agreement 
Annex 11: Free Trade Commission 
Annex 12: Implementation of modifications approved by the Free 
Trade Commission 
Annex 13: Free Trade Agreement Coordinators 
Chapter 10: Dispute settlement Chapter 15: Dispute settlement 
Annex 12: Model rules of procedure 
Chapter 14: Dispute settlement 
Chapter 12: Exceptions Chapter 16: Exceptions Chapter 15: Exceptions 
Chapter 14: Final provisions Chapter 17: Final provisions Chapter 16: Final provisions 
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Similarly to China's agreements with other Asian countries, the 
FTA between China and Chile gradually incorporates other areas of 
interest, such as trade in services and investment. In September 2006, 
shortly before the agreement came into effect, the President of Chile 
announced the start of talks on a second phase of the FTA with China with 
a view to broadening and deepening the accord in the areas of services 
and investment. In March 2008, after six rounds of negotiations, the 
countries concluded the technical negotiations to bring trade in services 
into the existing FTA. In April 2008 they signed the Supplementary 
Agreement on Trade in Services of the Free Trade Agreement between 
the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government 
of the Republic of Chile, which came into effect in August 2010.6 Chile 
is now negotiating an investment chapter in the framework of the third 
phase of the FTA with China. 
The three Latin American countries have secured similar tariff 
reductions. Peru secured immediate tariff elimination for 83.52% of its 
exports, slightly less than the 92.01% and 99.64% achieved by Chile and 
Costa Rica, respectively In addition, 1.02% of Peru's exports were excluded 
from tariff reduction (basket D), compared with 0.73% and 0.01% for Chile 
and Costa Rica, respectively (see table IV.ll). Peru excluded 592 sensitive 
products from tariff reduction, which was equivalent to 8.05% of tariff 
headings and 10% of the value of its imports from China. Peru has thus 
negotiated a larger number of exclusions than Chile, whose FTA with 
China excludes only 2.97% of its imports from that country 
The list of immediate tariff reductions includes some products 
which are of great interest to Latin America and the Caribbean in 
terms of exports. The FTA between China and Chile established tariff-
free entry to China for the two main tariff items exported to China 
by the region, integrated circuits and microassemblies (HS category 
854221) and computer parts (category 847330). Duty-free access was also 
secured immediately for lead ores and concentrates (category 260700), 
zinc ores and concentrates (category 260800) and copper waste and 
scrap (category 7404) and in one year for aluminum waste and scrap 
(category 7602). But sugar (category 1701), another major export product 
for the region, was excluded. 
On 20 September 2007 Chile and China signed an environmental cooperation agreement 
based on Article 108 of the FTA. 
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Table IV. 11 
CHINA: TARIFF REDUCTION SCHEDULES ESTABLISHED IN FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENTS WITH CHILE, PERU AND COSTA RICA 
(Percentages  of  total  exports  to China) 
Category of 
tariff  reduction Chile
8 Peru" Costa Rica 
A Immediate 92.01 83.52 99.64 
1 year 0.02 
B 5 years 0.35 0.37 0.10 
C 10 years 6.89 1.34 0.19 
D Exclusions 0.73 1.02 0.01 
15 years 0.05 
E - L c 17 years 13.75 
Total 100 100 100 
Source: Ministry of Foreign Trade and Tourism (MINCETUR) of Peru; Office  of International Economic Affairs 
(DIRECON), Ministry of Foreign Affairs  of Chile; and Ministry of Foreign Trade of Costa Rica (COMEX). 
a Refers to exports for 2004. 
b Refers to exports for 2007. 
0 For Peru, 12.86% of exports correspond to fishmeal, on which tariff  reduction will conclude on 1 
January 2015. 
On the other hand, while Peru removed tariffs immediately on 
63% of its imports from China, Chile and Costa Rica did so on a smaller 
percentage (50% and 57%, respectively) (see table IV.12). Peru gave China 
preferential access either immediately or within five years for 75% of tariff 
headings, including telephones, mobile phones, computers, electronic 
devices, laminated steel products and urea. Longer-term tariff reductions 
apply to categories such as beef and yogurt (15 years), rice (17 years with a 
grace period of 4 years) and milk and cheese (17 years with a grace period 
of 10 years). 
All three Latin American countries have some highly sensitive 
products excluded from the agreement. In the cases of Chile and Peru, 
these include agricultural products in price bands, such as flour, wheat 
and sugar, some segments of textiles and clothing, iron and steel products 
and domestic appliances. For example, Peru has some textile and footwear 
products in the 10-year tariff reduction list as sensitive products. Most 
of the items on the list of exclusions (D) and 16-year reductions (E) 
correspond to the textile and clothing sector (see table IV.13). In the case 
of leather and footwear, sensitive products have been excluded and tariff 
reduction offered over a 16-year period (see table IV.14). These products 
represent 93.5% of tariff headings and 100% of imports in that sector. They 
are products of great export interest for several Latin American countries 
and many countries of the region face stiff competition from China in local 
and other markets. 
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Table IV. 12 
CHINA: TARIFF REDUCTION SCHEDULES ESTABLISHED IN FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENTS WITH CHILE, PERU AND COSTA RICA 
(Percentages  of  China's  imports  from  each country) 
Tariff  reduction period by 
tariff  category Chile
8 Peru" Costa Rica 
A Immediate 49.57 62.71 56.60 
B 5 years 20.55 12.94 4.00 
C 10 years 26.91 14.35 25.10 
D Exclusions 2.97 8.05 9.90 
E 16 years 1.18 
G c 12 years 0.07 
H c 15 years 0.30 2.80 
J-1, J-2, J-3d 17 years 0.39 
Import quotas 1.60 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Ministry of Foreign Trade and Tourism (MINCETUR) of Peru; Office  of International Economic Affairs 
(DIRECON), Ministry of Foreign Affairs  of Chile; and Ministry of Foreign Trade of Costa Rica (COMEX). 
a Refers to imports in 2004. 
b Refers to imports in 2007. 
0 Agricultural products. 
d Agricultural products with grace periods of 4, 8 and 10 years, respectively, during which tariffs  will not 
be reduced. 
Table IV. 13 
COMPOSITION OF CHINA'S OFFER TO PERU IN TEXTILES 
AND CLOTHING, BY TARIFF REDUCTION PERIOD 
(Number  of  tariff  headings,  millions  of  dollars  and percentages) 
Tariff  reduction period 
by tariff  category 
Number of tariff 
headings 
Percentage 






share in the 
sector 
A. Immediate 72 7.4 22 7.6 
B. 5 years 85 8.7 7 2.5 
C. 10 years 211 21.0 32 10.9 
D. Exclusions 537 21.5 186 63.2 
E. 16 years 67 55.2 47 15.8 
Total 972 100.0 295 100.0 
Source: Carlos Kuriyama, "Resultados de la negociación del TLC entre Peru y China", Lima, Ministry of 
Foreign Trade and Tourism (MINCETUR), 2010, unpublished. 
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Table IV. 14 
COMPOSITION OF CHINA'S OFFER TO PERU IN LEATHER 
AND FOOTWEAR, BY TARIFF REDUCTION PERIOD 
(Number  of  tariff  headings,  millions  of  dollars  and percentages) 
Tariff  reduction period 
by tariff  category 
Number of tariff 
headings 
Percentage 






share in the 
sector 
B. 5 years 2 6.5 0 0.0 
D. Exclusions 25 80.6 30 53.9 
E. 16 years 4 12.9 25 46.1 
Total 31 100.0 55 100.0 
Source: Carlos Kurlyama, "Resultados de la negociación del TLC entre Peru y China", Lima, Ministry of 
Foreign Trade and Tourism (MINCETUR), 2010, unpublished. 
The FTA between China and Peru has a clause benefiting trade in 
goods produced in free zones. The agreement on special regimes allows 
Peru to maintain its temporary import and export regimes; in addition, 
merchandise manufactured in free zones may qualify for preferential 
access. For example, China has 15 free zones from which imports into 
Peru may continue to enjoy tax benefits until 2012, a practice which 
runs contrary to the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures. There is no provision of this sort in China's FTAs with Chile 
(Torres, 2010) and Costa Rica. 
With regard to rules of origin, the FTAs follow the general criteria 
of the multilateral system. In the Chile-China FTA, the definitions in 
the chapter on rules of origin for originating or non-originating goods 
establish an RVC of no less than 40% (the figure commonly applied in the 
FTA between China and ASEAN), exceptions, a cumulation regime and 
de minimis levels. Although this accord and China's FTAs with Peru and 
Costa Rica stipulate an RVC of at least 40%, most of the product-specific 
rules of origin citing RVC set a minimum of 50%.7 
7 Packaging materials and containers in which goods are packaged for retail sale are 
taken into account only when the rule of origin is defined by RVC. The agreement also 
allows cumulation of origin, i.e. raw materials and inputs originating in one party may 
be considered part of the production of a good manufactured in another country. The de 
minimis level applicable to non-originating materials which do not meet tariff classification 
change requirements was set at 8% in China's FTAs with both Peru and Costa Rica. All 
three FTAs establish that sets or assortments shall be regarded as originating provided 
that the value of the non-originating goods does not exceed 15% of the total value of the 
set or assortment. With regard to transit and storage in a non-party country, goods may 
still be considered directly consigned if they are stored for less than three months in a 
third country (the same period for the FTAs between China and Peru and between China 
and Costa Rica). This is a key point for several Latin American countries, since there is no 
direct shipment between most ports in the region and China (IICA, 2009). 
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The clauses on bilateral safeguards in China's three FTAs with other 
Latin American countries are quite similar. These clauses may be invoked 
in the case of threat of harm or serious harm from an import which has 
increased as a result of the tariff reduction or elimination agreed in the 
FTA. In this case, tariff reduction may be suspended or the rate raised to 
the MFN applicable at the time when the measure is taken or upon entry 
into force of the FTA. Chile may apply safeguards for up to one year, Peru 
up to two, with the possibility of extension for a further year. Costa Rica 
may apply safeguards for one year initially, but may extend them for a 
further three years. 
The customs cooperation agreement which Peru negotiated in 
parallel with the FTA is probably the most comprehensive arrangement 
China has entered into with another country. In the case of China and 
Chile, the customs agreement was negotiated in the framework of the 
FTA, which produced a lengthy delay in concluding the talks. In fact, the 
negotiations for a customs cooperation agreement between China and 
Chile began much earlier, in December 2005, in the context of the FTA, 
and were concluded on 13 November 2009. Under this agreement the 
parties must share official information that may be of use in combating 
illegal customs practices in trade between the two countries, such as 
undervaluation, triangulation and undercounting. 
Unlike the agreement between Chile and China, the FTA negotiations 
between Peru and China included services from the outset. The two 
countries adopted a positive list approach, in which each could include the 
services sectors in which it wished to undertake commitments. This is in 
contrast with Peru's FTAs both with the United States and with Chile, but 
similar to the Supplementary Agreement on Trade in Services of the Free 
Trade Agreement signed in 2008 by Chile and China, which also adopted 
a positive list approach. The lists of specific commitments on services in 
the FTA between China and Costa Rica, which form part of the chapter on 
investment, trade in services and temporary entry of business persons, are 
also drawn up on a positive list basis. In addition, the three agreements on 
services include the four modes of services supply included in GATS. 
China's list of specific commitments includes some services sectors 
that hold potential for Latin America and the Caribbean. China and 
Chile undertook commitments in their FTA beyond the WTO provisions, 
since China included 10 sectors (16 subsectors which were broader 
than or not included in the WTO list) and Chile offered 15 sectors.8 The 
8 China included 23 industries and subindustries including services relating to 
computers, management and consultancy, real estate, mining, environment, sports and 
air transport. Chile included 37 industries and subindustries in services areas relating to 
law, construction and design, engineering, computers, research, real estate, marketing, 
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sectors that could potentially benefit are professional and information 
technology services, mining and construction services, distribution, and 
environmental services (DIRECON, 2009). Financial services, air transport 
and maritime shipping are not included in the Supplementary Agreement. 
One of China's specific commitments to Peru in excess of those offered to 
Chile and those included under WTO is the elimination of barriers in the 
tourist services market. Chile and Peru committed in their agreement to 
conduct negotiations on professional services (acceptable standards for 
licences and certification of service providers) (Kuriyama, 2010). Another 
innovation in China's three agreements with Latin American countries is 
the chapter on temporary entry of business persons. 
The three FTAs establish a dispute settlement mechanism for 
conflicts arising in trade relations between the parties. China's three FTAs 
with Latin American countries are markedly similar in terms of scope of 
application, choice of forum, consultations, good offices, conciliation and 
mediation, establishment and composition of panels, suspension and 
termination of proceedings, report issuance and so forth. The agreements 
with Peru and Costa Rica also establish a broad scheme for settlement of 
investor-State disputes. Investment dispute provisions are particularly 
important because almost any complaint lodged by a Chinese investor 
against the State of Peru in international tribunals would necessarily be 
a complaint brought by the Chinese State itself, since most Chinese firms 
making direct investments abroad are still State-owned. 
The FTA between China and Chile has no specific chapter on 
intellectual property, although chapter III on national treatment and 
market access for goods contains two articles which refer to the subject 
(Article 10, on geographical indications, and Article 11, which makes 
reference to the protection of trademark or copyright goods) in conformity 
with the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs) and domestic legislation. Under Article 10, 
China included Shaoxing wine and Anxi Tie Guanyin tea on its list of 
geographical indications and Chile included Chilean pisco. The FTAs 
with Peru and Costa Rica cover geographical indications and trademarks 
in specific chapters. Peru's list of protected denominations of origin in 
the respective annex includes Cusco giant white corn, Peruvian pisco, 
Chulucanas pottery and lea pallar bean. In the FTA between China and 
Costa Rica, the respective article refers to two annexes containing the 
specific geographical indications in each country; China's list has 23 names 
and Costa Rica's, 10. The denominations of origin specified by Costa Rica 
include Costa Rican coffee, coffee from Tarrazú and Orosi, wood from 
Guanacaste, and Costa Rican banana. 
management and consultancy, mining, manufacture, leasing, education, environment, 
tourism, sports and air transport (IICA, 2009). 
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All three FTAs also contain a chapter on cooperation. The FTA 
between China and Chile refers to economic cooperation activities in such 
spheres as research, science and technology, education, culture, mining 
and industry, intellectual property, labour issues, environment issues and 
SMEs. China's FTAs with Peru and Costa Rica have similar provisions. 
Chile included fewer areas of cooperation than the other two countries, but 
with broader coverage. In research, science and technology, for example, 
the intension is to focus on sectors of shared and complementary interests, 
with an emphasis on ICTs. Activities will be promoted in postgraduate 
studies, research visits and the formation of public-private partnerships. 
With respect to SMEs, the two countries have expressed an interest in 
collaborating on the development of production chains, business clusters, 
technology transfer and new export SMEs. Through their Memorandum 
of Understanding on Labor and Social Security Cooperation and their 
Environmental Cooperation Agreement, Chile and China envisage several 
areas for cooperation on issues which Chile has already negotiated in its 
FTAs with the United States, Canada and the countries of the Trans-Pacific 
Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement.9 
4. Trade relations between China and Latin America 
and the Caribbean are mature and poised 
for a leap in quality 
The Asia-Pacific region offers great potential for trade and 
investment agreements in the areas of mining, energy, agriculture, 
infrastructure, science and technology It will require a concerned regional 
effort to take full advantage of these opportunities on a worthwhile scale, 
however. It will take, in fact, coordination by the Latin American and 
Caribbean region to present convergent, transparent and stable policies 
in order to secure long-term commitments between the two regions. The 
region's existing integration mechanisms must be strengthened to provide 
a regional counterpart for bi-regional dialogue with China and Asia-
Pacific and explore broader mutually beneficial initiatives than could be 
achieved through isolated national efforts. 
This is the time to map out a strategic link with China. China has 
formulated a foreign policy towards Latin America and the Caribbean, set 
forth in an official document which recognizes the potential of the region for 
comprehensive cooperation encompassing political and economic relations, 
9 The main areas for cooperation are: (i) labour policies and social dialogue, including 
decent work, labour legislation and labour inspection; (ii) improvement of labour 
conditions and training; and (iii) globalization and its impact on employment, the 
working environment, labour relations and regulations, and social security. 
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as well as social, cultural, legal and security matters.10 In the economic 
sphere specifically, the paper discusses the possibility of joint progress in a 
number of areas including trade, investment, finance, agriculture, industry, 
infrastructure, natural resources and energy, and tourism. 
Some Latin American countries are also making plans and 
taking actions to develop long-term strategic relations with China. 
These initiatives include Brazil's "China agenda", Chile's policy 
plan on China, Mexico's working group on China, the friendly 
partnership of common development forged between Jamaica and China, 
and a mechanism for policy consultations among the foreign ministries 
of the 21 countries in the region which maintain diplomatic relations with 
China (SELA, 2010), all of which see this link as a key external factor in 
their economic growth. 
In relation to business, discussions have taken place between the two 
regions on ways to strengthen strategic relations in the future. Since 2007, 
the China-Latin America Business Summit has convened on four occasions: 
in Santiago (Chile), Harbin (China), Bogota (Colombia) and Chengdu 
(China). From its first meeting in November 2007 in Santiago, the Business 
Summit has become a mechanism for regular high-level cooperation 
between Chinese and Latin American authorities, in close collaboration 
with several binational chambers of commerce from both continents. 
China and Latin America have also sought new modes of 
cooperation in the financial sphere in order to cushion the direct impact 
of the financial crisis. In 2009, the two parties instituted new kinds of 
financial cooperation that combined China's ample foreign reserves with 
Latin America's heavy demand for capital, including foreign-exchange 
swaps and loans in exchange for oil and for project financing. Landmarks 
included a swap of 70 billion yuan (US$ 10.2 billion) between Argentina 
and China in 2009, which enabled the Government of Argentina to pay 
for Chinese imports in yuan. This scheme was intended to expedite the 
settlement of trade transactions in the event of an international liquidity 
squeeze. China has set up similar arrangements with several Asian 
economies, including Indonesia, Malaysia and the Republic of Korea. 
These new forms of financial cooperation have boosted Chinese 
investments in Latin America and helped to integrate and deepen bilateral 
trade relations based on native advantages. In November 2009, the China 
Development Bank and the Brazilian State-owned oil company, Petrobras, 
The document mentions several guiding principles: mutual respect for territorial 
integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal 
affairs, equality and reciprocal benefit and peaceful coexistence. See "China's 
Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean" [online] http://english.gov.cn/ 
official /2008-11 / 05 / content_1140347.htm. 
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signed financing contracts for some US$ 10 billion in exchange for oil. 
China and Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela have joint development 
funds which have risen from US$ 6 billion to US$ 12 billion and the 
two countries have signed a loans-for-oil agreement; China also has a 
similar agreement with Ecuador worth US$ 1 billion. China has become 
the forty-eighth member of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 
and recently attended the Bank's annual meeting for the first time as an 
official member and participant in economic and financial cooperation in 
the Latin American region. IDB has, in effect, become a new platform for 
cooperation between China and Latin America. 
China attends to bilateral affairs with embassies in the capital cities 
of each of the 21 Latin American and Caribbean countries with which it 
maintains diplomatic relations. It also has six general consulates in Rio de 
Janeiro and Sao Paulo (Brazil), Santa Cruz (Plurinational State of Bolivia), 
Barranquilla (Colombia), Guayaquil (Ecuador) and Tijuana (Mexico). 
The Latin American and Caribbean region has various representations 
established in China, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of 
China and Taiwan Province of China: of the 21 countries mentioned, only 
15 have an embassy in Beijing. Each State in the region pursues its own 
bilateral policies with China, occasionally through links with another 
Latin American or Caribbean country. Mexico and many South American 
countries have at least one chamber of commerce, industry or business 
specializing in business with China, and virtually all of the governments 
in the region have set up institutions and instruments along the lines of 
bilateral inter-governmental commissions to develop cooperation with 
China (SELA, 2010). 
Yet efforts to build closer ties with the Asia-Pacific region have, for the 
most part, been sporadic and isolated. In the past few years, Chile, Mexico, 
Peru and several Central American countries have forged trans-Pacific 
trade agreements. These initiatives bear witness to the determination of 
some Latin American countries to establish long-term relations with Asia-
Pacific. But as yet there is no coordinated strategy between countries or 
groups of countries to strengthen trade and investment and productive 
and technological linkages through public-private partnerships with Asia-
Pacific. The first effort in that direction was the creation of the Forum of 
the Latin American Pacific Rim in 2007. 
Almost four years after it was created, the Forum of the Latin 
American Pacific Rim has made substantial progress in some areas, 
including recent advances in defining methods and modalities for 
negotiating an agreement on cumulation of origin, and the vigorous 
efforts of other working groups set up to develop a common agenda. 
The time appears to have come to give the initiative fresh impetus and 
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strengthen its identity as a group of countries pursuing an agenda of 
trade liberalization and investment facilitation, in order to secure a more 
advantageous position in the international economy (ECLAC, 2010b). 
China has shown great interest in strengthening its links with 
Panama. Among other matters, the Panama Canal is extremely important 
for China's trade with Atlantic ports, particularly in Argentina, Brazil, 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, and the east coast of the United States. 
China, too, needs closer ties with Latin America. With its burgeoning 
growth and industrial development of former rural areas, China has 
a growing need for infrastructure and energy which, together with its 
rising demand for food, represents a powerful motive for strengthening 
ties with Latin America's natural-resource exporters. China also needs to 
secure market entry for its exports on advantageous terms and recognition 
as a market economy: both aims which the President of China negotiated 
successfully in his visits to the region. And, lastly, China also wishes to 
amass a battery of trade agreements with Latin America that will secure 
preferential access for Chinese products and avert competitiveness losses 
arising from the region's bilateral agreements with the United States and — 
in view of the European Union's free trade negotiations with MERCOSUR 
and the Andean Community— with Europe. 
Naturally, the strategy of deepening and diversifying economic ties 
has a major political component. China is aware of its growing weight in 
the global economy and, just as the United States and the European Union 
are seeking to secure a strong presence in Asia, China wishes to build 
such a presence in Latin America. Although the rapprochement is not with 
South America alone, for a variety of historical reasons, China's relations 
with Central America and the Caribbean have been less fluid. But this is 
changing fast. Early in 2005, the Caribbean and Chinese foreign ministries 
held an important high-level meeting in the Caribbean and China became 
a full member of the Caribbean Development Bank (CARIBANK).11 
D. Conclusions and recommendations 
Unlike the pattern in Latin America and the Caribbean, in Asia-Pacific a 
de facto type of integration has traditionally prevailed, revolving around 
massive intraregional trade flows. These flows have been driven by growing 
productive and investment complementarities between the countries' 
manufacturing sectors. Asian integration has benefited from trade and 
investment facilities, the promotion of public-private partnerships for 
business development and the availability of low-cost labour. In the past few 
For further details on the closening ties between China and the Caribbean, see SELA (2010). 
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years, the Asia-Pacific region has moved towards a more advanced stage of 
integration, necessarily involving greater institutional structure. ASEAN 
has positioned itself as the axis for this process with a series of free trade 
initiatives with other Asian countries. With the web of FTAs now existing in 
Asia-Pacific, almost half of intra-Asian trade is conducted under some sort 
of preferential arrangement. For a number of reasons (especially to secure 
broader market access), Australia, China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea 
and Singapore, among other Asia-Pacific economies, have signed FTAs and 
forged strategic partnerships with Latin America, as well. 
De jure economic integration in Asia-Pacific has not been a single 
process; rather it has advanced along several paths and at different 
speeds. The impacts for the Latin American and Caribbean region of 
the proliferation of trade agreements in Asia-Pacific are hard to forecast 
and will depend, to a large extent, on the different trade liberalization 
constellations in the Asia-Pacific countries, ranging from the Free Trade 
Area of the Asia-Pacific proposed within the APEC forum, ASEAN+3 
and ASEAN+6, to possible combinations involving Asian countries and 
Oceania and trans-Pacific arrangements, including the broadening of the 
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement, some of whose 
members are Latin American. Estimates tend to confirm the assumption 
that the economic impacts of a regional-scope FTA in Asia would increase 
proportionally with the area of coverage. So an FTA in East and South-East 
Asia would bring its members more benefits than an FTA between China, 
Japan and the Republic of Korea. Whether a trans-Pacific initiative such 
as the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific or a broadened version of the 
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement can bear fruit also 
depends on the trade strategies adopted by the three main actors in Asia, 
especially China, and the strategy of the United States towards Asia-Pacific. 
The possible formation of an Asian trade bloc raises issues for 
Latin America and the Caribbean, as for other regions, inasmuch as 
it could intensify inward-looking tendencies in Asia. This is another 
reason to promote dialogue and to identify a shared agenda which can 
boost regional integration processes on both sides of the Pacific Rim and 
strengthen trans-Pacific linkages. Latin American governments must, 
as a matter of urgency, examine the possible routes open and take the 
respective decisions rapidly, efficiently and in a coordinated manner. 
The FTAs in place or under negotiation in Asia-Pacific vary in 
thematic coverage and breadth. Although they encompass behind-borders 
commitments, they are confined mainly to tariff reduction on goods and 
exclude a large number of sensitive products. Most FTAs in Asia contain 
inadequate coverage of the agricultural sector and vary greatly as to the 
timing of tariff reduction, lists of exemptions, rules of origin regimes 
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and implementation modalities. Many trade agreements signed by Asian 
countries also fail to sufficiently address the Singapore issues, since they 
lack WTO-plus coverage. So rules and disciplines need to be harmonized 
and converged before a broader free trade area can be created in Asia-
Pacific. A leap forward in this direction would raise FTA utilization rates 
among Asian firms, which have thus far been relatively low compared to 
those of other regions. 
A strategy for dialogue must take into account the great heterogeneity 
that exists within the Asian region, even within ASEAN. Given the 
heterogeneity within Asia and the Latin American and Caribbean region's 
varying importance as a trading partner for the different countries, it will 
be necessary to generate differentiated opportunities for dialogue and 
action, at least for the four main actors: China, Japan, Republic of Korea 
and ASEAN, without losing sight of the need to maintain a perspective on 
the region as a whole. 
The Latin American countries are also very heterogeneous and 
their connections with Asian economies vary in strength. Much flexibility 
will therefore need to be exercised in initiating contacts and negotiations, 
perhaps not necessarily including all the Asia-Pacific countries, but some 
individually. This is the case for China in particular. 
China has emerged from the crisis with a stronger productive, 
technological and financial base and with stronger links with Asia-Pacific. 
Its robust growth in the midst of a very complex international situation 
and its strengthened links with the other Asian economies are key to 
understanding the post-crisis scenario. In this connection, the entry into 
force on 1 January 2010 of the ASEAN-China free trade area is highly 
significant. This area holds a combined population of 1.9 billion and trade 
worth US$ 45 billion. By eliminating tariffs on the bulk of trade between 
China and the 10 ASEAN economies, this agreement may hurt several of 
Latin America's exports to China which compete with ASEAN products 
but do not enjoy the same tariff advantages. 
In order to improve economic ties with China, progress must be 
made on overcoming two major limitations: 
• Trade flows between the Latin American and Caribbean region 
and China today are almost exclusively inter-industrial. In 
other words, China sells manufactured goods to Latin America 
and the Caribbean, which sells mainly raw materials to China. 
This precludes a higher trade density, leaves less space for joint 
investments and hinders more effective integration of Latin 
American and Caribbean countries into Asia-Pacific production 
chains, which are increasingly intra-industrial; and 
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• The marked difference in productive and trade specialization 
conspires against greater reciprocal FDI and against productive, 
technological and trade partnerships. Progress in diversifying trade 
with China would also pave the way for stronger partnerships, 
reciprocal investments and more innovation- and technology-
intensive trade. 
The Latin American and Caribbean countries must take stock of the 
productive integration under way in Asia, centred on China, and try to join 
the value chains forming there. To this end, they must promote Chinese 
investment in Latin America and the Caribbean and vice versa, and 
foster partnerships between Latin American and Caribbean and Chinese 
businesses, emulating the Asian experience in productive integration 
around regional and subregional value chains. 
It is also possible to reduce the sharp asymmetry between growing 
trade flows and limited reciprocal investment. The main task here is for 
governments to craft a coordinated package of investment initiatives 
that is attractive to banks, firms and the Government of China. Chinese 
investment in infrastructure and energy projects would not only 
strengthen economic relations between the region and China, but would 
also generate positive externalities for Latin American regional integration. 
The infrastructure projects planned in the framework of the Initiative for 
the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America (URSA) and 
the Mesoamerica Project are natural candidates in this regard. 
Some issues remain in access to Asian markets. In Asia-Pacific high 
MFN tariffs apply to agricultural products and some natural-resource-
based manufactures, precisely those areas in which Latin America and the 
Caribbean has the greatest export interests and comparative advantages. 
The challenge for the region is therefore to position those exports which 
are subject to the highest levels of protection in Asian production and 
distribution chains. This means integrating more effectively into the 
China-centred productive and business networks growing up in Asia-
Pacific. The recent trend towards the consolidation of trade relations 
through trans-Pacific agreements should facilitate this, although 
substantial progress is needed at the same time in export diversification 
and regional integration. Indeed, regional integration is not only fully 
compatible with more aggressive incursion into Asian markets; it is also 
necessary for that incursion to be successful. 
Efforts to tighten ties with Asia-Pacific and with China in particular 
have been fairly sporadic and isolated, with the exception of the Forum of 
the Latin American Pacific Rim. This Forum has made progress in defining 
methods and modalities for negotiating an agreement on cumulation of 
origin and, through its working groups, in developing a common agenda 
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in other areas. The time appears to have come to give the initiative fresh 
impetus and strengthen its identity as a group of countries pursuing an 
agenda of trade liberalization and investment facilitation not only among 
the 11 member countries but looking towards Asia-Pacific as well. In 
particular, a more formal institutional structure will need to be developed 
if the Forum is to develop closer relations with Asia. 
The members of the Forum of the Latin American Pacific Rim could 
be in a position to produce a strategy on developing closer relations with 
China quite soon. To this end, the Latin American countries would need to 
hold some technical meetings and a summit of Heads of State in order to 
prepare a programme of trade and investment initiatives for strengthening 
the region's economic and trade relations with Asia-Pacific. The Forum 
of the Latin American Pacific Rim could thus become a representative 
interlocutor with Asia, starting with technical and political meetings 
with Asian countries, especially the ASEAN members. A more ambitious 
idea would be to promote trade and investment between the Pacific Rim 
countries by simplifying and harmonizing the rules of origin included in 
most of the FTAs between members, complemented with greater flexibility 
in cumulation of origin between the different agreements or even by 
negotiating a free trade area between the Pacific Rim and China. In such 
a venture, Chile, Costa Rica and Peru, the three Latin American countries 
having signed FTAs with China, should play a key role in coordinating 
positions and joint work in the different areas. 
Relations between China and Latin America and the Caribbean 
are ripe for a quality leap. The first decade of the new century witnessed 
a surge in trade relations between China and Latin America and the 
Caribbean. In just a few years, China has become a prominent and 
significant partner in the countries' trade and international positioning 
strategies. Relations are mature enough to take new steps towards a 
strategic and mutually beneficial link. The Latin American and Caribbean 
countries must redouble their efforts to diversify exports to China, embed 
value and knowledge into their products, promote business, trade and 
technology alliances with Chinese counterparts and encourage Latin 
American investment in China and in Asia-Pacific in order to boost the 
region's presence in Asian value chains structured around China. 
It is the right time to define, in a concerted manner, the priorities 
in the region's relations with Asia and to propose a strategic, mutually 
beneficial partnership. What seems to be most urgent is for governments in 
the region to frame a regional agenda on trade, investment, infrastructure, 
logistics, tourism and technology exchanges to form a basis for a strategic 
approach to China. This way, China's robust economic growth could help 
to induce a strong, steady —and more sustainable— pattern of innovation-
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based growth in the region that would have positive social impacts. China 
could use its substantial international reserves to back the investments 
suggested above and leverage its presence in regional multilateral banks 
to promote projects for upgrading the production, technological and 
export capacities of SMEs in Latin America and the Caribbean. It could 
also promote a more active programme of visits between universities 
and technology centres and more intensive dialogue between business 
organizations. This would help to explore and foster agendas of mutual 
interests and to anticipate and avert trade disputes through dialogue and 
the pursuit of shared benefits. 
Latin America and the Caribbean could respond quickly with a 
document setting out guidelines for a strategic approach to China. China 
has formulated a foreign policy towards Latin America and the Caribbean, 
set forth in a policy paper which recognizes the potential of the region for 
comprehensive cooperation encompassing political and economic relations, 
including trade, investment, finance, agriculture, industry, infrastructure, 
natural resources and energy, and tourism, as well as social, cultural, legal 
and security matters. The regional coordination needed to define a first 
response to China's Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean and 
set up the necessary technical working groups would lay the groundwork 
for preparing a summit of Heads of State of China and Latin America 
in the next few years. Such a meeting could produce a shared agenda of 
trade and investment projects that would attract Chinese investment to 
Latin America and the Caribbean and diversify the region's trade with 
China. This should be accomplished, of course, without losing sight of 
the central objective: first, to strengthen links between the countries on 
both the Pacific and Atlantic shores of the region itself and then, second, to 
strengthen ties between the whole region and Asia-Pacific. 
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China and Latin America and 
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The economies of China and of Latin America and the Caribbean —which 
will grow at double or triple the rate of the industrialized economies in the 
coming years— are becoming the contemporary poles of global growth, 
since the industrialized economies will be forced to adjust over the next 
few years to a context of slacker growth and higher unemployment. 
The present juncture in the international economy invites us to rethink 
global and regional partnership-building strategies and to afford  a greater 
importance to South-South ties in trade, foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and cooperation. 
This book examines recent developments in trade between China and 
Latin America and the Caribbean in terms of countries, sectors and 
products, as well as Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in the region. 
ECLAC argues that relations between China and the Latin American and 
Caribbean region are mature enough to sustain a leap in quality and to 
move towards developing strategic ties that can benefit both. 
This scenario raises both opportunities and challenges, includingthe need 
to forge trade relations more in keeping with the patterns of economic 
and social development which Latin America and the Caribbean is 
striving to achieve. 
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